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Abstract: The thesis focuses on Judicial Review of Legislation, exploring—with 
the aid of Robert Brandom’s inferential semantics—the possibility of engaging in a 
properly judicial assessment of the constitutionality of a law. In order to do this, and 
after criticising the proportionality approach to the subject, it addresses both the 
nature of the question that is put forward in cases of review of legislation and the 
essential features of adjudicative decisions, claiming that the conjunction of these 
two aspects leads to the configuration of a dilemma: the question asked in judicial 
review of legislation cases does not seem to be judicially answered. Resorting to 
inferential semantics, the thesis aims to provide a solution to the dilemma and to 
make explicit the costs of staying within judicial boundaries. 
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The legitimacy of judicial review rests on a promise, one that lies on the grounds of 
constitutionalism itself: that we, as a collective, can better develop our communal 
life by binding politics to law. This binding does not need to be understood in terms 
of an opposition between law and politics . The constitution can be seen as the 1
structure that allows political decisions to be made in the first place, working as its 
vehicle. But what serves to constitute a common will, to substantiate sovereignty, 
also—and by those same facilitating structures—establishes limits given by the very 
rules that serve to provide the institutional framework within which political 
participation and decision making takes place : the legal form can only 2
institutionalise , and therefore, facilitate political communication if those forms 3
constrain. 
!
In its simplest formulation, this promise can be translated into the idea of 
establishing legal limits to what can be politically decided , even if these are limits 4
that serve to carve the space in which politics can arise . They can be understood as 5
constituted by the reasonability of a given decision  or can be grandiloquently 6
presented as a way to prevent a majority from ‘destroying the greatest historical 
achievements’ of the people , thus imposing constraints on the political practice . 7 8
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 Opposition aptly characterised in Loughlin’s notion of ‘the straitjacket of law’, in (2000), 5. This idea is 1
explored in Tomkins (2005), 11 ff.
 Christodoulidis (1998). The general paradox configured by the tension between a power that arises from 2
The People, but that has to be constrained by institutional forms in order to be effective—Loughlin & Walker 
(2008); or between Self-Rule and Law-Rule—Michelman (1988), 1499.
 Habermas (1996), 458.3
 Klarman (1992), 796; Waluchow (2007), 27; Laws (1995), 73; Tushnet (2008), 19.4
 Habermas (1996), 151. Similarly, the limits can be understood in terms of securing that the legislative 5
debate is performed respecting the constitutional conditions that make the law-making practice one that lives-
up to the standards set by the constitution, filtering ‘naked preferences’ and thus allowing the identification of 
a public value (Sunstein (1986), 1133; (1985), 63); or as protections aimed at preventing politically engaged 
citizens from self-enclosing tendencies that would impede reconciling self-rule with law rule— Michelmann 
(1988), 1532. 
 Möller (2012b), 122, 178; Kumm (2010), 157-63.6
 Ackerman (2007), 1806: the Supreme Court is there to protect previous constitutional achievements attained 7
on the back of political moments of serious mass mobilisation, and to judicially acknowledge when one of 
those rare moments capable of amending the constitution outside the scope of Art. V have taken place—
Ackerman (1984), 1030-46.
 Ackerman (1991), 296.8
Regardless of its conceptualisation, the notion of legal limits to politics should seem 
to be particularly attractive and easy to understand for anyone who regularly 
engages in legal affairs; after all, is it not its capacity to bound and restrict the 
decisions of those who are its subjects, a palpable feature of law? There is an 
obvious—but not trivial—way in which the law constrains what its addressees can 
do: the fact that some particular ways of acting are proscribed by law, reduces the 
space of action that is left for the subjects to decide what activities they can engage 
in. And it is not only forms of behaviour of individuals that are taken outside the 
realm of what is legally acceptable, but the restriction also works vis-à-vis 
collective subjects: just as the law constrains my individual decision regarding how 
fast I  drive my car or how I must  treat somebody else´s property, it constrains the 
decisions taken by the directives of certain companies regarding what information 
must be included in their reports to the authority, and it also constrains a group of 
workers that are legally impeded to engage in certain forms of collective-industrial 
action against their employers. And if we keep an eye on our bound workers, we 
can immediately notice one of law’s most conspicuous means by which it fulfils this 
function: by vesting rights. For it is the property right of the owner of capital on the 
means of production  what gives rise to the correlative prohibition, directed to his 9
workers, to disrupt the ordinary operation of his factory. When it comes to the 
relation between law and politics, constitutional rights make this bivalence between 
facilitation and constraintment most patent. For even if they are not explicitly 
defended as limits to what can be politically decided , but are understood as tools 10
to overcome limitations of the political process , they fix boundaries to what can 11
count as a valid piece of legislation. 
!
Looking at the constitutional scenario, we can see how simple the realisation of the 
promise from which we depart might seem: if we grant legal/constitutional rights, 
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 It is worth noting that property over means of production is not considered by Rawls as as basic liberty—9
(1999), 54. A remarkable contribution regarding the special position of property as a right, is found in Julius 
(2017).
 Dworkin (1978) and (1996); and similarly Rawls (1993), Lecture V.10
 Ely (1978), 453; Habermas (1996), 80.11
then they can work as boundaries to what politics can decide and do. In this way, 
the constitutional framework works both as a vehicle of politics that enables the 
different political points of view to express themselves in the constitutionally 
configured arena, and also as a limit to what can count as the outcome of the 
political process : just as our fellow workers, who can freely engage in any form of 12
industrial-collective action, except—of course—from the kind of action that the law 
deems forbidden; in politics all decisions are possible, all but those that the law—by 
means of constitutional rights—appraises as unconstitutional. This is the promise 
that Judicial Review of Legislation aims to honour, that legislated law cannot 
contradict constitutional rights, attempting to fulfil ‘the modern constitutionalist aim 
of securing, by judicially enforced higher law, individual rights against political 
oppression . 13
!
So now, in the same way that labour judges have to decide when a particular action 
of a group of workers infringes the property rights of the owner of a factory, the 
Constitutional Courts are supposed to decide when a piece of legislation infringes 
the constitutional rights that fix the limits of what is constitutionally permitted, and 
they are supposed to enforce these constitutional boundaries by means of a judicial 
decision —it is an adjudicative moment assessing a legislative one. 14
 
Against this understanding of Judicial Review of Legislation, I will argue that the 
operation it demands of the Court is impossible, that there can be no properly 
Judicial  Review of Legislation. The reasons for this impossibility will rest on two 
considerations, one regarding the nature of the question that is asked in Review of 
Legislation cases and another regarding the proper characterisation of judicial 
decisions. I will argue that these two aspects cannot be reconciled. I will claim that 
the appropriate understanding of Review of Legislation (as opposed to Review of 
Application) is one in which what is at stake is the validity of a piece of legislation 
 9
 Leubsdorf (1987), 193-4.12
 Michelman (1988), 1493. It prevents ‘law from being eroded by the legislation of transient majorities’—13
Rawls (1993), 233.
 Tushnet (2008), 22.14
that depends on the semantic inferential relations between the intensions of the legal 
and constitutional provisions at issue, and that this relation is not something that can 
be judicially assessed. To justify this, I will argue that the judicial moment is 
characterised by the challenge of correlating a legal rule with an extensional 
fragment of the world, an ‘observational’ challenge that is absent in Review of 
Legislation. And since this ‘observational’ dimension is missing when it comes to 
the question about the validity of a legislated rule, a decision about a law’s validity 
cannot constitute an instance of adjudication.  
!
If this is correct, then the Court is in a complicated position, because despite this 
dissonance between the intensional question of validity that is put forward in 
Review of Legislation and the extensional dimension that characterises judicial 
answers, it still has to decide—and it has to do it with judicial tools: Review of 
Legislation, I will claim, puts the court in the dilemma of having to employ judicial 
means in order to answer a non-judicial question.  
!
Tackling the dilemma requires to identify these means. To do this I will turn to 
Robert Brandom’s inferential semantics in order to explain how the extensional 
dimension of adjudication is structurally expressed in a particular distribution of 
entitlements to assertions, to premises that can ground the judicial justification of a 
decision. Exploring this distribution will make patent the specially poignant 
position of the court: inferential semantics will allow me to show how the lack of an 
extensional dimension in Review of Legislation cases entails a profound curtailment 
of entitlements to assertions that could justify the court’s ruling —it entails, that is, 
a deficit of premises in which to ground the decision. But Brandom’s philosophy of 
language will also allow me to show how the Court can address the constitutional 
question of validity despite the curtailment of premises effected by the pure 
intensionality that characterises the assessment of validity. Overcoming this 
dissonance between question and answer, however, comes at a cost of the rationality 
of the process itself: I will argue that deciding these constitutional questions as a 
 10
judge entails a degradation of meaning that impedes giving an appropriate, rational 
consideration to the constitutional problems that are taken to the judicial arena. 
!
One final comment before explaining the order in which I will proceed. I will be 
claiming that Constitutional Courts are not entitled to some crucial premises when 
deciding on the constitutionality of a law, being therefore profoundly deprived of 
reasons to put forward in their justifications and forced to consider only some 
‘secured’ inferential relations between the contents of the rules at issue. But this 
does not entail a restrictive approach to adjudication in general: as I will argue, it is 
only the special position in which the court finds itself on Review of Legislation 
cases what determines that a strictly judicial decision has to be restricted to a 
minimalistic inferential semantic analysis. On the other hand, the fact that ordinary 
judges deal with concrete fragments of the world determines that they have at their 
disposal premises that are unavailable for the constitutional court.  
!
The first chapter of the thesis deals with the proportionality approach to Judicial 
Review. There I will criticise proportionality as an adequate tool to tackle 
constitutional cases, and, by doing this, I will identify some key elements of the 
alternative theory that I will be proposing in the following chapters: first, I will 
claim that the way in which proportionality casts constitutional queries is one that 
cannot address the conflict as one between incompatible or straightforwardly 
contradictory claims; against this, and from the second chapter onwards, I will 
argue that the notion of contradiction is to be placed at the centre of the 
constitutional analysis, that unconstitutionality is to be understood precisely as a 
relation of incompatibility or normative contradiction between legal and 
constitutional provisions. Resting on the labour cases Viking and Laval, the second 
objection claims that the decision reached through proportionality is not constrained 
by the constitutional provisions the Court claims to be applying, hinging instead on 
premises that are not legally established which work to the direct the detriment of 
the worker’s collective rights. In proportionality, I will argue, the Court is not bound 
to the Constitution—and the third chapter will address how bounding to law 
 11
corresponds to a fundamental feature that serves to characterise a properly judicial 
decision. Finally, I will argue that proportionality blurs the difference between 
assessing the constitutionality of a law and assessing the constitutionality of an 
action by assuming that these problems can be adjudicated in a similar way. The 
second chapter will explain why this difference is crucial.  
!
The aim of this second chapter is to distinguish between Judicial Review of 
Legislation and Judicial Review of Application. By doing this, I will attack what I 
will call the conflated approach to Judicial Review, according to which both in the 
American and European models of Judicial Review the Constitutional Courts are 
supposed to perform the same function under different procedural conditions. 
Against this, I will defend that while on the European model the courts have to 
decide on the validity of a rule in consideration to its relation with one or more 
constitutional provisions, on the American system what is to be analysed is the 
constitutionality of a concrete application of a piece of legislation. To ground this 
distinction, I turn to the difference between extensional normative conflicts, which 
cannot lead to the loss of validity of one of the conflicting rules, and intensional 
normative contradictions, which can. I will argue that recognising this difference is 
crucial to maintain the distinction between validity and applicability as two related, 
but different properties. This will allow me to characterise the validity problem 
presented in cases of Review of Legislation as one that depends on the semantic 
relations between the rules at issue. 
!
Having established the nature of the question that the court has to face in cases of 
Review of Legislation, the third chapter will attempt to identify what can count as a 
properly judicial answer. Here I will not try to present a full theory of adjudication, 
but only to identify an essential feature of it, one that is absent in Review of 
Legislation cases. I will claim that the judicial moment is characterised by the 
particularity void, by the distance between the intensional nature of a rule whose 
application is at issue and the extensionality of the concrete fragment of the world 
that serves as the object of adjudication. To cross this void, I will claim that the 
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judge has to engage in an application discourse in order to legitimise her decision. 
With recourse to Wilfrid Sellars’ work on different patterns of linguistic activity, 
these considerations will allow me to model the judge’s position into that of an 
‘observer’, of a subject that must attempt to perform a ‘language-entry transition’ 
that connects the non-linguistic world with language. I will argue that without the 
possibility of grounding the decision in ‘observation’—without void, and therefore, 
without application discourse—a decision cannot be a judicial one even if it is 
validly adopted by a court within the scope of its legal powers. And that is precisely 
the problem that arises with Review of Legislation: the inferential relations that 
determine the validity of the rule at issue cannot be the object of ‘language-entry 
transitions’, they cannot be observed because they correspond to a different type of 
linguistic activity and so a judicial assessment of them is unavailable. 
!
The fourth chapter deals with the need to employ judicial tools to answer to a non-
judicial question. To do this I will first examine Brandom’s inferential semantics, 
attempting to provide a sufficiently comprehensive exposition of the way in which 
his work explains meaning in terms of a net of commitments and entitlements, to 
assertions and substitutions, that participants attribute and acknowledge as 
consequence of claiming something. I will explain how meaning arises in the 
practice of giving and asking for reasons, so it stands in an intrinsic relation of co-
determination with reasoning itself. After this exposition, the crucial step will 
consist in employing Brandom’s devices to identify the responsibility that a Court 
would undertake by declaring the unconstitutionality of a piece of legislation and 
the means by which it can vindicate it. This will allow me to examine to what extent 
the court can live up to the commitments entailed by its decision without 
overstepping the margins that define the judicial moment, and the costs—both in 










Constitutional rights set the limits of legislative decisions and Judicial Review 
corresponds to the procedure by which they are enforced. It is at this moment of 
enforcement when proportionality enters the picture, dominating contemporary 
constitutional rights law . Constitutional rights, we are told, do not work as regular 15
legal provisions, they—the constituents of the legal limits to politics—are not to be 
understood as norms but as principles , and because of the way principles are 16
conceived—as optimisation requirements—proportionality analysis is not only an 
alternative, but in fact required in order to assess if a piece of legislation ‘infringes’ 
them . In this scheme, proportionality is presented as the structure that allows the 17
Constitutional Court to decide, in a rational way, when certain political decisions 
infringe the constitutional rights that mark the legal boundaries of the political, 
securing the restraint of politics to the domain of law. 
!
Therefore, both proportionality in general, and balancing in particular, burst into the 
constitutional discussion offering a structure for rational argumentation, one in 
which the different interests and values involved in the constitutional debate can be 
appropriately assessed and evaluated  against one another. In this way, 
proportionality seeks to assure that the outcome regarding the possible infringement 
of the constitutional limits to politics is decided in the light of a rational balance 
between the opposing principles. While constitutionalism is compromised to bind 
politics to law, proportionality is compromised to offer an adequate structure to 
enforce this binding—it is supposed to allow the assessment of whether or not a law 
has infringed constitutional limits, and is supposed to do that by means of offering a 
rational structure that allows for an appropriate consideration of the relevant 
 14
 Möller (2012), 13; Beatty (2004), 160; Webber (2009), 87 and with further references.15
 Alexy, (2002), 388.16
 Alexy (2014), 52. As Schmitt points out, ‘there can be no adjudication of a norm over another norms’—17
(2015), 112. Two norms can stand in a relation of contradiction, but one does not infringe the other.
principles affected by the decision. This is, proportionality promises, at least (i) that 
we can use it to enforce the constitutional limits to legislative decisions and (ii) that 
the process of enforcement thus carried out is one that responds appropriately and 
rationally to the constitutional values at stake. 
!
In this Chapter I will tackle these promises and thus present two objections to 
proportionality . First, I will claim that proportionality cannot but distort the claims 18
involved in constitutional debates (1). I will do this by characterising 
proportionality as a second level matrix of analysis (1.1) that prevents the claims to 
be understood as standing in an unbalanceable relation of proper contradiction (1.2). 
After this, I will claim that proportionality cannot serve as a mechanism to enforce 
constitutional constraints (2), for it structures the constitutional problems in terms of 
questions whose answers are not available in the constitution (2.1). Laval and 
Viking will serve as examples of how this detachment from the constitution works 
both to safeguard neo-liberal interests and to conceal such affront by presenting it as 
a legal decision, despite the fact that its pivoting arguments do not arise from the 
constitution (2.2). 
!
1. Distorting the claims 
!
Let’s start by looking at the possibility that proportionality offers to balance the 
relevant constitutional interest on a rational way. We are told that an interference 
with a constitutional right is justified as long as there is a balance between the 
values affected by it and the ones that it favours. Proportionality, after all, is not 
there to replace legal and moral argumentation, but it aims to provide the 
appropriate structure to rationally engage in that legal and moral assessment. 
According to this structure, proportionality operates through a three-step 
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 Urbina (2017) presents somewhat similar objections to proportionality, but against what is suggested here, 18
he argues that these two problems relate to two different accounts of proportionality—Part I and II 
respectively.
sequence : on a first level, the suitability of the measure is examined; this is, if it 19
actually aims toward a legitimate goal. This means that a measure that interferes 
with a fundamental right can only be deemed constitutional if it promotes a 
legitimate aim. On a second level, the necessity of the measure is assessed, and so 
now what is questioned is whether or not such an aim can be achieved by means of 
a less intrusive measure. Finally, as a third step, the judge must engage on a strict 
analysis of proportionality, which corresponds to the process of balancing. 
!
Operating through this structure, judicial review is seen as a process that, unlike the 
ordinary and democratic process of decision making, ensures that the solutions that 
are reached by the courts are rationally justified , that their decisions will give 20
adequate consideration to all the relevant interests. And in proportionality, that 
adequate consideration calls for the assignation of values to the conflicting 
principles. 
!
The values involved in the constitutional dispute, the balance of which defines the 
limits between prima facie and definitive infringement of rights, are supposed to 
enter into the rational structure of the balancing process in order to be weighted one 
to the other . This way, only to the extent that the degree of non-satisfaction of one 21
principle is proportional to (or matched by ) the degree of satisfaction of the other, 22
the infringement of the constitutional right at stake is justified . And the way of 23
assessing the proportionality between the opposed principles requires assigning 
value to both the principles involved and to the degree of satisfaction and non-
satisfaction that is effected by the measure whose constitutionality is under 
evaluation. 
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 Alexy (2014), 52; Möller (2012a), 711. A fourth operation that addresses the existence of a legitimate aim 19
is distinguished in some versions of the test—Kumm (2004), 579 ff.;  Klatt & Meister (2012), 8; Urbina 
(2017), 5; 
 Courts would be immunised from the ordinary political pressure, Kumm (2010), 154. In a similar sense: 20
Rawls (1993), 216; Dworkin (1997), 30.
 Alexy (2002), 67.21
 Rivers (2006), 177.22
 Alexy (2002), 102.23
1.1. Proportionality as a second-level structure 
 
Proportionality, thus understood, corresponds to a test that provides the Court with a 
structure within which constitutional reasons and considerations are addressed 
through its staggered sequence evaluations. This relation between the structure of 
proportionality and the constitutional reasons that are assessed in it, allows to 
characterise proportionality as a second-level structure for the operationalisation of 
reasons. The most sophisticated endorsement of  this model has been put forward by 
George Pavlakos in order to defend proportionality as a suitable candidate to deal 
with deontological reasons . His argument models the analysis of proportionality 24
on the structure of autonomy, which in turn provides the background that makes the 
practice of practical reasoning possible in the first place. Within this practice, 
deontological constrains do not work as fixed points in the moral space, they are not 
canonic propositions with a defined meaning that prescribe particular courses of 
action, since their extension and intensity are in need of determination for each 
concrete case . As Pavlakos argues, the internal point of view of an agent 25
reconstructs all relevant reasons within the practical reasoning process, vindicating 
each from his reflexive point of view. And this point is reflexive for it operates on 
two levels: on the one hand, the agent has his first order reasons and they will 
usually be in tension, but on a higher level, he can make those reasons the object of 
his thought, achieving the capacity to scrutinise them in the light of considerations 
that are not external to the very practice of practical reasoning. Harry Frankfurt’s 
example of an unwilling addict  serves to explain the point: this is a man that wants 26
to use his drugs, but that can also reflect on that desire and form a second order 
volition—he doesn’t want to want to use his drugs. While at the first level he has 
conflicting desires, at the second level he wants his desire not to take drugs to 
determine his conduct. Second level volitions, the capacity to reflect on first level 
 17
 Kumm and Walen attempt to defend proportionality from this charge, in Kumm & Walen (2014).24
 Pavlakos (2011), 132.25
 Frankfurt (1971).26
desires, are what characterises a person, so the key issue is the capability of 
thematising one’s own desires by means of a reflection that has them as its object. 
!
So, it is on the second level that the tension between reasons is resolved through a 
process of deliberation that, by assigning concrete meaning to conflicting reasons, 
ensures a coherent, yet provisional outcome. Here is where deontological and 
teleological arguments gain force by being attached to the practice of practical 
reasoning: ‘This level stands for our capacity to take a reflective stance vis-à-vis our 
reasons, it allows us, in other words, to reflect on how we reflect’ . Second level 27
propositions are not substantive, the do not directly guide action, but constitute the 
scheme that rationally relates facts with the agent’s thoughts, they constitute the 
background that enables us to represent the first order propositions as normative, 
substantive reasons —‘reasons do not exist in a pure form independently of a 28
reflective practice, but are constitutively dependent on it’ : something counts as a 29
reason if, submitted to the reflective capacity of an agent, it provides a justified 
solution to a practical problem . 30
!
Having identified some facts as reasons, they then need to be coherently maximised, 
and so from the same reflexive point of view their extension and intensity has to be 
decided. To do this, the reflexive structure of autonomy yields a general principle 
that enjoys the status of a rational truth: only principles for action that all 
deliberative agents should accept as reasons for actions are valid. And it is in the 
light of such Kantian regulative principle, specified by means of rules that regulate 
practical reasoning, that it is ‘possible to assign values to the various conflicting 
first-order reasons that call for optimisation in any particular context of action’ . 31
!
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 Pavlakos (2011), 149.27
 Pavlakos (2015), 280, 29228
 Pavlakos (2011), 150.29
 Pavlakos (2009), 79.30
 Pavlakos (2011), 151.31
In this reading, the process of balancing corresponds to the second-level 
thematisation of first-level reasons. The ‘measure for the correct balancing’, in 
Pavlakos account, is derived from the second order reflection that characterises 
practical reasoning: balancing formula is understood as an expression of such two-
level structure by ‘preserving the primacy of practical reasoning over teleology and 
deontology’ . Just as in our ordinary practical reasoning we distinguish between 32
first-level teleological and deontological reasons that are in tension, on the one 
hand, and a second-level structure through which they are coherently maximised, on 
the other; with proportionality analysis we find the same two levels at work: 
conflicting first-level teleological and deontological constitutional considerations, 
and a second-level proportionality test that allows to address them. Therefore, 
constitutional rights reasoning as proposed by Robert Alexy ‘is a species of rational 
practical reasoning’ : by engaging in proportionality analysis the judge is not doing 33
anything substantially different from what all rational agents do when they have to 
make practical decision on which different kinds of reasons are relevant, and if we 
can operate all the time with deontological reasons, then so can the judge. 
!
If this is a brief but still adequate description of proportionality, then the rationality 
of the process itself hinges on the possibility that this kind of analysis is actually 
appropriate to assess the values that enter into the balancing process thus 
configured. That is, the key issue at stake is whether or not the matrix of analysis 
that is presented by proportionality can give a fitting account of the principles 
involved and the relation between them. And the problem immediately arises once 
one accepts the possibility of a discrepancy between the structure of proportionality 
and the nature of either the values to be assessed or the relation between them. 
!
In what follows I will try to elaborate on this idea and propose a critique of 
proportionality that is similar but not exactly the same as the more mainstream 
objection to it. According to this usual challenge, the problem of proportionality lies 
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on the fact that since it can only operate by ascribing discrete values to all the 
principles to be balanced, proportionality necessarily understands all the rights 
involved on the analysis as commensurable rights; that is, as rights for which it is 
possible to predicate a concrete weight. The idea of balancing, in order to maximise, 
seems to entail that rights are in a way equivalent to profit: 'optimisation', in an 
economic context, 'has a clear meaning because it is obvious what one is 
optimising, namely, profit' . What this understanding impedes, according to the 34
mainstream objection, is to make sense of rights as something incommensurable . 35
And of course, if some rights or principles are actually incommensurable, then 
translating them into the language of proportionality, assigning them a value to be 
balanced against another, constitutes a distortion of such right. And this connects to 
another critique which asserts that reasoning with rights by means of balancing their 
weights prevents such rights from actually working as they should, that is, as 
firewalls. The problem with Alexy’s approach, then, would lie in the fact that he is 
assimilating principles with values, and therefore disregarding the distinction 
between the deontological sense of the former and the teleological sense of the 
latter . Understanding rights on this consequentialist manner, they are wrongly 36
conceptualised as the kind of thing to which a given weight can be predicated; and 
because of that, they run the risk of being defeated if under some circumstances the 
opposing weight turns out to be higher: it would be part and parcel of understanding 
rights this way that they can be overcome, so the critique is also based on the idea 
that submitting rights to the structures of proportionality necessarily distorts them, 
preventing us from seeing them for what they really are: incommensurable firewalls 
against certain decisions. 
!
Aligned with this, I will claim that proportionality entails a distorting effect, one 
that misconstrues the possible relations between the rights at issue by excluding the 
alternative of understanding them as standing in an unbalanceable relation of 
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contradiction . To better understand this problem, it is useful to think of 37
proportionality as a particular grammar. In this context, grammars are to be 
understood as networks of discriminations  that define the set of possible 38
descriptions of an object, or—since the world is not the totality of things—of 
facts . Because of this, grammars cannot be tested against facts or empirical 39
evidence; we cannot choose a grammar in consideration to the facts it picks vis-à-
vis another: the difference between them is not that they pick up different objects or 
events, but that they define that different descriptions of those events are acceptable, 
and by that they establish the frame within which something may count as a fact in 
the first place . A grammar, then, provides the framework through which the world 40
is thematised in a process that attributes meaning to it in accordance to the 
categories that constitute such grammar in the first place. 
!
Being this the case, every meaningful account of the world supposes that what is 
being thematised in a meaningful way has been reduced to the grammatical 
structures that are operating in such ascription of meaning. Therefore, each 
grammar not only provides a structure that makes meaning possible, but by those 
same means hinders the possibilities of different meanings—such reduction is the 
price of sense. This does not mean that a different meaning cannot be provided, but 
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only that within each grammar the scope of what is and, even, can be meaningful is 
restricted by the structural categories that constitute it. 
!
In this way, having more than just one grammar synchronically operating opens a 
prospect, that of moving from one grammar to another, and with that, attaining a 
shift from one form of understanding to a different one—multiple grammars allow 
alternative senses of a same extension. This movement corresponds to what is 
called 'aspect change' , a concept that Aletta Norval takes from Wittgenstein and 41
tries to use as equivalent to Rancière’s 'opening up the space where an argument 
may be heard in the first instance'. The idea is that this change allows us to 
challenge the way in which a political hegemony thematises certain problems: being 
hegemonic, the sense that is attached to a phenomenon is decontested, so its 
surrounding concepts are limited in a particular way, constraining their political 
use . The hegemonic grammar can therefore be characterised as the grammar of 42
perception: continuous aspect perception is automatic, we describe an event without 
being aware of other possible interpretations, focusing on the readiness to hand of 
the correct form of description . Aspect change occurs when one realises that a new 43
kind of characterisation of a situation may be given, and by seeing it in those new 
terms a shift in perspective that establishes different relations between objects is 
effected. The change allows one to step 'beyond the guidance of grammar' without, 
however, 'giving up on intelligibility' , since the break introduced is one that is not 44
so radical as to no longer make sense to the subject. It is not a change that denies 
everything that came before, but one that depends of the previous steps and re-
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1.2. No contradiction 
!
Once we look at proportionality as  grammar, we notice that in order for it to work, 
the principles and relations among them that are the object of analysis must be 
constructed, by the structures of the proportionality test, in a way that is 
comprehensible to proportionality itself. Everything that enters into the 
proportionality analysis can only do it by being reduced to the categories through 
which proportionality operates, and this is where the reduction of possibilities that 
facilitates the attribution of meaning expresses itself as a price in reflexivity, for the 
obvious meaning that cannot be attained within a scheme of interpretation is one 
that questions that same scheme of interpretation: if the meaning of an act within a 
scheme were to question it, then that would spell meaninglessness, and that would 
impede it to question the scheme in the first place. This means that within 
proportionality, the categories that structure the operation of the analysis cannot be 
contested; and because of that, if we have a right whose point is precisely to deny 
that a relation of proportionality between rights is to be established, then such right 
cannot be accommodated as such within the proportionality analysis. Such 
contestation can never express itself within proportionality, it has to remain outside, 
invisible to the constitutional problem. 
!
Once proportionality is working, then, the principles involved are understood as 
principles whose value is not denied by the very act of balancing one against the 
other, so it is understood from the get-go that a relation of proportionality between 
them is appropriate and rational. In this way, workers’ rights to collective-industrial 
action is to be extended up to the point that it doesn’t disproportionally affect the 
opposing property rights of the owner of the means of production. But that implies 
that under this scheme each right is characterised as one that is not supposed to 
abolish the other. Otherwise, if it is recognised that the whole point of the right is to 
disproportionally affect the opposing one, then it would be irrational to submit the 
determination of its extension to the condition that its exercise does not 
disproportionally infringe the right that it is supposed to overwhelm. In other words, 
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proportionality could not claim to be a rational way of dealing with the conflict if it 
doesn't assume that the conflict is one whose appropriate solution is defined by a 
balance between the opposing principles. 
!
And this is what has to be problematised by noting that from a different perspective 
it is possible to make sense of the relation between the rights involved as one that 
contradicts the way in which proportionality construes such relations. Once we 
depart from proportionality, we can claim that what is worthy in one right on a 
certain context—the idea that justifies and grounds it—can be understood as 
something that is defeated by the very act of balancing such right against the 
opposing principle: suppose that what is valuable of a certain right is that it 
constitutes an achievement in the fight against some forms of oppression, so its 
purpose is to work as an instrument of emancipation by means of annulling legal 
rights that allow one group to exploit another; if that is the case, then just by 
entering the terrain of proportionality such emancipatory right is denied its value. 
!
Let me try to make the point clearer: using proportionality we could understand that 
a couple of principles are in such a relation that one weighs infinitely more than the 
other, and so the heavier will always necessarily defeat the lighter. But the only way 
in which such defeat can take place, within proportionality, is by putting them both 
on the same scale. What this approach does not see is that the very act of 
considering both principles could negate the value of one of them. What I could be 
claiming is not that a certain right weighs more than the opposing one, but that my 
right is there to exclude the other from consideration, that my right contradicts or is 
incompatible with the other, so it is affected by the very act of weighing it against 
the latter. And the possibility of the court facing contradictory claims is palpable 
once its position is contrasted to the structure of autonomy in which Pavlakos 
models it: while a subject that engages in the practical reasoning process cannot be 
entitled to contradictory claims, the court has to deal with claims endorsed by 
different subjects, and they can contradict each other: at the same time that I can go 
to the Court and claim I am the owner of some extension of land and therefore the 
 24
State cannot take it without compensation, the State can claim that I am not the 
owner, so no compensation is required; and then, how is the court to proceed? The 
same agent is not entitled to endorse them since they are not just in tension, but they 
are contradictory claims, but they nevertheless can be simultaneously presented to 
the Court, and then the alternative of maximising one on a proportional relation to 
the other is no longer available, since there is no single scale that can deal with both 
contradictory propositions. Therefore, the Court can only decide by rejecting or 
changing one of the claims so the contradiction ceases and is replaced by a simple 
tension. 
!
And if we stay with the parallel between proportionality and practical reasoning, we 
will notice a second way in which proportionality restricts the possibilities of 
thematising constitutional claims: if the structures of proportionality are just as 
flexible as the ones of ordinary practical reasoning, then proportionality as a theory 
would not be telling us much, it would just be repeating that given a certain problem 
all relevant reasons are to be considered as they are normally considered by 
reflexive rational agents. On the contrary, if the idea is that by means of 
proportionality, practical reasoning adopts a structure that is not identical to the 
ordinary thematisation of reasons, then, within the proportionality test, the first 
order reasons will not be in position to be considered with as much openness as 
within the general practice of practical reasoning. This is the predicament I fear we 
segue into: for proportionality to make a difference, its structures must constrain the 
operation of first level reasons in a way that is not defined by the general practice of 
practical reasoning. And this problem can be taken one step further by asking about 
the degree of reflexivity that proportionality can accommodate in comparison to 
ordinary practical reasoning. According to Pavlakos’ model, at the second level two 
things occur: moral propositions of the first level are the object of our reflexion and 
from this reflexion we obtain other moral propositions about the relevant properties 
that make something a concrete reason. Now, my question is to what extent is it 
possible, within the ordinary practical reasoning, to move the location of one moral 
proposition among the different levels. Can the position of a reason be disputed, so 
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the agent can start considering a certain reason as one to be weighed by a second 
order analysis and then reconstruct his scheme of practical reasoning in a way that 
what used to be a first level reason is now reassembled as a proposition that serves 
to define what can be a reason in the first place? Can we, as rational agents, take 
someone’s claim not as a first-level proposition to be assessed by means of second 
order moral propositions, but as one that is supposed to integrate or modify in some 
way this very second-level that serves to define what a first-level reason is? 
!
I think that the way Pavlakos presents the structure of ration agency might give 
room to this possibility. As we’ve seen, the reflexive structure of autonomy is 
grounded in a general practical principle whose content corresponds, more or less, 
to the Kantian Categorical Imperative: ‘only those principles are valid that any 
deliberating agent would want to endorse as reasons for action'. But such starting 
point is vague, so it has to be specified by rules that provide the criteria for the 
distribution of costs in the process of optimizing practical reasons . It is here where 45
a reason that in principle only counts as a first order consideration could be 
reformulated by an agent as part of the background architecture of practical 
reasoning: the first order reason could be elevated into the realm of the specifying 
rules that define the properties of first order reasons, so it would no longer be purely 
an object of moral thought, but it would constitute part of the standards that 
contribute to define what can be regarded as one of those objects. The obstacle that 
this displacement has to overcome arises, in Pavlakos´s account, out of the fact that 
within the practice of practical reasoning, reasons do not work as canonic 
propositions that by themselves prescribe concrete courses of action in particular 
cases —they need to be scrutinised by the second-level process of deliberation in 
order to define its practical force vis-à-vis conflicting considerations. Only once 
they are thematised by this reflexive structure, they acquire their concrete, practical 
meaning. And if that is the case, then it seems impossible for a reason to be 
thematised by means of the same structure that it is simultaneously supposed to 
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modify: if the reason modifies the structure on which its meaning pivots, then it is 
the sense of the reason itself what is destabilised. 
!
But this obstacle is not impossible to avoid. Wittgenstein’s certainty only prevents 
us from doubting everything simultaneously but does appear to give space to doubt 
part of the second level architecture that is taken for granted in the process of 
articulation—we can meaningfully resist and alter some of those propositions by 
pivoting on others that remain implicit. That idea is similar to the process that we 
previously described as ‘aspect change’, where the shift of perception took place 
not by denying everything that came before, but only by re-signifying the previous 
steps. And because we don’t go as far as completely negating the relations on which 
we are operating, we reflect without ‘giving up on intelligibility’. 
!
If this is a possibility within ordinary practical reasoning, then the structure of 
autonomy allows a degree of reflexivity that cannot be matched by proportionality: 
if proportionality is there to offer a particular structure, distinct from the ordinary 
structure of practical reasoning, then primary reasons could not challenge such 
structure by operating within it. If that is the case, the claims that aim to alter the 
thematising structure have to be distorted, since they cannot be considered as claims 
that express propositions that attempt to specify the Kantian Categorical Imperative, 
thus regulating practical reasoning, but just as first-order reasons that need to be 
optimised. Understood like this, proportionality leads us to a dilemma, because it 
cannot have it both ways: either it gives the conflicting reasons the same 
possibilities that they have when they are articulated by rational agents, and in that 
case it doesn’t seem to offer anything new; or it does provide a particular structure 
to that articulation, and therefore it restricts the ways in which those reasons can be 
thematised. 
!
Now we can see two related but different ways in which submission to the 
balancing process entails the distortion of the constitutional claim that is articulated. 
On the first case, the reduction affects the possibility of understanding such a claim 
 27
as one that is not just in tension, but is incompatible with the opposing one; so it 
impedes doing justice to a claim that aims to, and whose value hinges on, the 
exclusion of another interest from consideration. On the second scenario, the 
structure of proportionality—if it is to offer something that we didn’t already have
—can only place the claims made as first order reasons, but not as constituent parts 
of the very structure of articulation that serves for the identification of reasons at the 
first level. 
!
None of this, of course, is just a hypothetical problem. We can see in practice how 
proportionality can only deal with certain rather serious problems by shaping them 
in a way that cannot give its due to the principles involved. In Lustig-Prean and 
Beckett v. UK , case strangely celebrated by the defenders of proportionality 46
themselves , it was ruled that the discharge from the Royal Navy on the sole 47
ground of being gay violates Article 8 ECHR. This—obviously—is not the part that 
should not be celebrated, for the problems lie on the justification of the decision. 
The Court argued that the contested measure aimed at a legitimate goal, which was 
the maintenance of morale, fighting power and operational effectiveness of the 
armed forces, and that it was a suitable means to further such a goal. The problem 
the Court identified was that the expelling of army members based on sexual 
preference was disproportionate, since it entailed a serious infringement of the 
soldier’s privacy that was not justified vis-à-vis the degree of disruption to the 
armed forces that is carried with the acceptance of gay people in the Royal Navy. It 
is true, the Court asserted, that if declared homosexuals were to serve in the army, 
then integration problems would arise in the military system; but pointing to the 
experience in other European armies that had recently opened the armed forces to 
homosexuals and similar cases regarding the inclusion of women and racial 
minorities, the Court predicted that the degree of disruption caused by the inclusion 
of gays was relatively minor. The measure was disproportionate, in the end, because 
gays would not actually cause such a big headache if they were accepted in the 
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army. Well, lucky them! For only if the levels of homophobia were higher—so the 
degree of disruption that they cause were more serious—then the discharge based 
on sexual orientation would be justified. This way, according to proportionality, the 
extension of the rights of an oppressed group is to be determined in part by the level 
of hatred that is expressed by their oppressors, but not so that the more hatred is 
directed at them then the more extensive their rights must be, but inversely: the 
more that they are oppressed the lesser the degree to which their rights can be 
extended. 
!
The problem, as we can see, lies on the very formulation of its terms. First of all, 
one should immediately be suspicious about the values that are put as conflicting 
principles, for why do we have to understand this as a measure that affects the 
(individual) right to privacy and not the (collective) right of an oppressed minority 
to be equally recognised in their dignity by a public institution? If we understand 
that what is at stake here is this second claim, then the mainstream critique of 
proportionality reclaims front stage, since it seems quite inadequate to ask for a 
discrete value that could answer how much weight should be recognised to the 
democratic ideal of constituting a community of equally free citizens and how much 
further away from that ideal we are moving if we exclude homosexuals from the 
army. These do not seem to be the kind of questions that can be answered that way. 
But the problem also presents itself when we look at the relation between the 
opposed principles, for if what is at stake is a right regarding the dignity of an 
oppressed minority, then obviously it cannot be appropriately thematised by 
conditioning the extension to which it is to be exercised to the degree of disruption 
that such exercise would cause: framing the problem in those terms would 
immediately deny the emancipatory potential of the right. The claim that cannot be 
heard is that the extension of the minority’s right is not to be balanced at all against 
the homophobic reaction that their inclusion could generate, not that it should be 
given a superior weight vis-à-vis such disturbance. Understood like this, the right of 
a minority to be treated equally in the access to public positions is defeated and 
depleted of its value when it has to be weighed against the disturbing effects that it 
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causes on the privileges that it is supposed to overthrow. Proportionality can only 
cast the problem as one in which the opposing principles are in tension, but not as 
one in which the relation between them is one of proper contradiction, as a conflict 
in which one of the rights is there to exclude the other: if the only way of doing 
justice to a right is by exercising it disproportionally against the opposing one, then 
proportionality cannot but miss the point and constitute an irrational procedure, a 
bad taste charade when seen from the perspective of the oppressed group that is told 
that their right is going to be given its due. 
!
Finally, it is worth noticing that allowing for the possibility of understanding rights 
in constitutional cases as standing in an unbalanceable contradiction is not to say 
that these rights, in their general constitutional formulation, are incompatible—that 
one is there to negate the other. In constitutional disputes, rights are put forward in 
relation to the interest of some group or in consideration to some particular setting, 
hence the same right can work as a legal vehicle for different demands. This means 
that in one case a right can be there to exclude the other in this dispute, but not to 
override it tout court. To make the difference explicit, think of black people in the 
‘60s opposing restaurant owners who denied service to them: they were not 
claiming that their right to eat at whatever restaurant they want (and could afford) 
was to be balanced against the owner´s right to exclude them; quite the opposite, the 
fight against segregation is the fight to annul the oppressor’s rights and it would 
obviously defeat the emancipatory effort to say that in order to decide, a 
proportional relation must be achieved between the right to exclude blacks and the 
right of blacks not to be excluded. But, understanding that what was at stake was an 
unbalanceable contradiction doesn’t require us to understand that they were 
straightforwardly trying to negate private property. The straight forward 
contradiction was directed against special dimension of this right: the right to own a 
restaurant included the right to deny service to blacks; and so we can make sense of 
the blacks’ fight as one that aimed to negate particular instances of general rights 
that were not being questioned. If we go back to Lustig-Prean and Beckett, we’ll 
see that arguing that equal treatment to minorities requires that the disturbance that 
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they cause to the ordinary operation of the military forces is not to be considered in 
the discussion, does not impede recognition of the constitutional value of the proper 
organisation of the army: that remains as a constitutionally relevant goal, but once it 
is confronted with the claim of an oppressed minority, such goal does not translate 
as the homophobic disturbances that the inclusion of gay people could generate. 
!
2. Enforcing legal constraints?  
!
In this section I will argue that proportionality cannot honour its second promise, 
that of serving to judicially enforce constitutional constraints on legislative 
decisions. If the previous section aimed to make explicit how the structure of 
proportionality is inadequate for certain claims, here I want to show how, once the 
judge is operating within this structure, proportionality serves precisely to freed her 
from having to decide in consideration to the constitutional provisions: while the 
form of proportionality constraints the understanding of the claims involved, 
distorting them whenever is necessary, the identification of the values and weights 
within such form is up for grabs, unbind to any relevant constitutional provision. 
Proportionality, I will argue, frames the problem in a way that makes law silent 
regarding its solution. After explaining how proportionality detaches the judge from 
law, I will deal with the consequences of this liberation: if legal standards are not 
serving as pivots for the constitutional decisions, then something must take their 
place. With reference to Laval and Viking, I will show how once legal 
constraintments have been pushed aside, Law and Economics analysis takes over, 
providing the relevant criteria to decide constitutional cases and facilitating an 
entrenchment of neo- or ordo-liberal visions of society in law ‘while insulating 
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To see how proportionality leads to unconstrained decision making, let us go back 
to its ordinary characterisation. Alexy tells us that proportionality is only supposed 
to provide the structure in which practical reasoning takes place, so it is part and 
parcel of proportionality that the values to be assigned to both the principles at stake 
and to the degree of fulfilment and non-satisfaction of them by a contested measure 
are not given by proportionality itself : it is not proportionality that decides that 49
expelling army members based on their sexual orientation constitutes a serious 
infringement of soldier’s right to privacy, nor that the integration problems that their 
inclusion would generate would only be minor. 'Weight formula is not an alternative 
to moral argument, but a structure of legal and moral argumentation’ ; or, in 50
somewhat similar terms, proportionality is just ‘a legal framework that must be 
filled with content’ . We have seen already that such structure necessarily 51
constrains how the different claims can appear within the process of argumentation 
itself, but from there we can now take one step further. 
!
If the weight formula does not indicate the concrete weights to be introduced to the 
constitutional consideration, but on these weights nevertheless depends the decision 
about the constitutionality of a piece of legislation, then one has to wonder what 
serves to relate the authoritative measure whose constitutionality is under evaluation 
and the constitution itself. Aharon Barak claims that the operation of proportionality 
depends on ‘the principles and values of each legal system’, so balancing would 
reflect how each system values social benefits and marginal harms . Law is 52
therefore supposed to provide the answer: the distance between a legislative 
decision, like excluding homosexuals from the army, and the constitutional limits 
that are supposed to constrain it, should be crossed by means of legally established 
considerations—it should be the law that defines that 'excluding homosexuals 
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constitutes a serious infringement while the damage to the operational organisation 
of the army is minor’. 
!
To see how far this resort to the values endorsed by the legal system can take us, the 
first thing to notice is that an enforcement of constitutional provisions on legislative 
powers cannot pivot on previous legislative decisions: to identify the values to be 
weighted, the Court cannot refer to other pieces of legislation in order to justify that 
excluding a minority from entering the army constitutes a ‘serious’ detriment of 
constitutional rights. Doing this would amount to employing one law to set the 
magnitude in which a constitutional right is negatively affected and then using such 
quantum thus identified a standard to assess the constitutional status of another law
—the legislator tying itself. On the contrary, if what is being enforced are 
constitutional limits, then the assigned values have to arise from the constitution; 
and since the conflicting constitutional provisions by themselves cannot solve the 
conflict between them (by themselves they do not dictate the extent to which one 
must fulfil this optimising prescription ), the court is in need of a constitutional 53
criteria to distribute the relative weights of the provisions to be balanced—in 
absence of one, recurring to the ‘principles and values of the legal system’ is a 
sterile attempt to constrain the decision. Against Habermas , Alexy has argued in 54
favour of the rationality of balancing by claiming that reasons can be offered in 
support of ‘judgements about intensity of interference and degree of importance’  55
of the principles at issue, allowing to understand that an inferential system is 
implicit in balancing  and thus securing its rationality. This might be so, but the 56
relevant question now is a different one and it has to do with the possibility of 
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2.1. Proportionality against the text 
!
It is at this point that proportionality releases the judges from the constitution, that it 
frees her from the constitutional provisions in order to decide the question about 
constitutionality: when asked why should judges be the ones who decide the 
constitutional problems that are dealt through proportionality analysis, Mathias 
Kumm immediately concedes that they only know the law and that law does not 
provide the answer for these issues: 'within the proportionality-based human rights 
paradigm, the law—understood as the sum of authoritatively enacted norms guiding 
and constraining the task of adjudication—typically provides very little guidance 
for the resolution of concrete rights claims’ . And Kumm is certainly right in this: 57
the relevant constitutional provisions would rarely do more than assert the rights or 
interests in tension , they constitute the object on which the decision must fall, and 58
it is precisely for that reason that they cannot provide the solution. So if the judge 
looks back at the constitution attempting to find an answer to a case in which a 
magazine calls a paraplegic reserve officer both a ‘born murderer’ and a ‘cripple’, 
the only information that she will find is that the constitution recognises both 
freedom of expression and a general right to personality—it will find the rights in 
conflict, but they cannot provide the measure to assess whether ordering the 
magazine to pay damages to the sum of DM 12.000 constitutes a ‘serious’ 
infringement of freedom of expression. When it comes to weighting, proportionality 
offers ‘no immediate guidance as to what makes a measure disproportionate or how 
to conduct the balancing’ . Alexy focusses on the fact that the judge can obviously 59
offer reasons that justify this distribution of values . This is trivially true but also 60
beyond the point, for whatever these reasons are, the criteria to make the 
distribution cannot be grounded in the very rights that the assigned weights are 
aiming to balance. 
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!
This detachment from the constitution seems like an inevitable consequence from 
the way in which rights are understood by proportionality. Since they are 
conceptualised as principles that require to be realised to the greatest possible 
extent, then their scope is radically expanded: trivial pursuits such as feeding 
pigeons and riding horses are protected by constitutional rights ; even more, Kai 61
Möller has argued in favour of understanding that the right to autonomy covers 
even evil interests . That being the case, then constitutional conflicts will be 62
constituted by the enactment of any conceivable law or the performance of any 
imaginable action—everything turns into a constitutional question, and so the 
constitution simply cannot provide the answers.  
!
Accordingly, Kumm tells us that the fact that something constitutes a constitutional 
value says nothing about the relation between such a value and another one, neither 
in abstract nor concrete terms ; and this means that it is the constitution itself that 63
is silent regarding the relation between the principles involved. Nevertheless, the 
decision about the constitutionality of an authoritative act is grounded—according 
to the proportionality approach—precisely on the assertion of a relation between 
those values, and therefore the constitutionality of a law depends on a relation of 
which the constitution itself says nothing. Self-deprived from constitutional tools, 
proportionality needs to offer a suitable replacement capable of steering the court’s 
decisions, and the notion of (rational) justification is thus pushed to the foreground. 
Now, when every measure affects and promotes constitutional rights, the criteria to 
decide on the constitutionality of an interference lies not on the constitution but on 
the substantive justification of the questioned action, and proportionality provides 
the matrix to make the assessment , offering the balancing format that is to be 64
filled by moral arguments or propositions such as ‘that the infringement with the 
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personality right is serious’ . These propositions are represented by the values to be 65
weigh and so there is a shift from interpretation to justification : constitutionality 66
turns into reasonability , a property that theorists of proportionality don’t think that 67
can be easily found at the legislative stage .  68
!
The extent to which a general notion of justification has displaced the constitution 
as the pivot in which the decision rests, is made explicit in the discussion about the 
role of limiting clauses. Even if the legally authoritative text does provide an answer 
to the constitutional question, an idea crucially related to the test of proportionality 
comes in to rescue the judge from the obligation to decide only in consideration of 
the constitution, because attached to the theory of balancing is the notion that the 
constitutional text itself is not very important when it comes to solving the 
constitutional disputes . For Möller, the fact that constitutions establish a set of 69
distinct rights, giving each one a particular formulation that often have individual 
limitation clauses, is so irrelevant in solving constitutional disputes that nothing 
would be lost in the process if instead of those lists we were to operate just with one 
comprehensive prima facie right to personal autonomy . So, if a constitution 70
explicitly conditions the limitation of a right only to the requirement of being 
established by means of a law, the constitutionality of such a legal limitation would 
still be decided by the moral evaluation that operates through proportionality. But 
that is not enough, for even if the constitution leaves no space whatsoever to include 
an exception or limit to a right, such absence is not an obstacle to its inclusion. 
Martin Borowski tells us that this doesn’t mean that the text is not to be taken 
seriously (and, how could he?), but only that 'one ought, too, to allow for some 
leeway where a reasonable need for limitation is present' . He is talking here about 71
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the possibility of limiting the scope of a right even when the text itself does not 
provide grounds for that limitation; and one might think that the leeway he is 
referring is to be restricted to those cases in which we have some constitutional 
rights whose status as actual fundamental principles of the rule of law is not 
undisputed. But one would be wrong, because even though Alexy repeats that the 
possibility of a judge ruling against the literal text of the constitution is something 
that has to be taken very seriously, he is nevertheless happy to include an exception 
to the 103.2 rule of the German Fundamental Law, which forbids nothing less than 
the retroactivity of criminal laws (!) .  72
!
Therefore, the limiting reasons must be interpreted generously to cope with 
substantive considerations that are to be scaled in the proportionality analysis; and 
precisely because those substantive considerations come into the game to define the 
limits of the constitutional rights, then it is these substantive considerations that 
provide the force of the argument regarding the constitutionality of a measure. The 
constitutionality of a questioned measure is then to be decided in the light of 
considerations that are not defined either by proportionality (that only offers 'little 
more than a structure which functions as a checklist’ ) or the constitution (that 73
doesn’t define the values to be balanced and whose text only has a ‘modest role to 
play’ ), but demands a new political decision , one adopted by judges through 74 75
moral reasoning . They, Kumm tells us, must engage in 'an exercise of general 76
practical reasoning, without many of the constraining features that otherwise 
characterise legal reasoning' . 77
!
So, proportionality is just a structure and the constitution itself does not provide the 
values to fill it. Then, in order to decide, something like a rational policy assessment 
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is required . But the rationality of it can only take us so far, and it is key to notice 78
that in hard cases such distance is still one (crucial) step short. The rational structure 
of proportionality comes into play when the judge has to explain why he thinks that, 
given the considerations at stake, the balance falls to one side and not the other. In 
order to provide a full argument to support his decision, the judge should have to 
develop 'a complete moral argument with regard to the relation between the two 
values at stake' . But he cannot do that, for the issues are 'too complex to be 79
resolved in a theoretically satisfactory way at the moment when we have to decide 
the case'. So how can the judge decide the outcome of the balance in hard cases? 
Well, now they are the lucky ones, for they are fortunate  enough to have moral 80
intuitions to which they are 'sufficiently strongly committed to feel confident in 
saying that the balance between the two values should go one way or the other' . 81
With a dash of irony we can say that Möller obviously is not proposing that 
intuition should prevail unrestricted by any checks firmly grounded in reason; rather 
'it is that intuition will feature as part of the decision-making process where no 
theoretically satisfactory account of the relevant issues exists' . But notice the role 82
that Möller is allowing intuition to play: it is that of deciding the outcome of the 
balance within a process that is called 'balancing'. 
!
Being that the case, asserting that the balancing process has to be carried out by 
comparing how important the principles are 'for the constitution'  appears as an 83
empty formula, because nothing necessarily follows from it . And the problem 84
operates also at a second level: since the scope of rights is extended, then several 
rights will be at stake for every given measure, and it is the judge who has to decide 
which ones will be put forward. We have seen already how Lustig-Prean and 
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Beckett v UK could have been understood as a case in which it wasn’t privacy, but 
dignity that was affected by the homophobically motivated measure; hence the 
identification of the values that are to be considered as the constituents of the 
constitutional conflict is part of the question that is left unresolved by 
proportionality. And the discrepancies here cannot be understated: while LGBT+ 
activists rightly claim that the exclusion of gay people from the army constitutes an 
act of arbitrary discrimination that affronts the most fundamental right of every 
citizen to be treated equally by the law, that is obviously not how the measure is 
understood by the opposing side, for they would claim that there is an arbitrary 
discrimination only as far as 'those who are on an equal condition receive a different 
treatment', but their point would precisely be that gay men are not on an equal 
condition in relation to heterosexuals (at least when it comes to entering the army 
forces). All the discussion about gay marriage pivots on this discrepancy. That is 
why it is so convenient to present the problem as one that affects the right to 
privacy, for such understanding is more likely to generate consensus among the 
different actors; however, the cost of such consent lies in making invisible the 
oppression that affects sexual minorities: if the problem is stated as one that has to 
do with the right to privacy, then the interference is thus presented as one that has to 
do with something common to everyone, for we are all equally susceptible of being 
victims of privacy violations, and therefore the situation is put forward in a way that 
serves to conceal the particularly burdensome position that sexual minorities occupy 
in society. 
!
And this political divergence with respect to the identification of the proper right 
involved in the constitutional dispute can be even more acute. While in the previous 
case it would not be problematic to defend that equal treatment to all citizens is a 
legitimate goal, so disagreement would only start when it comes to decide if the 
questioned measure interferes or not with it (and the magnitude of the interference), 
we can easily think of other cases in which the parties in dispute would not even 
agree on recognising something as an acceptable principle. Just to give an example, 
I understand that the strengthening of workers´ bargaining power is of crucial 
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importance in a democracy, an essential aspect of the right to association and to 
political action in general. But that is hardly the way labour rights are understood by 
the CATO Institute. If we were to stand with Möller, then in deciding a 
constitutional case in which these two claims are put forward, we probably 
shouldn’t even ask if the constitution recognises collective labour rights, since the 
decision would depend just on the judge’s assessment of the right to personal 
autonomy. If that is the way to proceed, then it is not even possible to pretend that 
the law can adjudicate this divergence, and therefore the decision could only rest on 
the political stand that the Court takes. 
!
This way, proportionality frames the problem in a way that not only excludes the 
possibility of understanding the opposing rights as standing in an unbalanceable 
contradiction, but it does so in a manner that disconnects from the constitution the 
identification of which are the claims and rights involved, their abstract value and 
the magnitude of the intervention—these questions are set by proportionality so that 
they cannot be answered by the constitution. If this is the case, then in what sense 
can we say that it was the constitution that constrained a legislative decision? 
!
2.2. Proportionality against the workers 
!
Let me draw on Laval and Viking, two labour cases that perfectly exemplify how the 
race to the bottom is invisibilized by proportionality, to try to make these previous 
points clearer . 85
!
Viking is a Finish firm that owns a royal-navy size fleet of ferries. The conflict 
originated when Viking, wanting to take advantage of lower labour standards, tried 
to use the Estonian flag when going to Tallinn. Because of this, The International 
Transport Workers Federation (ITF), together with the Finnish Seamen’s Union 
(FSU), took industrial action that aimed at impeding the change of flag. Viking went 
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to English Courts and from there the case went to the ECJ. Viking claimed that the 
industrial action infringed their right of freedom of establishment. 
!
In Laval, a Latvian company got a contract in Sweden and posted Latvian workers 
there. Those Latvian workers, together with the Swedish, started negotiations with 
Laval’s Swedish subsidiary in order to extend the collective agreement to the posted 
workers. In the context of those negotiations, the union blocked Laval’s building 
sites and Laval went to the Swedish courts, which also referred the case to the ECJ. 
There, the worker’s action was weighed against the right of freedom to provide 
services. 
!
In those cases, the ECJ decided by assessing the right to strike in Community law 
against the right of establishment and freedom to provide services. According to the 
proportionality scheme, both claims cannot operate without some matrix that can 
thematise each right, for they are not to be understood as fixed points that prescribe 
particular courses of action. The result of this process, as we now know, was that 
the Court recognised the fundamental status of collective action, but—and this is 
really the important part —conditioned its exercise to the extent that it was 86
proportional to the companies’ rights. That is, the worker’s right—a right that is 
there to serve as a vehicle to defend them against the firms’ claims—can only be 
exerted within certain limits defined in consideration to the companies’ interests. 
!
At this point we can repeat what we previously mentioned: by conditioning the 
exercise of the workers’ right to a proportional relation to the firm’s right, we 
exclude the possibility of understanding the former as a right in contradiction to the 
latter. So, if that is how the workers made sense of their rights, then their 
understanding of it was defeated by the Court before it could have even been 
heard . 87
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!
But now we can say something else, we can offer a more complete understanding of 
how proportionality operated to the detriment of the workers. The first thing to 
notice is that the ECJ held that Article 39 EC, that grants freedom of movement of 
workers, Article 43 EC, that grants freedom of establishment, and Article 49 EC, 
that grants freedom to provide services, all ‘do not apply only to the actions of 
public authorities but extend also to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating in 
a collective manner gainful employment, self-employment and the provision of 
services'. This is, the Court gave horizontal effect to those rights against the unions. 
This way, despite not being public institutions, and despite the fact that Article 
137(5) EC states that Community is not competent to regulate the right to strike , 88
the actions of the workers were constrained in a proportional relation to those rights 
established in the Treaty.  
!
Such an extension of the scope of those rights, however, is not based on the text of 
the Treaty but on what can only be considered a political consideration: that the 
rights granted to the companies would not be sufficiently protected if non-state 
barriers weren’t also restricted by the employer’s rights. In other words, that even 
though the text of the Treaty is silent about this, the adequate protection of the 
firm’s rights requires understanding those rights as playing a role in the 
determination of the acceptable degree to which worker’s fundamental rights can be 
exercised. The same can be said about the extension that the Court gave to the 
Directive 96/71: this directive aims to secure that workers that are posted from one 
Member State to another receive a minimum level of protection. Even though the 
rule states that it is not there to prevent the application of more favourable 
conditions to workers, the Court argued that its purpose was only to secure a set of 
minimum terms and conditions. This means that, despite its text, the directive could 
not be used in order to achieve labour conditions that went beyond the established 
minimum. The conclusion that followed was that the use of a collective agreement 
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containing more generous terms and conditions was not covered by the directive. 
Therefore, it was not acceptable to use the collective agreement (backed by 
collective action) to impose more worker-protective requirements or to go beyond 
the matters laid down in Article 3(1). 
!
This shows how the Court’s analysis not only proceeds by disengaging itself from 
the relevant legal texts (the employer’s rights restrain not just the state, but also the 
unions; the directive doesn’t cover collective agreements that go beyond minimum 
conditions), but also how the space that is left open once the text is pushed aside is 
filled by the Court’s own decisions, for there is nothing in the law that establishes 
that the degree of satisfaction of the workers interests that was achieved by the 
collective action is disproportionate to the harm done to the firm’s rights . This is 89
particularly clear when the Court states (in Viking) that 'to the extent that [ITF’s] 
policy results in shipowners being prevented from registering their vessels in a State 
other than that which the beneficial owners of those vessels are nationals, the 
restrictions on freedom of establishment resulting from such action cannot be 
objectively justified'. Why is it assumed by the Court that preventing the 
registration cannot be justified? According to proportionality such a conclusion 
depends on the value assigned to what is gained by the workers in relation to what 
is lost by the company, and in making such assessments no help from the law can be 
obtained. After all, what is the value to be given to the articulation of the political 
power of the workers? Of course, the Court didn’t understand that that was the 
value involved in the conflict, but—as we have seen—that is precisely part of the 
problem: that it is not just the resolution of the dispute, but the identification of its 
terms is up to the Court’s political decision . And even if we focus just on the fight 90
to improve the working and economic conditions, the situation is still particularly 
poignant, for the Court seems to ignore that the more harmful the collective action 
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is for the employers’ economical interest, the more effective it is in advancing the 
workers’ claims. 
!
So, it seems that the Court cannot apply the proportionality test and then, based on 
its result, decide in favour of one of the parties. On the contrary, it appears as if the 
conflict is configured in a way that unless the Court starts by taking a stand in 
favour of one of the claims, it simply cannot decide the case at all—if both claims 
are equally important, then the conflict appears to be governed by the political 
equivalent of Newton’s third law of motion: every step forward for one claim 
entails an equal step backwards for the other.  
!
And if that last observation is analysed together with the horizontal extension of the 
Treaty’s rights, then we can more clearly advert the political nature of the ruling. An 
interesting consequence of the horizontal effect given to the Treaty lies in the 
qualitative difference that such an extension makes to the nature of the interventions 
to be balanced. In principle, if the Treaty were to remain only with vertical effect 
and a question about the status of collective labour rights were put forward, then 
such questions would refer to the way in which the Member State has legislated 
regarding the union’s collective rights. This is, the issue to be judged would be 
whether or not the scope of the right to strike, as it is established on the legislation 
of some state, interferes disproportionally with the Treaty’s right to freedom of 
establishment and to provide services. The Court would have to compare the 
national law against the Community’s rights. But, by extending such rights against 
unions, the problem is configured in a way that leaves the Member State aside and 
focuses the issue not on some piece of legislation about the right to strike, but on an 
actual strike. 
!
If up to this point, and in relation to constitutional or fundamental rights, I have 
used the expressions 'scope' and 'exercise' indistinctly, it is because from the 
perspective of proportionality both levels are not qualitatively different. Even more, 
for some, that distinction cannot be sustained: 'the limiting provisions in the ECHR 
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frequently do speak of limits in the “exercise of rights”, and this, too, has found its 
way into art 52(1) ChFR. Can such “limits on the exercise of a right” be reasonably 
distinguished from “limits of a right”? The answer is negative' . And such 91
impossibility to distinguish between the intension and the extension of a right is 
based on the fact that, for the theory of proportionality, the justification of an 
interference with a right is always to be determined in the same way, regardless of 
whether we are talking about a law that concedes a right to some group or the 
exercise of a right by a member of it. If we are dealing with a law, then what has to 
be decided is if the scope of the right, as it is established by the legislation, is 
proportional to the interference that such rights cause to other constitutional rights 
or values. At this level, it could be argued that legislation allowing unions to engage 
in particularly intense forms of boycott disproportionately favours workers’ rights 
against their employers. What we are dealing with in Laval and Viking, on the other 
hand, is a question about the proportionality of a concrete exercise of a right granted 
by law, and not the law that bestows the right. The theory of proportionality offers 
the same answer to both kinds of problems, it claims to be adequate to resolve those 
two different conflicts. 
!
But such equation leads to a severe alteration to what we usually understand as the 
role of rights in advancing claims, a distortion that in principle should equally affect 
all rights indistinctly, but that in practice—or at least in these two labour rights 
cases—only affects one side of the conflict (and it is easy to guess which). If what 
is to be the object of the analysis is not the intension of the right—i.e., the way in 
which the right is established in the law—but its extension—i.e, the way in which 
the right is actually exercised by the workers—, then the three levels of analysis of 
the test of proportionality are to be focused on such exercise, and since the first step 
in proportionality requires asking what is the aim pursued by the measure that 
interferes with a right, the Court has to start its analysis by asking what is the goal 
of the strike and boycott performed by the workers? It is crucial to notice that the 
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pure formulation of the question precludes the possibility of understanding that it is 
the very exercise of the right that constitutes the legitimate goal of the workers. 
Instead of that, they are questioned by the Court about what they are looking for 
with their collective action, and so the decision about the justification of the strike 
will then depend on the relation that the Court can establish between such goals and 
their employer’s right. One cannot but wonder if this would be an acceptable 
position regarding other rights. Can we presume that the Court would also ask what 
is the legitimate goal that is pursued by the exercise of freedom of speech? Probably 
not, for in that case it would be palpable that such a right is deprived of most (if not 
all) its value. In any case, we don’t need to wonder if the Court would dare to ask 
the same question when it comes to the rights of the firms, because we only need to 
read its ruling to notice that such an inquiry is never formulated. 
!
This is the asymmetry we are looking at: when it comes to the rights of the workers, 
its exercise is scrutinised so that it is only justified as long as it pursues a legitimate 
goal in a way that is proportional to their employer’s right; but for the employers 
the exercise of their rights is never questioned, and this is how the race to the 
bottom is invisibilized in the analysis, for they [the employers] are never asked what 
goal are you pursuing with this activity? That query would have allowed us to 
patently see the actual interests in, and the essence of, the dispute: it is one between 
workers fighting for better labour conditions and gaining more power in production 
relations against private companies trying to maximise their profit; and so the 
proportionality of the means employed by the workers could have been assets 
against the revenues that the corporations were trying to make by taking advantage 
of the lower labour protections available. Instead of that, it is only the power and 
labour conditions of the workers and the means they employ to improve them that is 
put on the stand; hence the Court recognises that the exercise of the strike interferes 
with the firm’s commercial activities, but never sees the flagrant symmetry of the 
relation: allowing the firms to carry out their operations interferes with the workers 
exercise of their labour rights.  
!
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The problem is, from the beginning, stated as one in which the worker’s action is 
put under suspicion of affecting the employer’s right, but not the other way around. 
Excluding the question about the aim of the companies' actions serves the Court to 
conceal what otherwise would have been patent: that when it comes to deciding 
such cases the rational structure provided by proportionality cannot help us. At this 
point the illegitimate arguments or purely moral considerations or populistic 
pressures that might affect the rationality of the decision taken at the 'ordinary' 
political/legislative level have already been filtered, but we still have a distance 
between the competing interest and the decision, we nevertheless face an open 
question, one that can only be decided by taking a political stand: if it is true that the 
more effective the collective action is the more it damages the employers’ interests, 
then finding an answer requires favouring—i.e., to assign more value—either the 
workers’ improvement of their labour conditions and power, on the one hand, or the 
firm’s interest in maximising profit, on the other. Neither law nor proportionality 
settles the issue, and so by pronouncing on the issue, the Court thereby loses its 
position as a ‘third’ to the dispute, it has aligned itself with one of the actors, and it 
is only because it has done so that it can decide. And the way in which the decision 
is made and the alliances are formed, is by the endorsement of the Law and 
Economics approach: by not assigning values to the claims made, proportionality 
opens the door for Law and Economics’s thinking to fill the gaps, to provide the 
criteria that serves to make the decision; and with this, collective rights are seen as 
obstacles that must be overcome in favour of individual rights that favour the 
liquidity of the human capital market — collective action has become a 92
‘restriction’, and so the ‘social’ interests are from the start on the back-foot . Stated 93
like that, the true nature of the ruling is made explicit and we can see it for what it 
is: a political decision taken against the workers. 
!
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In the first Chapter we have seen that proportionality fails to honour its promises, 
that it is not a suitable method to enforce legal constraints; that its incapacity to 
accommodate contradictory, incompatible claims entails a distortion of them and 
that  it neglects the difference between assessing the constitutionality of a law and 
the constitutionality of a concrete, particular action performed in accordance with a 
law.  
!
From this point forward, I want to propose a new approach to Judicial Review of 
Legislation (JRL). In particular, I want to argue that when a court has to rule 
whether or not a law is unconstitutional, the scope it has to decide—to the extent 
that it is to decide as a judge, with judicial tools—is considerably restricted: I will 
defend that in cases of JRL a court can only declare that a law is unconstitutional if 
there is an incompatibility between the propositional content of the constitutional 
clause and the propositional content of the law whose constitutionality is under 
examination—the analysis of unconstitutionality is reduced to a study of the 
‘secured’ semantic relations between the two rules. 
!
To do this, I will identify JRL as a procedure that is categorically different from, but 
usually confused with, what could be called Judicial Review of Application (JRA). 
To present this distinction I will look at the discussion about the different models of 
JRL with the intention to reveal that, under the term JRL, at least two very different 
functions have been conflated from the very first moments of JR. In order to 
achieve this, I will first present what in this work will be called ‘the conflated 
approach’ to JR, according to which judicial review of constitutionality is always 
about assessing the validity of a legal rule (1). I will claim that this understanding 
can be traced back to Marbury v. Madison (1.1), that it conflates validity with 
applicability and normative conflicts with normative contradictions (1.2); and that it 
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is at odds with the procedural features of the American model of JR (1.3). After this, 
I will show how, despite its inconsistencies, this understanding is extended in the 
academic literature about JR, even by heavyweights like Ronald Dworkin or Jeremy 
Waldron (1.4). The aim of the second section is to offer what I characterise as a ‘de-
conflated’ approach to the review of constitutionality, in which different functions 
are assigned to the different models of JR (2): with reference to United States v. 
Salerno I will show that the mechanisms by means of which normative conflicts 
and contradictions are de-activated do not require to repeal the validity of any of the 
involved rules, and by doing this, the extensional nature of the former will be 
identified as the crucial factor in distinguishing between problems of application 
and those regarding validity. This will allow me to conclude that the basis for the 
unconstitutionality of a law can only be a normative contradiction (2.1), and this 
will, in turn, lead to an alternative reading of Marbury as a decision about a rule’s 
applicability (2.2) and to an understanding of the judicial duty to ‘say what the law 
is’ that does not entail the power to address the rule’s membership to the system 
(2.3). 
!
While explaining this distinction between JRL and JRA, and thus de-conflating JR, 
constitutes the aim of the present chapter, on the next one, a distinction between 
legislation and adjudication will be offered. This will allow me to present a 
characterization of adjudication in general, one that will then be taken into the 
particular arena of constitutional decision-making, serving as the background 
against which the atypical position of JRL can be recognized as such. 
!
By interlocking the distinction between JRL and JRA, on the one hand; and 
legislation and adjudication, on the other, the anomalous nature of JRL will be made 
explicit. As I will argue, what is unusual about this process is not reducible to the 
traditional view that accuses JRL of entailing a shift of powers that presents a 
counter majoritarian problem. While we could agree that JLR presents a challenge 
when it is faced with the democratic principle, such contradiction is not what I want 
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to focus on. What I want to argue is something more fundamental that is too often 
elided in the literature about JRL: that this procedure, that aims to determine the 
validity of a law, is anomalous within the very idea of adjudication, so its 
particularity can be seen even before the democratic principle is considered. And it 
will be this atypical position what will demand a purely inferential approach to 
decide these cases. A crucial consequence of this is that a defence of this reduced 
approach to JRL does not commit to defend the same understanding of adjudication 
in general—it is the particularity of JRL what demands the judge to decide about 
the relation between a law and a constitutional provision by performing only a 
restrictive inferential analysis that is insufficient in ordinary cases of adjudication. 
!
1. The conflated approach 
 
The characteristic feature of the conflated approach lies on its assumption that, 
regardless of the different procedural features that characterise different models of 
JR, this procedure is always about the same issue, that of deciding on the 
constitutionality of a piece of legislation. By assuming this, the conflated approach 
assigns the same function to two different models of JR: abstract and concentrated, 
on the one hand; and concrete and diffuse, on the other. Some brief and general 
remarks about these models can be useful enough to move forward: the second 
model finds its origin in the United States Supreme Court (USSC) and it is 
characterised by the conjunction of two properties: first, every court can resolve the 
constitutional question (therefore it is diffuse); and second, such question is only to 
be presented within the frame of a concrete case that is to be resolved by such court 
(that is why it is concrete). The first system, on the other hand, corresponds to the 
‘European model’, beginning with the Austrian Constitutional Court of 1930, 
established by the Austrian Constitution enacted in 1920 based on a draft by Hans 
Kelsen, who would have even referred to the Court as his ‘favourite child’ . In this 94
model there is just one court that can resolve the constitutionality question 
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(therefore it is concentrated) and it analyses the subject regardless of a concrete case 
(that is why it is abstract). This way, according to the traditional approach, in both 
cases what is to be judged is the constitutionality of a law. Hand in hand with this 
classification comes a warning, and from no other than Kelsen himself: the 
American model is intrinsically problematic because it makes probable a lack of 
uniformity in the decisions about the constitutionality of a piece of legislation, and 
therefore the concentrated review is to be preferred . In this way, according to the 95
traditional view, both systems of JR do one and the same thing, so the difference 
between them is reduced to the procedural conditions on which that same 
substantive judicial activity is performed; and—the mainstream approach continues
—the procedural conditions that characterises the abstract review are more suitable 
than the ones that characterise the concrete review process to fulfil such function. 
Here we can find the basis of the conflated approach: regardless of the procedural 
differences, the function is the same in both models, and the concentrated one is to 
be preferred. 
!
But before accepting Kelsen’s suggestion, there is an alternative that we should 
consider, one that arises once we take a detailed look at the way in which different 
legal categories are entangled in the conflated approach. I will argue that the 
assumption according to which the same function is supposed to be performed in 
both the European and American models has grown on the back of a serious 
misunderstanding of the categorical difference between validity and applicability; 
that is, that it is only at the unacceptable cost of collapsing the two that the 
conflated approach can be defended. I will show how this confusion originated in 
the genesis of the American version of JR; and by disentangling it, by putting 
forward analytical tools that allow us to differentiate questions about the validity of 
a rule from questions regarding its applicability, we will be in a position to propose 
a differentiation in functions that will lead to a rejection of the conflated approach 
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and to defend that each model aims at a particular goal, one that is coherent with the 
procedural particularities of each system . 96
!
My aim is to argue that while the JR performed in the European model has to be 
understood as addressing the constitutionality of a piece of legislation, in the case of 
the USSC what is tackled is the constitutionality of a concrete application of a law. 
Although both the question about validity and the question about application 
requires to relate the semantic content of a legal rule with that of a constitutional 
one, only in the latter case such relation is mediated by a concrete, extensional fact, 
by a fragment of the world that exceeds any fixed formulation. That extensional 
quality that is decisive at the moment of application and that is absent when it 
comes to validity, will be essential not only to distinguish the function of each 
model, but it will also constitute the basis to differentiate between adjudication and 
legislation, thus constituting the bridge between this and the following chapter. 
!
To advance the argument, my fist steps will consist in studying Marbury v. 
Madison, to look at how validity and application are illegitimately entangled from 
the very inception of JR in the United States; then, by clarifying this confusion and 
thus assigning different functions to each model, I will argue that the restrictive 
semantic approach to adjudication that I propose is indispensable to perform the 
function of concentrated  systems. 
!
1.1. Marbury v. Madison 
!
To see how the debate about the function of the USSC has been riddled with 
confusion since its first moments, we should start by noting the line of thought 
presented by Chief Justice John Marshall in his famous justification of JRL by the 
USSC. His argument has been provocatively called by Lawrence Sager ‘the little 
old judge argument’: the power to review the constitutionality of a law is just the 
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ordinary power that is constitutionally given to judges, it is—at the end of the day—
just another case of ‘judges doing what judges have always done’. The form of this 
train of thought is that the Constitution is Law and that judges are to deal with Law 
in general. From this would follow that if there is a conflict between ‘regular’ and 
constitutional law, judges are to solve the conflict in favour of the latter. This way, 
the constitutional conflict is presented as just another case of a conflict between 
different regulations, the same type that judges are supposed to solved on a daily 
basis . 97
!
I will try to show that the fate of this defence stands or falls depending on how the 
JR is to be understood. That is, there is one possible function of JR that is 
compatible with this understanding of it as being just an ordinary instance of 
adjudication, and there is another function that is incompatible with what the 
judicial process is about. 
!
But let us not put more words in Marshall’s mouth and go directly to what he said in 
Marbury v. Madison. He argues that (1) ‘all those who have framed written 
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of 
the nation’, and because of that (2) ‘an act of the legislature repugnant to the 
constitution, is void’. This comment of Marshall is not exclusively about the 
judicial function, but an insight regarding the way he sees the general relation 
between law and constitution: the first statement about the fundamental legal status 
of the Constitution entails, according to him, the second one about the validity (or 
voidness) of the ordinary law; this is his first inference. He will later commit to two 
premises from which he will arrive at his second conclusion: regarding the court’s 
role he claims two things: (3) ‘it is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is’ and (4) ‘if two laws conflict with each 
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each’. From those remarks about 
the judicial function he arrives to a particular consequence about the constitutional 
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analysis, conclusion that is presented on a conditional form: (5) ‘if a law be in 
opposition to the Constitution; if both the law and the Constitution apply to a 
particular case… then the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the 
case to which they may both apply’. 
!
I will spend some time scrutinising what could very well be the most quoted ruling 
in the American tradition; if I do so, it is not simply to expose the inconsistency of 
Marshall’s argumentation, but because I think that those five sentences serve to 
articulate two opposing views of JRL, one that by connecting validity with a 
concrete conflict between law and constitution conflates the two models of JR, and 
another that allows to distinguish two different functions, being one of them 
coherent with the particular features of the concrete and diffuse model. The key for 
the distinction lies on the sense to be given to the third statement: ‘It is (…) the duty 
of the judicial department to say what the law is’. In order to see this, we must first 
make explicit the conflation in which Marshall has put us and then disentangle and 
reorganise the categories that he collapsed. 
!
The first inference that Marshall puts forward is about the validity of law and its 
dependance on the constitutional regulation. He says that if a law is repugnant to the 
Constitution that law is void. But in that inference he doesn’t directly address the 
question of when, or under what conditions, a law ‘is repugnant to the Constitution’. 
Usually we understand that the validity or voidness of a law is dependant on the 
fulfilment of the standards that the Constitution establishes for the creation of the 
law. If we were to use Hart’s categories, we would say that the criteria for the 
distribution of validity or voidness is established by a rule of recognition. 
!
But from Marshall’s text we can infer that he is thinking about something else, for 
he then turns to talk about a constitutional conflict between a law and the 
‘paramount law of the nation’. From this perspective, he understands that a law is 
repugnant to the constitution if it is in conflict with it, and he explains what he 
means by conflict when he asserts that it arises in cases in which ‘both the law and 
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the Constitution apply to a particular case’. Notice that in this sentence it is key that 
Marshall is talking about a concrete conflict of application: when he relates the 
voidness of a law to its relation with the Constitution, he is not thinking about 
whether or not the law was enacted satisfying of the standards imposed by the rule 
of recognition—he is connecting the validity of the law to the question about the 
particular judicial decision of a case in which the legal provision is opposed to a 
constitutional one. If a conflict in application occurs, then, for Marshall, the law is 
void and the judge must decide according to the constitutional clause. This recourse 
to a particular case in order to tackle the voidness of a law is no accident: Marshall 
needs to present his case for JR as fitting the constraint established in Article III of 
the United State Constitution, according to which the domain of the judicial 
department lies on deciding concrete ‘cases or controversies’. If the validity of a 
law is not dependant on a particular case, then it would be quite difficult for 
Marshall to justify the court’s involvement in the decision about the voidness of a 
piece of legislation. 
!
Now, one possible understanding of Marshall’s set of inferences is that being the 
law void because it conflicts with the Constitution on a particular case, then the 
judge is not to apply it. The attractiveness of this reading is that it allows to address 
and relate to each other all of Marshall’s points: the Constitution is supreme law, so 
if an ordinary law is in conflict with it regarding a particular case, then such law is 
void, and if the law is void then the judge cannot apply it . In other words, three 98
relations are assumed in this understanding of Marshall’s ruling: that validity 
defines applicability, that the power granted to judges to apply the law entails the 
power to assess the validity of such law, and that a conflict between a law and the 
constitution at the level of application defines the voidness of such law. In this way 
the question about a conflict between law and Constitution is related to the question 
regarding the validity of the law, and the question about validity is related to the 
question about judicial application. In this scheme, the third assertion of Marshall, 
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the key idea that ‘it is the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is’ can 
be read as referring to the power of the court to say that a particular text is not law, 
that it is void, because it conflicts with the Constitution. 
!
Notice that if this is how we are to understand what Marshall is saying, then he is 
defending this scheme as one that is supposed to follow from the very nature or 
rationality of a legal system with constitutional supremacy. He doesn’t give any 
positive or legal support to his reasoning, so we are entitled to attribute to him the 
belief that these relations (first, between validity an application; then, between a 
law’s voidness and the court’s power to declare it; and finally, between a conflict 
and voidness) are necessary in a legal system as the American in 1803. The 
naturalisation of this articulation, the acceptance of this series of inferences, 
constitutes the inception of most of our current predicament, of what I have called 
the conflated understanding of judicial review. Making explicit the illegitimacy of 
these inferences is the aim of the following section. 
!
1.2. Objections to Marshall’s inferences 
!
Here I will argue, against this possible reading of Marshall’s ideas, (a) that there is 
no necessary connection between validity and application; (b) that the judicial 
power to decide on the application of a rule is compatible, but does not entail the 
power to decide on the validity of those rules; and (c) that the verification of a 
normative conflict at the moment of application between a legal and a constitutional 
rule does not entail the voidness of the first one. 
!
a) From validity to application 
!
Marshall’s picture assumes that if a law is void then the judge cannot apply it . But 99
this is an enormous oversimplification. A norm is valid if it is part of the legal 
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system, and its membership—as it has been said before—depends on the 
satisfaction of the criteria established by secondary rules of recognition. If a norm 
satisfies those criteria, it will remain as part of the system until there is an explicit 
statement of cancellation, i.e., until it is abolished, and such abolishing effect takes 
place once an abolishing law is in force. 
!
Usually, norms that are in force are to be applied by judges and norms that are not 
in force are not to be applied; but this correspondence is far from being an 
entailment relation: as it is commonsensical for any judge, it is not enough to know 
that a law is no longer in force to assert that it cannot be applied . There is nothing 100
particularly mysterious in having to apply a law that has already been abolished to a 
case that was verified while the law was still in force. The most typical occasion for 
this phenomenon is found in criminal law cases in which a legal modification that 
increases the penalty for an offence, simultaneously derogates the original law 
which established a lesser punishment. On that scenario, given general rules 
regarding the non-retroactivity of substantive criminal regulation, the judge will 
have to apply the law that is no longer valid, and therefore she must not apply a 
valid and in force law . 101
!
Now, this decoupling between validity and application doesn’t immediately seem to 
prove Marshall wrong. After all, retroactivity (including preteractivity) and 
utractivity (the application of a rule to a case that took place after it was abolished), 
all occur in consideration to special norms that regulate the relation between being 
in force and being applicable to a case, so if there is nothing legislated to modify 
the default correspondence, the usual effect is plain activity: what is in force is 
applicable and what is not in force is not to be applied. But it is certainly not the 
case, as Marshall’s argument seems to imply, that just because a law is not currently 
valid at the time of judgement that the judge can ignore it. My point is precisely that 
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modern legal systems include norms that define themselves the relations between 
validity and application , so there is nothing in the rationality of a legal system 102
that assures the connection that on Marshall’s reading is defended. On the contrary, 
precisely because legal systems are not static, there have to be special rules 
regulating the application of laws once legal modifications have taken place 
between the verification of the action to be judged and the moment of judgement: if 
something can actually be considered part of the rationality of a legal system, no 
necessary relation can be sustained between validity and application regarding 
every rule. 
!
Some readers might reply that, since the examples that I have put forward all dealt 
with laws that were part of the legal system, they are irrelevant for this discussion 
because the connection that Marbury v. Madison establishes is not between repealed 
laws and its applications, but between not-laws-at-all and their applications. 
Marshall’s ruling in Marbury v. Madison wouldn’t be constituting the voidness of 
the law at the time of the judgement (ex nunc), but it would be declaring it from the 
very beginning (ex tunc). If something was never part of the legal system—the 
defence of Marshall would continue—, if it was never valid nor in force, then the 
USSC is just expressing the always-already lack of legal existence, and when it 
comes to that kind of voidness, there is no application possible. 
!
Even if this is what Marshall was talking about, then still his argument is not 
enough to justify the lack of applicability: once again, judges and legal practitioners 
in general are all well aware that judges can be legally obliged to apply foreign law 
to decide a case, and foreign law is, by its very definition, not just currently invalid 
law in the legal system of reference, it has never been valid, nor in force, nor part of 
the relevant legal system in any way. In terms of its validity or existence in relation 
to a national legal system, the status of foreign law—unless there is a particular rule 
that asserts otherwise—is for all purposes that of not-law. This means that it is not 
 58
 For Wróblewski, these are ‘transitional rules’ (1992), 84.102
true that a rule that manifestly fails to satisfy the conditions established by the rule 
of recognition, and therefore has never been part of a national legal system, 
necessarily cannot be applied (and even preferred) by a judge in order to adjudicate 
a case . In these cases, just as it happens with the derogation of laws, the 103
application is disconnected from the validity: the decision of what rules have to be 
applied by a judge is not something that can be decided just by looking to the rules 
that define the validity, force or membership to the system. To suggest that these 
questions are identical constitutes a collapse of application into validity, in hartian 
terms: an inclusion of the rules of recognition in the scope of the rules of the rules 
of adjudication. 
!
b) From a decision about application to a decision about validity 
!
The previous point is directly related to one of the main objections presented 
against Marbury v. Madison: there is no reason to assume that the question about 
the validity of a rule (however it is to be determined) has to be decided by an 
institution just because such institution has to decide the question of application; the 
court can very well be obliged to apply a rule without being entitled to consider its 
validity .  104
!
To make this point clear let us take the case of a ruling that orders the restitution of 
the due thing to the owner who lacks possession. Suppose that the Constitution of 
this legal system orders that in cases like this a ruling in favour of the owner can 
only be declared if the judge offers the defendant the opportunity to present 
witnesses, and that in this case such opportunity was never given. Now, when the 
owner goes to an executive procedure to get the execution of the ruling, the new 
judge in charge of such procedure may know that the Constitution was infringed by 
the previous one, and even more, such disconformity could also be alleged by the 
counterpart. Despite this, there is no reason whatsoever to assume that the new 
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judge cannot enforce the previous  ruling: as far as the law operates with 
constitutive norms and contemplates differentiated scopes of competence, it is 
perfectly possible to have a (constitutive) legal rule-A that establishes that some 
quality—i.e., an official stamp and signature by the judge—constitutes the 
institutional status of ‘definitive ruling’ on whatever decision the courts adopts; and 
simultaneously another competence rule-B can order the new judge to enforce all 
‘definitive rulings’ according to rule-A and forbid him to consider any claim that the 
losing party of the principal case presents during the execution (this would be quite 
a reasonable rule for an executive procedure). If that is the case, then the question 
about the validity of the decision dictated by the first court on the principal case is 
not relevant to the new judge: he is incompetent to address it. Regardless of the 
substantial validity of the first ruling, the second judge would be legally forced to 
apply it in consideration of the conjunction of rule-A and -B and the fact that the 
decision of the first judge has the official stamp and the appropriate signature. 
!
The same is true when it comes to the infraction of constitutional conditions for the 
validity of a piece of legislation: suppose that the Constitution in a legal system has 
a rule that asserts that any action of a public officer, performed in breach of his 
institutional duties, is void. Suppose also that in this legal system legislators are 
forbidden to accept money from third parties in exchange for voting laws in their 
favour. Both conditions, I think, are perfectly reasonable and probably are included 
in many modern legal systems. Chile’s legal system has rules like these, and we 
recently had a case in which a group of Senators received illegal money from a 
private fishing company that, in return, asked them to vote in favour of a law that 
gives this company fishing rights in perpetuity and for free. With their votes, the 
law was approved and enacted through its publication in a public record. Months 
later, the bribery was discovered and so the Senators are currently facing a criminal 
trial. Suppose, finally, that they are found guilty of bribery (as they should be, for 
the felony is obscenely clear). I think that it shouldn't be too hard to argue that given 
these conditions the fraudulently approved law should be void according to the 
Constitution—the approval of the law corresponds to an action performed by public 
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officers done in breach of their institutional duty of not receiving money in 
exchange for favourable legislation. But it also seems quite clear that with this 
information we still don’t know what institution, if any, is legally competent to 
declare the voidness of this law: ‘For the statement that an act is null is not possible 
without another statement, answering the question of who is competent to establish 
the nullity of the act’ , so if courts were to have the power to annul laws, it 105
wouldn’t be just because they have the power to apply the law , but because a 106
specific piece of legislation grants them such power. 
!
This way, when a case is presented to a judge, the question regarding the validity of 
the rules at issue is in some sense hidden by the competence rules that define what 
rules are to be applied: when these competence rules order the application of 
another rule, the question about validity is displaced—such rule is now applicable 
regardless of its validity status. Because of this, competence rules like these are to 
be considered, systemically, as part of the set of adjudication rules, and not related 
with the rules of recognition or change. 
!
Once we look at this carefully, it is truly quite obvious: not just courts, but a very 
broad variety of institutions and both public and private subjects are legally required 
to apply law. Policemen obviously have to, but no one would ever think that 
because of her applicative powers a police officer can refuse to enforce a judicial 
rule ordering to seize some object because in the main trial the judge didn’t give the 
defendant the opportunity to present witnesses. In other words, from the fact that 
judges have jurisdictio it doesn’t follow that their competence has to include the 
power to decide on the validity of the rules they are supposed to apply. And this 
circumscription that is defined by competence rules also impedes them to apply all 
valid rules on their procedures: family judges are not usually entitled to apply 
criminal legislation, even if the cases that they are deciding might very well 
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constitute criminal offences. This compartmentalization  that takes place at the 107
level of competence rules is crucial to avoid the proliferation of normative conflicts 
between valid rules: for each judge, only the rules that competence rules define as 
prima facie applicable can stand in conflict. This leads us to our next point. 
!
c) From an extensional normative conflict to an intensional normative 
contradiction 
!
The third illegitimate relation on Marshall’s argument is undoubtedly the more 
visible one and the more interesting for the present study: he seems to be 
contending that a conflict at the level of application between a law and the 
Constitutions renders the first one void—that if regarding a particular case, both are 
simultaneously applicable and they offer incompatible answers, then the 
unconstitutionality of the law is to be declared. This is hard position to defend. 
When it comes to the movement from lack of validity to un-application, Marshall’s 
sin lies on an oversimplification of the problem, but at least there is a connection 
there. Now the problem is more acute—I will show that conditioning validity to the 
absence of a normative conflict turns the former into an unmanageable category. 
Against this, I will argue that what can serve as the basis for the unconstitutionality 
is a contradiction at the semantic level of the rules and not conflict at the applicative 
moment.  
!
The first step in our clarification attempt is to provide an explanation of both 
normative conflicts and normative contradictions. This is crucial for the present 
study since only once we have a clearer image of them, we will be in position to 
understand what relation has to be established between a legal and a constitutional 
rule in order to assert the unconstitutionality of the first. An ideal starting point to 
move forward is to analyse the possible relations in which the semantic contents of 
two rules can stand, and we can base these relations on Alf Ross’ categories :  108
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!
i. Identity or total inconsistency, case in which both rules share the same semantic 
content and therefore every possible fact-in-the-extensional-sense that instantiates 
the operative facts of the first rule necessarily instantiates the operative facts of 
second one;  
!
ii.- Subordination or total-partial inconsistency, case in which the semantic content 
of the first rule corresponds to a sub-set or a specification of the semantic content of 
the second one, so every possible fact-in-the-extensional-sense that instantiates the 
operative facts of the first rule necessarily instantiates the operative facts of the 
second one, but not vice-versa; and 
!
iii.- Overlapping or partial inconsistency, case in which the semantic contents of the 
rules is such that at least one possible fact-in-the-extensional-sense that instantiates 
the operative facts of the first rule, instantiates the operative facts of the second one, 
and at least one possible fact-in-the-extensional-sense that instantiates the operative 
facts of the first rule, does not instantiate the operative facts of the second one, and 
vice-versa. 
!
Given this classification, a normative contradiction  is configured between pairs 109
of rules that stand in relation of identity or subordination, as long as the 
consequences they assign to their semantic contents cannot be simultaneously 
enforced, or if they establish incompatible deontic status to those semantic 
contents : in the same legal system, there is an incompatibility if it is 110
simultaneously ‘allowed or required of unmarried men to get married’ and 
 63
 The notion of ‘contradiction’ is related to the notion of ‘incompatibility’: while contraries are 109
incompatible sentences—so the contraries of ‘f is a circle’ are ‘f is a triangle’, ‘f is an octagon’, etc.—the 
contradictory of a sentence is the negation of it, the one that is entailed by all its contraries, in our example: 
‘f is not a circle’. Blue, green, yellow are all incompatible with and therefore contraries of red, and they all 
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 The grounds for this understanding of normative contradictions can be found in Von Wright (1951), 2. He 110
characterises the semantic content of the rules as ‘act-qualifying properties’, as opposed to ‘act-individuals’ 
which are understood as ‘individual cases which fall under’ them.
‘forbidden to bachelors to get married’ (contradiction based on a relation of 
identity); or if it is simultaneously ‘liberated or forbidden to feed cats’ and ‘required 
to feed felines’ or of it is simultaneously ‘permitted or required to run’ and 
‘forbidden to move’ (contradictions based on a relation of subordination) . 111
Normative contradictions are considerably more complex when we are dealing with 
relations of subordination than when they are in cases of identity ; but still, once 112
the incompatibility is established at the intensional level and therefore a pair of 
rules stand in normative contradiction, every fact-in-the-extensional-sense that 
instantiates the operative facts of either of the rules in relation of identity will lead 
to a normative conflict at the moment of application; and the same is true for every 
fact-in-the-extensional-sense that instantiates the operative facts of the subordinated 
rule: both rules are applicable, and they establish incompatible solutions to the 
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forbids, the inverse is not clearly the case: if a rule forbids a sub-type of what is generally permitted—as it 
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rules are incompatible: permissions correspond to the negation of a prohibition, but their structure is not 
equivalent to a forbidding norm. To see this lets notice the difference between a prohibition and a 
requirement to perform the same action. A prohibition to do x grounds a duty to omit all particular actions 
that constitutes instances of ‘x’, so by forbidding x, all sub-types of x are forbidden. This is not true when we 
face a requirement to x. The duty in that case is not to perform all actions that could be described as x, but 
any of them. Prohibitions conjunctively affects their content, requirements do it disjunctively. Now, if 
permissions are the negation of a prohibition and liberations are the negation of requirements, then 
permissions qualify their content disjunctively and liberations qualify their contents conjunctively. This 
means that from a permission or requirement to x, it doesn’t follow at the intensional level neither a 
permission nor a requirement regarding a particular sub-set of x; as it does when we are dealing with 
prohibitions and liberations. I think this is aligned with Von Wright’s remarks about the deontic status of the 
disjunction of two acts: ‘from the fact that at least one of the acts is permitted, it follows that their disjunction 
is permitted, and from the fact that both acts are forbidden, it follows that their disjunction is forbidden. In 
other words: the disjunction of two acts is permitted, if and only if at least one of the acts is permitted. 
Speaking loud or smoking is permitted in the reading-room, if and only if speaking loud is permitted or 
smoking is permitted’ (in (1951), 6). From this follows that although ‘permitted to run’ is incompatible with 
‘forbidden to move’, ‘permitted to move’ is compatible ‘forbidden to run’. And, on the other side, while 
‘liberated from moving’ is incompatible with ‘required to run’, ‘liberated from running’ is compatible with 
‘required to move’. Notice, of course, that even though normative contradictions are verified when the 
general rules are permissive or requiring, a normative conflict will arise, at the extensional level, every time a 
concrete fact instantiates the content of the special rule, regardless of its character. 
concrete case . With the pairs of rules that we indicated, from the normative 113
contradiction (at the intensional level), a normative conflict will arise in cases of 
application (at the extensional level). But this doesn’t mean that every verification 
of a normative conflict entails the existence of a normative contradiction: for a pair 
of rules whose semantic contents overlap, a case that instantiates both their 
operative facts will generate a normative conflict, but this conflict at the level of 
their extensions will not be the expression of an underlying incompatibility at the 
intensional level of their semantic contents—there is no incompatibility, no 
normative contradiction, between a pair of rules one of which requires parents to 
save their children and another rule that forbids entering someone else's house; but 
of course there can be a fact-in-the-extensional-sense that instantiates both of them 
(the case activated by a mother going into someone else’s house to save her 
daughter) and with it a normative conflict will be triggered . 114
!
Against this background, we can now asses Marshall’s claims. According to 
Marbury’s argument, a law is repugnant to the constitution if it is in conflict with it, 
and the conflict arises in cases in which ‘the court must either decide that case 
conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution; or conformably to the 
Constitution, disregarding the law’. By claiming this, he seems to be proposing that 
if on a particular case both the constitutional and the legal regulation collides then 
the legal regulation has to be considered void. If this were to be the case, then the 
very idea of legal validity seems to be hopeless: validity relates a rule with a legal 
 65
 If the contradiction includes a liberating or a permissive rule, then the incompatibility at the intensional 113
level between the deontic statuses does not entail an impossibility of joint compliance: the preference in 
favour of the liberation or permission only allows the addressee to exclude the requiring or forbidding rules, 
so by following these latter ones, no rule is infringed. The contradiction or incompatibility is not expressed in 
an impossibility of simultaneous performance (as it is claimed in Elhag et. al. (1999), 39), since such 
impossibility only occurs when we have rules that ‘prescribe’ certain forms of behaviour; but the 
incompatibility is extensionally manifested in a conflict by the fact that every concrete action that instantiates 
the content of the rules will receive incompatible deontic statuses. See Raz (1999), 91. Munzer, who 
distinguishes between ‘rules that conflict in themselves’ and ‘rules that conflict on a particular occasion’, 
claims that permissive rules can lead to situations in which joint conformity is logically impossible, but 
recognises that claiming this requires an extension of the term ‘conformity’—(1973), 1143-4.
 Alchourrón claims that a normative system with just these two norms: (i) Judges ought to punish all those 114
who have committed a crime, and (ii) Judges ought not punish those who are under age, is one that is 
‘“inconsistent” modulo a set of (contingent) facts’: it is consistent, but ‘it will put judges into a normative 
conflict whenever they are confronted with a case of a minor who has committed a crime’—(1991), 423. A 
similar distinction is found in Guastini (2014), 118.
system, but in Marshall’s reading that relation is dependent on the existence of a 
normative conflict at the particular level of application to a concrete case—conflict 
that it is not configured by the stable relations that stand between the fixed contents 
of two or more rules, that is not dependent on the finitude of the rules’ intensions, 
but on the contingent verification of a particular case that, supporting multiple 
descriptions, falls under the extension of both of them. The validity of a rule, in this 
reading, hinges on the verification of a fact-in-the-extensional-sense, on the 
occurrence of an event that can be subsumed on both the legal and the constitutional 
rule. A simple example will help us to see why this model cannot work. 
!
Suppose that after a crude dictatorship that imposed strict censorship on books, the 
People takes over power and, through a constitutional assembly creates a new 
Constitution that asserts a right to write and publish books. Suppose also that, as it 
happens on most criminal codes, the law of such country forbids and criminally 
punishes the intentional slander, injury and expression of false accusation. Here we 
have two rules, a constitutional one that grants a right to publish books, and a legal 
one that forbids intentionally expressing false accusations. Under those conditions, 
what is the constitutional status of such criminal legislation? If we were to take 
Marshall’s view, the answer has to be: ‘it depends’. Since it is possible for one 
extensional, concrete action to be described both as ‘publishing a book’ and as 
‘expressing an intentionally false accusation’, the law will be valid as long as no 
intentionally false accusation has been performed by the publication of a book, but 
if a book that falsely accuses someone were to be published, then a normative 
conflict would arise: in that case, the same extensional, concrete action would be 
constitutionally allowed as an instance ‘publishing a book’, and legally forbidden as 
an instance of ‘false accusation’—the two rules would stand in normative conflict 
and therefore the legal prohibition would be void. Notice that we wouldn’t just be 
discussing which regulation should prevail and be applied by a court on this case, 
because it might be unproblematic to assert that the legal prohibition cannot be 
applied on this particular case; but why from this concrete collision or conflict 
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should follow a general consequence regarding the validity or voidness of the law? 
Under this scheme, every single legal rule whose operative facts are not in a relation 
of exclusion or heterogeneity with the operative facts of any constitutional rule  is 115
in danger of being declared void, and whether that voidness is actually verified or 
not depends on the contingency of some particular fact-in-the-extensional-sense 
taking place. 
!
Again, as it happened with Marshall’s relation between validity and application, the 
conflation that we must avoid now is also between the two categories but in the 
other direction: on Marshall’s argument, the conflict that would render the law 
invalid is only configured at the level of application of both norms, and because of 
that it is dependent on a particular case that instantiates the content of the legal and 
constitutional rule; but the validity of a rule corresponds to its membership of the 
relevant legal system, status that is independent of the applicability of the rule to a 
particular case. While on the first inference he illegitimately assumed that if a rule 
lacks validity it cannot be applied, now he seems to understand that if a rule 
conflicts with hierarchically superior one, then the first is invalid. 
!
Kelsen argued that a conflict of norms corresponds to ‘a situation in which two 
norms are valid, of which one prescribes a certain course of conduct, and the other a 
course incompatible with this’ , but if we are to make sense of validity of law as 116
depending on the relation between the legal and the constitutional regulation, so that 
the alleged law is void if there is a conflict between the two, then such conflict can 
only be understood as a general or necessary conflict between the two contents and 
not one that is only configured under a particular circumstance. We need something 
that, unlike the properties that can obtain in contingent events, remains unchanged 
from case to case. This is, if voidness is conditional on conflict, then the conflict has 
to be configured at the intensional level of the propositional contents of both norms, 
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not at the extensional level of application. In other words, it has to be a case of rules 
that stand in normative contradiction  or incompatibility—relations that being 117
exclusively dependent on the content of the norms, which remains stable for all 
cases, is independent of the verification of a concrete case; the conflict cannot be 
that of practical collision or normative conflict, which depends on the verification of 
unrepeatable concrete cases . That seems to be the only way to make validity 118
dependent on the relation between the contents of the rules without appending it to 
the contingency of a particular case, i.e., without making validity dependent on 
application. More about this will be said in this and Section 2, but a full explanation 
of this relation of incompatibility will only take place with the help of Brandom in 
the fourth chapter. 
!
In other words, while validity cannot be distributed in consideration to normative 
conflicts, it can—although it doesn’t have to—be dependent on the existence of a 
normative contradiction between the constitution and a piece of legislation. To de-
conflate JR, I will go deeper into these relations, and explain why the configuration 
of neither a normative conflict nor a normative contradiction has to lead to a loss of 
validity, even though regarding the latter, such invalidation is possible if a special 
regulation so establishes. But before moving in that direction, it will be convenient 
to take two prior steps to attain a better understanding of the conflated model: the 
first one is to show how this approach not only collapses validity and applicability, 
but also, how it fails to accommodate the procedural features of the American 
system of judicial review. I will argue that the concrete nature and diffuse 
competence that characterises the American model are incapable of being 
reconciled with decisions about a rule’s membership to the legal system. Then, I 
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1.3. Not fitting the procedural features of the American model 
!
In the previous sections I have argued that the described understanding of Marbury 
leads to an impossible scenario, one that collapses validity into application; that 
infers from the power to decide on the application of a rule, a power to decide on 
the validity of it. This move that cannot distinguish between extensional and 
intensional relations among rules, and thus confuses normative conflicts with 
normative contradictions. 
!
Having established that this particular reading of Marshall’s ruling is unsound, now 
I want to argue that the function that such reading attributes to the USSC is one that 
cannot be achieved through the procedural features that characterise JR in the 
American model: if validity depends on the stable relations between the contents of 
two rules, if it hinges on an incompatibility between the contents of the norms at the 
intensional levels, then—by the very general nature of the incompatibility relation
—the features of concreteness and diffuse competence of the American model turn 
out to be irrational. In other words: if the court is to be judging the validity of a law, 
being the validity independent of the particular configuration of any concrete case, 
then why would it be only revisable in the context of a case or controversy? If the 
object of analysis is not particular to that case, but a general feature, why organise 
the system in a way that the analysis can only take place when the court is in front 
of a concrete case? What changes from case to case is not the content of the rules 
involved but the particular features of each concrete controversy that is to be 
addressed by those rules. What shifts is the extensional dimension of the fragment 
of the world that constitutes the object of adjudication in every individual act of 
adjudication, not the intension of the legal material that is to be applied to it. This is 
the extensionality that characterises the applicative moment and that is absent when 
the analysis is focused on just the rules at issue. 
!
Just as the concreteness cannot be reconciled with the abstract nature of the 
incompatibility, the diffuse nature of the model is also unsustainable: each court can 
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decide on its own if a rule is valid, so the judicial decision about validity has no 
effects on other courts (except the USSC). This means that the decision has inter 
partes effects regarding the validity-status of a rule. 
!
What is the picture of validity that a system that adopts the American model is 
committed to? It seems we are on the edge of a performative contradiction: we say 
that we are deciding on the membership of a rule but inter partes effects regarding 
the validity of a rule seem to be incompatible with such assertion. If the analysis to 
be performed were dependent on the particularities of a case, then any discrepancy 
between courts could be explain by references to the differences between the cases 
that each court is dealing with; but we have seen that such case-dependency is 
incompatible with legal validity, or at least with a notion of it that is not reduced to 
the applicability of such law to a concrete case. The question that has to be 
addressed is if validity is a property that can be judged independently by each court, 
or if by its very nature is something that cannot be distributed that way. What I will 
argue is not that it is possible but inconvenient to grant each court the power to 
decide on the validity of a law, but that validity—since it refers to a property that a 
rule has in relation with the whole legal system—is not something that can be 
decided that way. In other words, a decision that does not have erga omnes effect 
cannot be about validity, even if it claims to be. 
!
If a rule is void, then it is not part of the legal system; but that exclusion is in 
relation to the whole system, and as far as two courts are courts of that same system, 
the exclusion entails that for both of them the rule is void. So the prevention of the 
erga omnes effect configures a grammatical mistake when it comes to a decision 
about validity: validity, as long as it is not collapsed into applicability, is not a 
relation that can be ‘compartmentalised'—its generality is not some effect that can 
or cannot be verified, for it corresponds to an intrinsic property of some rule in 
reference to the legal system: a rule cannot be simultaneously valid and void in the 
same legal system, but that is precisely the possibility that is configured if the 
decision about it only has inter partes effect—this is to recognise that the first 
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decision does not legally settle the issue about its membership to the system. Since 
validity corresponds to a relation between the rule and the legal order, once it is 
affirmed, its status can be changed, but that possibility entails that until then the 
status of the rules is the one that was judicially decided. What is to be noticed is that 
changing the status is not what is at stake here: inter partes effect regarding the 
validity means that the new decision is not changing anything, for the first one 
didn’t have the effect of defining the status of the rule for other courts. If the first 
court’s decision does not settle the status of the rule as void, at least for the moment, 
then the first court did not actually exclude it from the legal system, i.e., if the 
decision has inter partes effect only, then the decision might have declared that the 
rule was invalid, but it didn’t actually managed to invalidate it. 
!
Using speech act terminology, the ruling has the illocutionary force of a declaration, 
this is, an speech act whose function is to configure the social reality (in our case: 
legal reality) in the way that it declares that the world is configured. If a ruling 
declares that ‘rule-A is part of the system’, the function of such act is to configure 
the world so that rule-A is part of the system . But, if rule-A is part of the system 119
only for this case, then its status regarding the system is simply not defined by the 
ruling, and since deciding on the validity of a rule is to fix its status regarding the 
legal system, the act failed to configure the reality the way it declared it to be. This 
means that the diffuse and concrete model is structured to produce failed rulings: 
the declaration of voidness does not actually achieve the exclusion of the rule from 
the system. 
!
The whole picture is bleak: lack of general effect is consistent with understanding 
that what was analysed was not the validity of a rule, but some particular problem 
that was configured on this case only—its applicability. That would be the case if 
the court were to solve a conflict of rules that takes place in the concrete case, but 
we have seen that such particular conflict is disconnected from the question about 
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the validity: validity has to be general (case-independent) and that is why the effects 
of the ruling declaring or denying it cannot be inter partes. 
!
None of this changes once we consider the particular position of the USSC in the 
system: being the higher court in that legal system, the stare decisis principle entails 
that other courts have to recognise its ruling when ‘the point has already been 
decided in a prior case’, this is, only as far as the prior case is directly in point . 120
Regarding its decisions and their force on lower courts we could agree that the 
problem of inter partes does not arise, but the logic of the system remains the same: 
for every ruling of other courts the contradiction between what is declared (‘such 
rule is valid/void’) and the effects of that declaration remains untouched. 
!
Even more, for the USSC itself inter partes effect still applies, so if the validity of a 
law is challenged twice in front the USSC, the second time it will appear that the 
first decision of the court was just as ineffective as the lower courts decisions: the 
USSC would have declared once that such law was valid, but now that it faces it for 
the second time, the law status is once again hanging in the air. As Gary Lawson 
puts it, if there is a conflict between ‘the Constitution on the one hand and a prior 
judicial decision on the other. Is there any doubt that, under the reasoning of 
Marbury, the court must choose the Constitution over the prior decision?’ . In a 121
similar sense, Kelsen argues that ‘stare decisis is not at all an absolute principle’: 
‘above all it is assumed that it is not valid in the case of an interpretation of the 
Constitution. "Constitutional questions are always open to examination”. Hence it is 
possible that the Supreme Court declares one and the same statute in one case 
constitutional and in another case unconstitutional as well as vice versa’ . 122
!
Because of this, if the USSC is to decide on the validity of a legal rule, then it is not 
just that it is desirable to adopt the Austrian model, but more radically, that the 
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concrete and diffuse model simply cannot do the job: on the one hand, validity is 
case-independent, but the model requires the opportunity of a concrete case; on the 
other, validity is a relation with the legal system, so it binds all courts, but the model 
gives freedom to each court to decide about it independently. From this it would 
follow that if what is to be analysed by a court on a JR process is the validity of a 
law, then such analysis should be conducted on an abstract and concentrated system. 
This is how JR of Legislation should be understood: as a process in which the 
validity of a law is judged by its relation to one or more constitutional provisions, so 
that if there is incompatibility between them the law is rendered void. Such relation, 
being one between the contents of the legal materials at the two levels, is 
independent of any particular case and is therefore to be analysed in abstract, that is, 
not as an application problem—validity cannot to depend on concrete, particular 
cases that are faced at the level of application. If JR of Legislation is a review on the 
validity of a law, then the appropriate procedural features are those of the European 
model; and in that case, Marshall’s dictum ‘the judge is to say what the law is’ 
corresponds to the power to declare which rules are part of the legal system. Under 
these considerations, the preference of an abstract and concentrated model is 
beyond doubt, and a concrete and diffuse model can be seen as the result of a 
Supreme Court justice trying to do what cannot be done on a particular case or 
controversy. 
!
But, if we hold on to the distinction between validity and applicability, if we 
differentiate between a normative conflict at the extensional level of a concrete case, 
conflict that is configured at the moment of application; and a normative 
contradiction that is configured at the intensional level of the contents of the rules 
involved, contradiction that depends on an incompatibility which is configured 
regardless of any concrete case that can be subsumed in both the rules at issue; then 
we can propose a different understanding of the function that a concrete and diffuse 
JR model is supposed to achieve: a court, in the American model, is not there to 
address the general question regarding the validity of a rule in consideration to the 
constitution; but the constitutionality of a concrete application of a legal rule in a 
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case in which a constitutional provision is also internally applicable. A court like the 
USSC is not engaging in JR of Legislation, but on what we can now properly call 
JR of Application. 
!
Before moving in that direction, I want to address how extended this conflated 
approach is in constitutional literature and how it has pervaded the American 
practice, which, in an oblique attempt to distinguish between validity and 
applicability, differentiates between facial and applied challenges to legislation. 
This leads to a dangerous confusion about the role of courts in general, but even 
more alarming is that such confusion regarding the function of the USSC entails a 
conflation of the legal categories that are embroiled in the characterization of the 
legislative and judicial functions, leading to the collapse of validity into application 
and to an impossibility to distinguish normative conflicts from normative 
contradictions. 
!
1.4. The spread of confusion 
!
Despite the fact that endorsing the conflated approach entails the rather serious 
consequence of collapsing essential legal categories, this has been surprisingly 
neglected by a considerable number of authors—even giants like Dworkin and 
H.L.A. Hart seem to have overlooked the problem. Law’s Empire, one of the most 
sophisticated defences of JR, explicitly claims that the role of the USSC is that of 
deciding on the constitutionality of statutes. He asserts that ‘if the Constitution, 
properly interpreted, does forbid capital punishment, a justice who refuses to strike 
down  state statutes providing death penalties would be changing the Constitution 123
by fiat’ . The same idea was defended in his earlier Taking Rights Seriously  and 124 125
is even more clearly supported in his later Freedom’s Law, in which a particular 
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conception of democracy is construed precisely in order to defend the ‘invalidation’ 
of legislation by courts from the accusation of being undemocratic .  126
!
That also was the way in which Hart appears to have read Marbury v. Madison, and 
in general that seems to be his understanding of the role of the Supreme Court—in 
his words, the function of the court in these cases is ‘to review and declare 
unconstitutional and also invalid  enactments of the congress as well as of the 127
state legislatures’ . 128
!
They are in good company: Mathew Adler, Larry Kramer, Mark Tushnet, Jeremy 
Waldron and many others have claimed that under a concrete and diffuse model of 
JR, paradigmatically exemplified by the USSC, the Court is supposed to decide on 
the validity of the laws at issue, that it has the power to declare them void or to 
strike them down — as Marshall before them, they all entangle, more or less 129
explicitly, the two categories. 
!
The problems of conflating the two are expressed in how difficult it has been to 
offer a coherent treatment of the distinction—originally presented in United States 
v. Salerno  and now extendedly accepted by the American practice—between 130
facial challenges and applied ones. The attempt to distinguish the two can be 
understood as the attempt to differentiate between validity and applicability 
problems within a practice that neglects their differences. I will argue that the 
differentiation between these two challenges is improperly constructed and that the 
problem lies precisely in its incapacity to maintain the difference between the 
validity and applicability. 
!
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On a facial challenge it is claimed that there is ‘no set of circumstances’ on which 
the law can be constitutionally applied. The second case, on the other hand, refers to 
the unconstitutionality of the statute applied to a particular set of circumstances. 
The problem is once again that the validity of the statute is being made dependent 
on questions about its operation: according to Salerno, only if the statute cannot be 
applied constitutionally to any case, is it facially invalid, and therefore from a 
condition about a potential, but concrete instance, we arrive to a consequence about 
validity in general. 
!
Michael Dorf, who engages in a profound study on this subject, criticises that with 
this standard ‘broad middle range of statutes, which are unconstitutional in a 
substantial number of applications but constitutional in a substantial number of 
others’ are to be regarded as facially valid . The problem that this middle range of 131
cases presents is the following: using Dorf’s example, let us suppose that we have a 
constitutional right to dance in barrooms wearing shoes, and a state statute forbids 
dancing on barrooms tout court, regardless of whether shoes are being used or not. 
This is a law that forbids a whole genre of conducts (dancing on barrooms) of 
which the constitutional right only extends to some cases (dancing on barrooms 
wearing shoes). This means that by Salerno standards, the law is facially valid, for 
it can be applied to some cases without affecting any constitutional right: every time 
it is applied to a dancer who is barefoot, no constitutional right is affected since 
there is no right to dance barefoot. So, a barefoot dancer would lose both the facial 
and the applied challenge .  132
!
Dorf wants to argue that a constitutionally invalid law cannot be applied, even in 
cases in which its application wouldn’t affect constitutional rights. The problem is 
that he still connects the general question about the unconstitutionality of the law 
with particular instances in which the law stands in a concrete normative conflict 
with the constitutional regulation: in order to impede the application of an 
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unconstitutional law, he argues in favour of the doctrine of the severability, 
according to which the court should treat the unconstitutional applications of the 
statute as being severable from the constitutional ones. In this way, our barroom-
forbidding law should be held unconstitutional ‘as applied to the persons who are 
not barefoot’, so the whole law doesn’t fall, but only to the extent that it 
criminalises non-barefoot dancing—the remainder of the law is valid . This allows 133
him to say that the invalid law, which is severed from the valid, is not to be applied. 
!
There are practical problems to this approach, and Dorf is aware of them; but the 
issue which I want focus on is how his work collapses validity and applicability in a 
way that makes it impossible for him to sustain his argument. Let us start by noting 
the particular way in which Dorf expresses his idea: he says that what is to be held 
by the court is that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to some group (in our 
case, to non-barefoot dancers, for they—unlike the barefoot dancers—have the 
constitutional right to dance). I’m not quite sure how to make sense of this. This 
sounds pretty much like saying that the court is to declare that some applications of 
the law are unconstitutional (those which are performed on non-barefoot dancers); 
but that assertion would be incompatible with his claim that what is to be judged by 
the court is the law itself, its constitutionality, and not an application vis-à-vis the 
right that someone might have to perform some action. In other words, Dorf insists 
that the object to be compared with the constitution is not an action to be affected 
by the application of the law, but the law itself: the focus has to be ‘on the 
constitutionality of a challenged statute rather than on the privileged or unprivileged 
character of the conduct of the litigant challenging it’. But if what is to be judged is 
the law itself, then why would the decision of the court be not about the statute 
itself, but about the statute as applied to some case? 
!
As it was mentioned, the way in which Dorf tries to solve this contradiction is by 
recognising the severability doctrine , which mediates in his attempt to reconcile 134
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the analysis of the law itself and its application. This doctrine consists in performing 
a function that the constitution never assigns to the courts, that of rewriting the law. 
So, he claims that: 
!
Prior to the court's ruling, the law read: ‘Barroom dancing shall be 
an offence’. By ruling that the statute's unconstitutional applications 
are severable, the court essentially holds that the law has two parts. 
The first reads: ‘Barroom dancing shall be an offence if the dancer is 
not barefoot’. The second reads: ‘Barroom dancing shall be an 
offence if the dancer is barefoot’. Under this analysis, the second 
part of the statute stands on its own as a constitutionally valid law. 
!
The basis of Dorf’s problem, I think, lies on the fact that he doesn’t propose a 
standard for validity of the law itself that is independent on the contingency of 
concretely affecting rights by its application on particular cases. For Dorf the 
question of the validity of the law is connected to its conflict, in a particular case, 
with a constitutional right. That is why the judgment of validity is not predicated to 
its natural subject, the rule ‘forbidden to dance’; but to instances of application 
(‘forbidden to dance as applied to…’). And then he is in the impossible situation of 
having to convert the decision about the application of a law into one about the 
general validity of such law, and this transition is done at the cost of changing the 
law itself: through severability, he goes from the unconstitutionality of the law as 
applied to persons who are not barefoot, to the unconstitutionality of a new law 
whose content now includes a reference to the ones to whom the application was 
deemed unconstitutional: ‘Forbidden to dance if the dancer is not barefoot’. So in 
the end, although he never told us if the law whose content is just ‘forbidden to 
dance’ was valid or not, he did inform us that such law was unconstitutional as 
applied to barefoot dancers, and that a different law that was never enacted
—‘forbidden to dance to not barefoot dancers’—would be unconstitutional too. 
!
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What is relevant for a normative incompatibility is not the application of the rules, 
but the relation between the rules themselves, between one that ‘forbids to dance’ 
an one that ‘allows to dance wearing shoes’—both are incompatible in the same 
way that the assertions ‘J can run’ and ‘J cannot move’ are incompatible: even if in 
the case of barefoot dancers there is no normative conflict between the rules, a 
system is inconsistent if it simultaneously allows to dance wearing shoes and 
forbids to dance. Such relation of incompatibility between contents, that is 
independent of particular applications, constitutes the normative contradiction that 
remains stable throughout all possible applications and normative conflicts between 
rules. 
!
In all these readings, it is understood that in the American model the courts analyse 
the constitutionality of a law, within the framework of a concrete case or 
controversy, and declares the voidness of it if a conflict between the law and the 
constitution is verified. This is the conflated approach to JR: understanding that 
whether it is a concentrated and abstract model or a diffuse and concrete one, the 
analysis is always the same—the validity of a law in consideration to the 
constitutional text. The differences that the conflated approach sees between the two 
models are only regarding the opportunity in which this analysis takes place (a 
concrete case or in abstract terms), the institution that engages in it (ordinary courts 
or a specialised one) and the effects of the decision (inter partes or erga omnes). 
Against this, I have argued that the validity or voidness of a rule is incompatible 
with inter partes effect and that it cannot depend on the verification of a conflict at 
the level of a concrete case. 
!
2. De-conflation by different functions 
!
In this second section I want to argue in favour of a different approach , one that 135
distinguishes between JR of Application, as a process that aims to assess the 
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constitutionality of the application of a legal rule to a concrete case based on an 
analysis of an extensional normative conflict between legal and constitutional 
provisions; and JR of Legislation, a process that asses the constitutionality of a 
piece of legislation based on an analysis of a possible intensional normative 
contradiction between legal and constitutional provisions. 
!
It is only appropriate to begin this disentangling task by noting that this difference 
was early recognised by Carl Schmitt: commenting the decision of 4 November 
1925 of the German Reichsgericht, he claims that the key moment of the ruling lies 
on the idea that ‘the judge is subject to statute’, but such subjection ‘does not rule 
out the possibility that a statute of the Reich or some of its provisions may be 
declared to be invalid by a judge if that statute stands in contradiction with other 
provisions that enjoy precedence and that the judge must take into account as well’. 
Although the court used the expression ‘invalid’, Schmitt rapidly makes clear the 
proper way of understanding the decision: ‘What this says is that if there are 
provisions in a constitutional statute that regulate a certain kind of matter of fact, 
and if we can subsume a case that is to be decided under that regulation, then the 
regulation contained in the constitutional statute is to be given preference, in the 
case of collision’. So ‘It is only the possibility of subsumption of the facts of a case 
under the provisions of the regulation in the constitutional statute that makes it 
possible for a judge (…) to refuse to apply the ordinary statute (but not to invalidate 
it) (…) This is not really a denial of the validity of the ordinary statute. It is only a 
non-application of the ordinary statute’ . 136
!
2.1. De-activation of normative conflicts and normative contradictions 
!
I will defend that our understanding of unconstitutionality as a property that arises 
from the verification of some form of conflict between a piece of legislation and a 
constitutional provision, requires to identify the relation that serves as the basis for 
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the unconstitutionality as one that has to correspond to a normative contradiction: it 
will be on the back of it that a law can be coherently taken to be unconstitutional. 
To achieve this, we need to get a better understanding of the difference between, 
and ways of solving, both normative conflicts and contradictions, and thus explain 
how those mechanisms for dealing with them can de-activate the problems they 
present without entailing the voidness of any of the rules involved , but making 137
such voidness possible in the case of the latter. In this way, we can make sense of 
the unconstitutionality of a law not as a necessary consequence of a normative 
contradiction, but as one that follows from it once another premise is assumed. To 
make this explicit, we must look at the way in which these problems are solved and 
to the consequences that follow from the de-activation of the conflict: first I will 
claim that solving conflicts between rules requires the operation of a rule of 
preference; then, I will use United States v. Salerno and the distinction between 
explicit and implicit derogation to argue that rules of preference do not affect the 
validity of the displaced one. 
!
a) Rules of preference 
!
In every case in which for a same fact-in-the-extensional-sense two or more rules 
assign different and incompatible solutions, a rule of preference has to be 
invoked , one that commands the displacement of one of the conflicting rules in 138
favour of the other. By including them in the picture, the definitive applicability of a 
rule to a concrete case corresponds to a twofold property that is properly addressed 
by distinguishing between the internal and external applicability of a rule: we are to 
understand that a rule is internally applicable to a case if the description that 
constitutes the operative facts of the rule is satisfied by the event that configures the 
object of judgement, this is, if the case can be described using the semantic content 
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of the rule at issue . But from that correlation between rule and extensional fact, 139
doesn’t follow that such rule is applicable to determine the solution to the case. We 
still need to analyse the external applicability of the rule. A rule is externally 
applicable if, being internally applicable, its application is required by another 
rule . While the reference to the internal applicability of a rule answers the 140
question regarding if a concrete case is regulated by a rule; the external applicability 
provides an answer to the question regarding if a judge has to apply it . This does 141
not have to lead to a regress when it comes to the question about the applicability of 
the rules of preference: we can assume as a starting point that every valid and 
internally applicable rule is also externally applicable unless another rule makes it 
externally inapplicable, and that every invalid but internally applicable rule is not 
externally applicable unless another rule makes it externally applicable. With this, 
validity is related to applicability, but not in the necessary sense, regarding every 
rule, as Marshall was proposing. Also, this escape from an eternal regress, in turn, 
does not lead us into a circularity if validity—which conditions applicability—is 
ultimately dependent on actual effectiveness (understood as a non-legal property 
consisting in the fact that the rule is observed) and not on applicability (understood 
as a legal property consisting in the fact that the rule is legally to be applied). 
!
In the absence of such a third rule, the interpretative alternatives to deal with 
conflicts are not sound: it could be argued that one of the conflicting rules include 
an implicit clause according to which the other one is not to be applied in case of 
conflict. In the case of a dying son inside someone else’s property, we would still 
have two rules, one of which forbids to enter the private property without the 
owner’s authorisation; but the rule that requires the parents to save their sons would 
implicitly include in its content a clause according to which the prohibition to enter 
is not to be applied in cases in which entering is required of parents in order to save 
their sons. The second alternative is to understand that there is only one rule whose 
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semantic content arises from a combination of the contents of the original ones : 142
the elements of the preferred rule are included as negative elements into the content 
of the operative facts of the displaced one—if we are to solve the normative conflict 
in favour of the requirement to save, then our only rule will assert that it is 
forbidden to enter a private property without the owner’s authorisation if that is not 
required for parents to save their son , so a ‘limitative clause’ is to be added to the 143
one of the original rules . 144
!
There is a trivial sense in which these interpretative solutions that dissolve the 
conflict at the level of the contents of the rules involved are unsound: an example of 
the first alternative is found in Jorge Rodriguez’s work. He claims that in cases of 
conflict we assume a criterion that gives preference to the permission, ‘and 
therefore, our representation of the rules can be restated’ as composed by two rules 
that do not stand in conflict. But if there is no conflict among the rules, then he 
cannot claim that in these cases ‘we assume that there is a criterion that assigns 
preference’ to one solution over the other ‘in cases of conflict’ . The problem is 145
that each rule is defined by its content, so an alteration of the content entails the 
disappearance of the original rule and the creation of a new one, but in that move 
the object that is supposed to be modified has disappeared—the rule that requires to 
save cannot modify the rule that forbids to enter, for only regarding such original 
content we can understand that there is a conflict to be solved in the first place, one 
that requires the modification of the forbidding rule. To avoid this, it can be argued 
that there are no rules before the systematic interpretation that renders non-
conflicting rules, so when we identify the ‘conflict’ what we really have are just 
legislative statements that have to be interpreted in order to arrive to definitive, non-
conflicting rules . Although this approach would still have to clarify how 146
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‘legislative statements’ are to be understood , the main problem is practical: since 147
each rule can conflict with multiple other rules, the modification of their contents 
would lead either to an endless multiplication of rules (one for each possible 
conflicting rule) or to one semantically overloaded rule (that includes in its content 
implicit clauses regarding each possible conflicting rule). In either case, until all the 
prima facie rules or legislative statements are considered, no rule can be formulated. 
!
Kelsen’s coercive understanding of law, collapsing the distinction between external 
and internal applicability, exemplifies this interpretative stance. For him, every 
proper legal norm is a sanction-norm, one that specifies all the conditions on whose 
fulfilment a sanction is made dependant . With this, rules of preference, and in 148
general, all rules that serve to determine the application of a legal sanction, are 
included in the content of each legal norm. Thus, the contents of what we are here 
understanding as rules of preference are included as a negative element in the 
content of what Kelsen calls ‘primary’ norms. Understanding that each legal rule 
includes in its content all the conditions for the imposition of a sanction, allows him 
to understand that there are no conflicts between primary norms: before he shifted 
his position in the ‘60s , he claimed that ‘conflicts of norms within the normative 149
order which is the object of cognition can and must be solved by interpretation’. So, 
if the conflicting norms were created at different times, then the application of lex 
posteriori principle entails that ‘the validity of the latter norm supersedes the 
validity of the earlier’. If the conflicting norms were prescribed simultaneously, 
then ‘either the two norms can be understood to be subject to a choice or one can be 
understood to be limiting the validity of the other (…) If neither one nor the other 
interpretation is possible, then the legislator creates something meaningless’ and ‘no 
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objectively valid legal norm is present’ . As Joseph Raz has pointed out , 150 151
Kelsen’s legal norms become semantically very extensive: all the justifications and 
excuses that exclude punishing a theft, together with the rules regarding 
concurrence of felonies and all the procedural regulation that defines general 
conditions for imposing a sanction, also have to be included in the definitive 
formulation. 
!
If we are to avoid these undesired consequences and still remain capable of 
analysing the applicability of a rule to a concrete case, positing shorter rules of 
preference that command the displacement of conflicting, but also simpler rules, is a 
convenient alternative. That is, every normative conflict requires the application of 
a third rule that determines the application of one and the displacement of the other. 
What is crucial to notice is that the operation of a rule of preference does not 
exclude the displaced rule from the legal system. 
!
b) Implicit derogation as a problem of applicability 
!
A useful legal category to make this explicit, is that of ‘implicit derogation’ and the 
qualitative difference between it and the explicit derogation. The latter corresponds 
to a legislative act in which by the enactment of a rule the validity of a previous one 
is ended. This takes place by explicitly mentioning the original law in the content of 
the new one, which declares that the validity or force of the first is terminated, in 
Kelsen’s terms: derogation is the repeal of validity of an already valid norm by 
another norm, so ‘derogating norms are dependent norms’ . Because of this, the 152
location of explicit derogation within the theory of law lies in the category of 
normative powers , in relation to the secondary rules of change. 153
!
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The implicit derogation, on the other hand, is just a matter of application, more 
precisely, it takes place by the operation of lex posterior derogat legi priori. 
Although this is a problem that can be analysed in great detail, we can say in 
general terms that implicit derogation is configured when we have, in the same legal 
system, two rules that are in a relation of incompatibility, so it is not just that in a 
particular case is impossible to follow both, but that there is an incompatibility 
regarding their semantic contents—it depends on a relation at the intensional level 
that is configured by the fact that they either share the same semantic content or by 
the fact that the semantic content of the older rule constitutes a ‘sub-set’ of the 
semantic content of the newer one . It is because of such a relation at the 154
intensional level of the rules, that on their extensional level we find that every 
situation in which legi priori is to be applied is also a situation in which lex 
posterior is to be applied too; so if the consequences that the pair of rules assign to 
their shared content are impossible to enforce simultaneously, then the judge cannot 
comply with both the old and the new rule and she will just have to leave one un-
applied. The question is if from such un-application we can infer something about 
the validity of the displaced rule, and the answer will depend on the nature of the 
solution that is given to the contradiction. 
!
A good case to study the problem is the important USSC’s decision on United States 
v. Salerno. What was being discussed in that case was the Bail Reform Act of 1984. 
The different ways in which this case can be thematised depends on the JR model 
under which it is analysed, and the different answers to which they lead will be 
addressed at the end of Section 2.2 of the present chapter; for now, I will just use 
the rules involved in Salermo to exemplify different possible relations between 
them and explain how lex posterior can serve to deal with them. According to the 
Act, in order to decide on the preventive detention of a person accused of a criminal 
offence, the judge must consider whether or not the defendant’s freedom constitutes 
a present danger to the community. Previously to the Act things were different, 
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because for defendants not accused of capital crimes, bail was denied ‘only when a 
fair adjudication could not be otherwise ensured’ . The relevance of this case to 155
the American jurisprudence is enormous, for it defined the conditions on whose 
fulfilment depends the distinction between facial and applied constitutional 
challenges, this is, as it was explained discussing Dorf’s work , it marks the 156
difference between unconstitutionalities grounded on concrete conflicts, and those 
that can be declared regardless of a particular infraction. 
!
To properly understand the relation between both rules, what has to be noticed is 
that the content of the previous standard constitutes a sub-set of the content of the 
latter standard: defendants not accused of committing a capital crime constitute a 
sub-set of defendants accused of a criminal offence. These rules stand in a relation 
of inclusion, since their semantic content is such that every case that instantiates the 
operative facts of the original rule also instantiates the operative fact of the new 
rule, but not the other way around. This means that whenever a judge is faced with a 
defendant that, not being accused of committing a capital crime, asks to be released 
on bail, she cannot follow both the previous standard for bail and the new one 
contained in the Act, and she cannot do it because following the first requires her to 
ignore what she must consider according to the second, and to consider the second 
impedes her to follow the first—this exclusionary effect is configured by the 
inclusion of the adverb only in the content of the original rule. If a judge is to decide 
on the defendant’s freedom, she faces the problem that each rule is internally 
applicable to the case, but they provide not just different, but incompatible answers 
to the same question. In this scenario, the judge has to solve the problem by giving 
preference to one of the rules over the other, and this is when lex posterior derogat 
legi priori can enter in the adjudicating process: if this principle is to be applied, 
then the new rule is the one to be preferred in the decision of the case. Since this 
situation is not dependent of the concrete configuration of a case, but is configured 
by the fact that the semantic contents of the norms demand incompatible actions to 
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the judge regarding defendants not accused of committing a capital crime, the old 
standard has completely lost its applicability. That is why this phenomenon is called 
‘derogation’: as long as lex posterior derogat legi priori is recognised, lex priori is 
never to be applied again—implicit derogation can thus be defined as the necessary 
lack of application, due to the operation of the principle of lex posteriori, of one 
rule whose operative facts are either identical with, or a sub set of, the operative 
facts of a later rule. 
!
According to this, in cases of implicit derogation the relation between the pair of 
rules is one of normative contradiction, and the solution to the normative conflict 
that arises from it in a concrete case is achieved by the application of lex posteriori 
principle—it is this principle what serves as a rule of preference to displace one rule 
in favour of the other . What has to be analysed is whether the application of this 157
principle entails anything regarding the validity of the displaced rule. And to answer 
this is important to notice that lex posteriori is not applicable only to cases of 
normative contradiction: if the relation between the operative facts of the rules is 
not of identity nor speciality, but overlapping, so that there can be cases to which 
the old rule is applicable but not the new one, then still the criteria of lex posterior 
indicates that the new rule is to be applied over the older one in those cases where 
both of them are applicable. 
!
A simple modification of the original case can serve as an example. Suppose, as 
before, that the original standard only applies to defendants not accused of 
committing a capital crime, but now the Act is only to be applied to repeat 
offenders. Now, if the judge faces a case in which a recidivist that is not accused of 
a capital crime asks to be released on bail, then both rules are in principle applicable 
and they both require incompatible solutions. If the lex posterior principle is 
followed, the judge should decide based on the new rule, but we shouldn’t go as far 
as to say that the old one is ‘implicitly abolished’, because even if such principle 
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were always followed, the old rule is still applicable to all cases in which non-
recidivist request bail: in this example the extension of the rules only ‘overlap’—
there is no relation of identity nor specialty or inclusion between them, so there are 
cases to which only legi priori is applicable (when the defendant is a non-recidivist 
not accused of committing a capital crime), cases to which only lex posterior is 
applicable (when the defendant is a recidivist accused of committing a capital 
crime) and cases in which both rules are applicable (when the defendant is both a 
recidivist and someone accused of committing a capital crime)—only for this last 
group the principle of lex posterior is to be operationalised. 
!
The relation between this new pair of rules is no longer one of normative 
contradiction, they just happen to stand, in some concrete cases, in normative 
conflict. This means that lex posteriori serves as a rule of preference for the solution 
of both normative conflicts and normative contradictions, and only in the second 
case it leads to what is called ‘implicit derogation’. So, every case of implicit 
derogation supposes the applicability of lex posterior principle, but not every 
instance of application of such principle leads to the ‘implicit derogation’ of the 
displaced old rule. But even more than that, the same rule of preference can operate 
even in the absence of a normative conflict. Allow me to provide one final variation 
of this example to prove the point: suppose that the original standard simply 
requires, for defendants not accused of a capital crime, to consider the possibility of 
a fair trial; and that the new one requires, for recidivists, to consider the present 
danger to the community—unlike the previous case, now the adverb only is 
nowhere to be found in either rule. Given these formulations, both rules that stand 
in a relation of overlapping are simultaneously enforceable: for a recidivist not 
accused of committing a capital crime, the judge can simultaneously consider both 
if the defendant’s release affects the possibility of a fair trial and also whether his 
freedom presents a danger to the community. There is no normative contradiction or 
a normative conflict, but if we understand that demanding this double evaluation is 
inappropriate or inconvenient, then the lex posteriori principle can still work as a 
rule of preference, displacing the first one and indicating that when it comes to 
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recidivist defendants, the judge should only consider if his freedom puts the 
community in danger.  
!
So, if we previously saw that implicit derogation entails the application of lex 
posteriori, but the application of lex posteriori does not entail an implicit 
derogation, now we see that the operation of lex posteriori as a rule of preference 
doesn’t even require a normative conflict. And this is not a particular feature of the 
specific principle here at issue, but a general characteristic of rules of preference. 
The most conspicuous case in which a rule of preference is applied in absence of a 
normative conflict is the one that is verified regarding the relation between parricide 
or infanticide and homicide:  as in these three cases the sanction corresponds to a 
period of time in prison, there is no incompatibility between the rules—whoever 
kills his son within his first 48 hours of independent life can simultaneously suffer 
the consequences assigned to all three crimes. But, against this interpretation, we 
usually understand that the penalty associated with infanticide is the only one 
applicable, and the offender will only be convicted for such felony. 
!
These rules of preference, as we have seen, are necessarily applied in cases of 
normative conflict, whether they are the extensional expression of an underlying 
intensional normative contradiction or not, and also in cases in which different 
solutions are ordered by different rules, even when those solutions are not 
incompatible. Carlos Alchourrón and Eugenio Bulygin defend that there is no 
difference between derogation (at the legislative level) and the ordering of 
conflicting rules that is established by the judge, they claim that ‘an alteration of the 
organising relations is just as fundamental as the elimination of contents’, since ‘the 
contents that are put aside when another rule is preferred are just as inapplicable as 
if they were abolished’ . For them, rules of preference seem to operate just as 158
derogating rules—and if the latter affects the validity of rules, then so would the 
former. To prove that this is not the case and that the displacement of a rule does not 
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entail lack of validity, it is enough to look at the different consequences that follow 
from the abolishment of the explicitly derogating law from those that follow from 
the abolishment of the implicitly derogating law: while the explicit derogation of 
the explicitly derogating law does not produce the re-validation of the repealed 
law , the explicit derogation of the implicitly derogating law determines the full 159
applicability of the implicitly derogated law; and the same is the case, mutatis 
mutandis, with the (explicit) derogation of lex specialis or lex superior. The reason 
for this is that once the implicitly derogating law is abolished and the normative 
conflict disappears, there is now just one rule that is applicable and therefore the 
conditions for the operation of the rule of preference are no longer fulfilled. The 
originally displaced law doesn’t recover its validity (it never lost it), but its scope of 
application. This regaining of applicability will take place every time the preferred 
law is ‘modified’  in a way that makes it no longer impossible nor inconvenient to 160
apply both norms simultaneously: the modification of the (until then) preferred rule 
can unproblematically determine the re-applicability of the (until then) displaced 
one. 
!
This means that the preference for the new rule instead of the old one, in cases of 
implicit derogation (the strongest case possible of displacement of a rule in 
consideration to a rule of preference), does not exclude the displaced one from the 
legal system, and it could not be any other way, precisely because the improperly 
called derogating effect is not based on the exercise of normative powers, but on 
rules that are located at the level of the secondary rules of adjudication; the 
operation of the rule of preference only takes place at the time of application: the 
judge must reach one decision and two rules in principle applicable lead to 
incompatible or incoherent answers—one is not to be applied, but its validity 
doesn’t need to be questioned. Not even in cases of implicit derogation can we say 
that the displaced rule is no longer valid. On the other hand, since explicit 
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derogation constitutes an exercise of legislative powers that are directed towards the 
validity of a rule, its abolishment leaves the repealed law outside the legal system. 
Explicit derogation—unlike implicit derogation or the effects of any operation of a 
rule of preference—is not dependent on a conflict or discrepancy at the extensional 
level between norms : there is no normative conflict at all between a rule and the 161
rule that explicitly abolishes it, because the operative facts of the repealed law are 
not part of the content of the repealing one.  
!
Salerno has proved to be quite useful; it has served us to show that the analysis and 
resolution of a normative conflict or, even less, a case with different solutions that, 
despite being compatible are nevertheless inadequate to apply conjunctively, 
necessarily involves the operation of a rule of preference that commands the 
displacement of one of the involved rules—the same solution is given in all three 
cases, even when there is no conflict. But this displacement doesn’t entail the 
voidness of the deferred rule, not even in cases of implicit derogation. And the 
contradiction cannot by itself entail it, since the displacement that is effected by the 
operation of a rule of preference is compatible with understanding that both 
internally applicable rules are valid, that the conflict is one between rules that are 
members of the system . 162
!
If we take a brief look at the debate about the ontology of norms, we’ll see that this 
conclusion is sound: it will be endorsed by anyone who defends what is called ‘an 
expressive conception of norms’ . According to it, what characterises norms vis-à-163
vis other kind of statements is their pragmatic force: norms are the result of a 
prescriptive use of language. If this is the case, then a norm exists when a set of 
empirical facts obtains (i.e. when the act of prescribing it is verified), and thus 
 92
 In a similar sense, Kelsen (1991), 108. His position on this matter is not clear: he does mention that 161
derogation can occur in two different situations, and one of them would be when there is an incompatibility 
between two norms; at the same time, he says that ‘the fact that two conflicting norms cannot be applied 
together is no reason for assuming that one of them repeals the validity of the other’ (111).
 Kelsen (1973), 228.162
 Alchourrón & Bulygin (1998), 385.163
norms are not understood as abstract, but as concrete entities . Since they are 164
understood as concrete entities, although we can predicate of them temporal and 
spacial conditions—we can say that they exist during a period of time in a given 
place—we cannot attribute to them the capacity of taking place in logical 
relations . This is Kelsen’s position: his understanding of norms’ existence 165
precludes the possibility of subjecting them to the principle of no-contradiction 
which, depending on the possibility of distributing a truth-values, is applicable to 
descriptive propositions but not to existing entities. Since they cannot stand in 
contradiction, ‘we cannot claim that if one of the conflicting norms is valid, the 
other must be invalid (…) When we have a conflict of norms, both norms are valid; 
otherwise, there would be no conflict’ . We’ve seen that since validity does not 166
entail applicability, then we can have a conflict with just one valid rule (or even 
without any valid rules, as long as they are both within the judge’s scope of 
competence and internally applicable); but his point would stand even if a conflict 
that includes non-valid rules is accepted: not being abstract entities, from the fact 
that the observation of one implies the violation of the other, we cannot infer that 
one has to be invalid . 167
!
So, any expressive conception of norms requires to accept that normative 
contradictions cannot by themselves lead to the voidness of one of the rules at issue
—it cannot lead to it because, even if they require incompatible actions at the 
intensional level, they do not logically contradict each other. This doesn’t mean, 
however, that to reject such conception of norms entails accepting the invalidity of 
one of the contradictory norms. Opposed to the expressive conception, in a ‘hyletic’ 
understanding, norms are characterised at the semantic level. They would 
correspond to the meaning (and not to the illocutionary force) of certain 
expressions, being purely ‘conceptual entities, independent of language’ that can be 
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expressed by linguistic means —i.e., by normative sentences: ‘a normative 168
sentence is the expression of a norm, and a norm is said to be the meaning of a 
normative sentence in much the same way in which a proposition is regarded as the 
meaning (sense) of a descriptive sentence’ . The problem with this approach lies 169
on the fact that since norms are like propositions, they are not subject to spacial and 
temporal predicates, so we could not say that they exist for a period of time in a 
defined location.  
!
But these two alternatives do not constitute a dichotomy . As Josep Vilajosana and 170
Riccardo Guastini have shown , the problem with these understandings is that 171
they assume that the conditions to individuate norms (conditions located at the 
pragmatic level, in the expressive conception; and located at the semantic level, in 
the hyletic one) entail an answer regarding their ontological properties. If both 
problems are distinguished, then we can defend that (similarly to the hyletic 
conception) norms correspond not to statements, but to what is expressed by norm-
formulations (the signs or symbols used in the enunciation of the norms ). These 172
formulations can be understood as deontic sentences  that are syntactically 173
characterised as the combination of a deontic operator (forbidden, required, 
permitted or liberated) with a semantic content constituted by a type of action (to 
kill, to rape, etc.) . With these criteria for individuating norms, they are 174
meaningful entities that—like descriptive propositions—can stand in logical 
relations: two norms can be incompatible, so normative contradictions are possible. 
But this doesn’t commit us to attribute to them a set of ontological properties 
equivalent to that of descriptive propositions. And we do not need to be committed 
to these ontological properties, because our characterisation is compatible with 
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understanding that their existence, when it comes to legal norms at least, can be 
conceptualised in relation to their membership in the relevant legal system. In this 
sense, to say that a norm exists means that it is a member of a set. Since this 
endorsement of existence-as-membership is compatible with the previous 
characterisation of norms as ‘what is expressed by a norm-formulation’, now we 
can predicate of norms both spacial and temporal properties, for they depend on 
their conditions of existence; and at the same time, we can claim that norms stand in 
logical relations, since those depend on their characterisation . And because their 175
existence corresponds to their membership, the verification of a normative 
contradiction would only entail the lack of validity (or nonexistence) of one of the 
contradictory norms if the conditions of membership so establish it. 
!
c) Contradiction as the basis of unconstitutionality 
!
If norms can stand in a relation of normative contradiction—which, in turn, depends 
on the meaning of the rules involved—, but from such contradiction it doesn’t 
immediately follow their lack of validity, then a normative contradiction and not a 
normative conflict is suitable to be the basis of unconstitutionality: as long as 
unconstitutionality entails the lack of validity of the law that is deemed 
unconstitutional, then it cannot depend on a problem that is configured at the level 
of application, on the verification of a contingent fact-in-the-extensional-sense. To 
keep the categories ‘clean’, we can now make sense of unconstitutionality as 
property that arises out of the verification of a normative contradiction. In order to 
arrive to this we just need to endorse the reasonable assumption that a law that is 
incompatible with the constitution is unconstitutional—such relation of 
incompatibility doesn’t by itself lead to the unconstitutionality nor lack of validity, 
but is apt to serve as the underlying property on which unconstitutionality arises . 176
This means that in order to arrive at the declaration of unconstitutionality, the 
constitutional judge has to assume (if it is not explicitly stated) as her major premise 
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some proposition along the following lines: ‘A legal rule that is incompatible with a 
constitutional provision is invalid’ . From this point onwards, I will take this 177
statement as the underlying premise for declarations of unconstitutionality. Such 
major premise, taken together with a minor one asserting the incompatibility or 
normative contradiction between law and constitution, leads to declare the law void
—all this chapter can be read as an attempt to justify such major premise and 
differentiate it from another one referring to normative conflicts. And the crucial 
thing that has to be noted is that this incompatibility is not configured at the 
extensional level of the rules involved, so it doesn't depend on a problem of 
application, but is configured at the stable level of the intensions of the rules, 
intensions that remain unchanged through its infinite applications in infinite 
concrete cases or controversies. 
!
By making this distinction clear, we are now in position to put forward a dual 
understanding of JR, one in which the question about the constitutionality of an 
application, being grounded on a normative conflict, can be addressed separately 
from the question regarding the constitutionality of the law itself, which is 
understood as dependent on the configuration of a normative contradiction. 
!
2.2. Marbury as a problem of application 
!
In the light of the foregoing análisis we can now return to suggest a different, 
plausible, reading of Marbury v. Madison. 
!
We just saw that in all cases of normative conflict the judge must decide according 
to the applicable rule and leave without application another one. This means that 
from the verification of a normative conflict it is legitimate to arrive to the non-
applicability of one of the conflicting rules. To decide which is to be preferred, the 
judge must consider all relevant criteria for the solution of normative conflicts and 
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all rules of competence that are applicable to that particular case. The problem with 
Marshall’s argument, as we have said, can be identified as the illegitimate 
connection that he proposed between validity, on one hand, and normative conflict 
and applicability, on the other. But once the validity is taken outside the argument, 
things seem to run quite smoothly: we can reorganise his argument as one that 
connects a normative conflict between a constitutional rule and a legal one, with the 
lack of applicability of the latter to the concrete case. That is the solution to which 
one is to arrive by the application of a rule of preference that commands the 
displacement of the legal rule, displacement that does not necessarily involve the 
voidness of the displaced rule. 
!
Only once JR is seen like this, as a matter of deciding on the applicability of the 
appropriate rule to a concrete case in which a normative conflict is configured, the 
‘little old judge argument’ could be accepted ; for as far as it is—structurally at 178
least—the same problem whether the collision is between a constitutional and a 
legal rule or it is configured with two or more rules belonging to the same hierarchy, 
the judge will be confined to the moment of application, resolving which rule is the 
appropriate to enforce on the concrete case she has in front of her. The question 
about validity doesn’t need to be raised, for the non-application of a rule when it 
collides on a particular case with another one, does not say anything about the 
validity of said rule. It is important, nevertheless, to repeat one more time that even 
if this understanding of concrete review is sound, JRA is not a necessary feature that 
just follows from adjudicative powers, for it is perfectly possible to have 
competence rules that prevents some (or even all) courts from directly applying the 
constitution, and if the constitutional rules are taken outside the competence of a 
judge, then no constitutional normative conflict can arise. 
!
With these considerations in mind, we can reorganise the argument presented in 
Marbury as follows: 
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!
i. The constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 
!
ii. The duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. 
!
iii. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on the applicability 
of one of them. 
!
iv. If a law is in opposition to the constitution, then the constitution must govern the 
case. 
!
This way, two changes are made to the original interpretation: first, we are 
excluding the second premise of Marshall’s argument (the illegitimate movement of 
relating the conflict with the voidness of some piece of legislation). Second, a new 
meaning to the expression ‘saying the law’ is demanded: now, it is not about saying 
what the general valid law is, but what the law is for this case. Let’s go back to 
Salerno to explore both changes. 
!
That case can now be understood as presenting two different questions: on the one 
hand, whether or not the new standard set for bail is compatible with the previous 
and constitutional one. We saw that they stood in a relation of normative 
contradiction, that the semantic content of the original provision (that refers to 
defendants not accused of a capital crime) constituted a sub-set of the semantic 
content of the Act (that refers to defendants in general) and that they both assigned 
incompatible requirements to the judge. If unconstitutionality arises from 
contradiction, then the Act should be declared unconstitutional, regardless of the 
fact that it can be applied in cases in which no normative conflict is configured 
(those in which the defendant is accused of committing a capital crime): the 
relevant property for unconstitutionality is to be identified in consideration to the 
rules’ intensions, not on concrete extensions. But such question is not properly 
thematised in a concrete and diffuse model of JR—as we have seen, the nature of 
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this query demands an abstract and concentrated system. In a system like the 
American, the proper question to ask the court is if the application of the legal 
provision is, in a concrete case, in conflict with the constitution, and the answer will 
depend on the particularities of the case: if the defendant is accused of a capital 
crime, then the Act does not conflict with the constitutional standard and therefore it 
can be applied; but if the defendant is not accused of a capital crime, a conflict 
arises and the application of the Act would be unconstitutional. The point is made 
clearer if we return to our first variation of Salerno: in it, the Act only applies to 
repeat offenders, so this alternative rule only ‘overlaps’ with the original one—there 
is no contradiction between them, but its application to a recidivist that is not 
accused of a capital crime should be declared unconstitutional. The answer to be 
given about the Act’s applicability does not allow us to move in direction to its 
voidness, so while the first question requires the judge to say what the law is, in the 
sense to declare if a piece of legislation is valid; with the second question the judge 
still says what the law is, but only in the sense of deciding what is the law for this 
case in which two rules are applicable. 
!
Having constructed a proper distinction between validity and application, we see 
that with the same pair of rules, two different questions can be asked, each 
presenting its own challenges: the question about validity requires defending a 
relation between the intensions of the rules, be it of identity, inclusion or 
overlapping, to decide if the semantic content of one is identical or corresponds to a 
sub-set of the other. The question about application presents a different problem, 
that of deciding if the concrete case that serves as the object of the judicial decision 
(object that instantiates infinite properties and supports infinite true descriptions) 
constitutes an instance of the semantic content of the rules at issue; and, if it were to 
instantiate more that one rule, it requires the judge to decide which rule or rules are 
to be preferred. These different understandings of what it is to ‘say the law’—that 
correlate with the distinction between validity and application, normative 
contradiction and normative conflict—are grounded in the extensionality that 
characterises concrete cases, and they will be again contrasted in Section 6.4 of the 
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following chapter. There, it will be argued that a strictly judicial decision regarding 
the validity or constitutionality of a piece of legislation is impossible: while the 
question asked in JRL is a demand to ‘say the law’ in the sense of deciding on the 
validity of a rule, a judicial answer is one that ‘says the law’ in the sense of 
deciding on the application of a rule.  
!
2.3. The judicial duty to ‘say the law’ 
!
It is possible to correlate the two senses of ‘saying the law’ with two different 
understandings of the judicial function, so we can see how the problem presented by 
JR connects with the problem of characterising adjudication in general—
characterisation that will constitute the main issue in the next chapter. When it 
comes to the applicability question, ‘saying the law’ relates to the identification of 
relevant standards for the decision of a concrete case, but once ‘saying the law’ is 
disconnected from application, the duty of the judicial department is understood in 
terms of the identification of general propositions of law that do not need to be 
applicable to any particular case that the judge is required to adjudicate. A brief, 
critical exploration of the contrast between these two approaches to adjudication—
each treating in isolation a different aspect of adjudication: one that focuses on the 
power to decide cases and another that highlights the power to attribute meaning to 
law—will serve as an adequate preamble to the following chapter about 
adjudication. 
!
Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer exemplify the second alternative . In their 179
view, the USSC is first and foremost a constitutional interpreter, a law-maker and 
not a case-decider . It is supposed to behave as a general interpreter of the law, 180
regardless of its applicability to a concrete case; so it can instruct, guide, help and 
order other bodies and branches in relation to the proper way of understanding the 
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law . By engaging in this general interpretative task, the court secures the law’s 181
capability to determine courses of action despite the existence of contesting 
interpretations, which threaten ‘the settlement function of law’  even in the 182
absence of a concrete case or controversy . The court, for them, is an ‘opinion 183
purveyor’  allowed to provide ‘useful statements about the law unnecessary to the 184
result in the case’  and mandatory for other institutions .  185 186
!
While Alexander and Schauer understand the judicial function as one defined by 
interpretation, neglecting the ‘case-deciding’ aspect of it—which, despite being 
explicitly granted to the courts by the Constitution is seen as just a detail; Edward 
Hartnett and John Harrison seem to endorse the complete inverse relation between 
cases and interpretation, understanding that the possibility to interpret the law is 
dependent or accessory vis-à-vis the power to decide cases: for the former, the 
judicial function it is reduced to ‘authoritatively resolving particular cases between 
particular parties. So long as some court—be it a state court or a lower federal court
—has the last word regarding “what is to be done” about a particular case between 
particular parties, the judicial settlement function is fulfilled’ . Similarly, Harrison 187
claims that ‘the power to interpret the Constitution, however, comes from the case-
deciding power. To suggest that the power to interpret is primary, and the case 
deciding power, secondary, is to misinterpret the Constitution and to confuse cause 
and effect’ . Now the priority is given to the case-deciding power, and the fact that 188
judicial decisions are supposed to be based on law is taken as a secondary feature. 
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!
Both opposing approaches to the judicial function, I will argue, are misconstrued. 
Nevertheless, taken together they serve to identify the crucial aspects of 
adjudication—they are misconstrued because not enough attention is given to 
interdependence of the two factors that each approach independently singles-out: I 
will claim that the relation between the particular case and the general law is no 
accident of the judicial activity, but its defining feature. So (with Alexander and 
Schauer, and pace Hartnett and Harrison) we shouldn't start from ‘deciding cases’ 
and then, in a secondary moment add the requirement to perform such function in 
consideration to the applicable general laws; nor (with Hartnett and Harrison, and 
pace Alexander and Schauer) should we should start by asserting that the judicial 
role is ‘to interpret the law’ and then constrain such activity to the context of 
particular cases. What is going to be defended in the next chapter is that an 
appropriate understanding of the judicial activity lies in figuring out the relation 
between general, legal rules and particular cases—or, in Hart’s words, by ‘the 
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In the previous chapter I have tried to offer a characterisation of JRL that allows us 
properly to understand the nature of the question that those cases put forward. To 
develop such study, I used Marbury as a starting point to confront abstract and 
concrete models of JR. Based on their differences, I presented a theory about the 
functions that each model aims to achieve, and with it, the question that on each 
case the court must answer. I concluded that while on concrete models what was at 
stake was the applicability of a piece of legislation in consideration to a 
constitutional rule, on abstract models the question refers to the validity of a law in 
consideration to its relations with a constitutional provision. I argued that the 
function of concrete models requires the judge to assess the existence of a 
normative conflict that takes place at the extensional level of the rules involved, but 
when it comes to abstract review, what the judge faces is a possible normative 
contradiction between the rules’ intensions.  
!
Those previous steps can be understood as attempting to define the problem that is 
presented to the judge on JRL cases. What I want to do next is to identify the 
features of a judicial decision, that is, to identify under what conditions a solution to 
the problem that is put forward can be understood as properly judicial. The 
importance of this, as I have previously remarked, is that the idea that underpins the 
justification of JRL is that of judicially enforcing legal limits to political decisions 
adopted by the lawmaker; so, in order to make sense of what that means, and to 
identify the extent to which such goal is possible, we need to put forward some 
theory that allows to identify when a legal decision can be understood as being a 
judicial decision. In this way, once we have identified both the question that is 
presented to the judge and the defining features of a judicial answer, we will be in a 
position to present a theory that provides the coordinates within which an answer to 
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such question could claim to be aligned with the institution’s underlying promise of 
judicially enforcing constitutional limits to the legislation.  
!
If on the previous chapter we could only provide some characterisation of JRL by 
analysing it hand in hand with what we called JRA, now, our study of the judicial 
function will demand us to run, up to some extent, parallel considerations about the 
legislative function . By doing this, I will try to extend the double correlation that 190
was constructed in the previous chapter (extensional problem, normative conflict 
and application, on the one hand; and intensional problem, normative contradiction 
and validity, on the other), and the key element that will serve us to move forward is 
to be found in the binomial extension/intension. I will argue that it is that same 
binomial what allows us to make sense of the distinction between application and 
justification discourse, and with them, the distance between adjudication and 
legislation. I will defend that it is the existence of concrete, radical particulars, and 
the problems that come with them, what serves to characterise judicial decisions. 
The lack of such extensional dimension, on the other hand, will be taken as 
distinctive feature of legislative, justificatory ones. 
!
By doing this, I do not mean to provide a full-blown, exhaustive theory of 
adjudication. What I am aiming for is something more modest: to identify key 
features of judicial decisions, characteristics that have to be verified for a judicial 
moment to arise. What I will try to identify are necessary, but not necessarily 
sufficient, conditions for adjudication, so it is enough that they do not obtain in JRL 
to configure a dilemma. 
!
To move in this direction, I will begin by presenting a general scheme of what is 
usually called a ‘mechanical’ model of adjudication (1). Then, I will put forward 
two common objections to it (2): the first one relates to a problem that is taken to be 
purely semantic and that arises from the indeterminacy of language—the most 
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conspicuous case here would be that of ‘vagueness’ (2.1). The second objection is 
understood as an axiological one, related to the adequacy of deciding a case 
according to the general solution given by a legal rule—this is what usually is 
discussed under the topic of ‘defeasibility’ (2.2). I will argue that these objections 
play a key role in understanding the essential aspect of the judicial moment, that the 
mark of success for theory of adjudication lies on its capability of giving an account 
of both, in explaining how the judge is supposed to overcome them. In (3) I will use 
Fernando Atria’s approach to adjudication to present a non-semantic understanding 
of it: while he doesn’t deny that there are semantic challenges, when it comes to 
characterising adjudication, these are understood as secondary vis-à-vis substantive 
problems of appropriateness. I will argue that this displacement of the semantic 
questions to a lesser role has consequences: the theory, that is grounded on Michael 
Detmold’s particularity void (3.1) and Klaus Günther’s sense of appropriateness 
(3.2), leads to understand that the key aspect of the judicial moment is found on the 
decision about the external applicability of the rule at issue (3.3). With this, while 
the challenge of crossing the distance between the intensionality of the rule and the 
extensionality of the particular case is adequately identified, objections will be 
presented regarding the offered solution (4): I will claim that the approach entails 
the resurgence of the justificatory question (4.1) and therefore stands at odds with 
law’s operation (4.2). To escape this blockage without leaving the right 
neighbourhood, I will recur to Nicos Stavropoulos’ and Hilary Putnam’s work in 
order to remark the semantic dimension of the question of appropriateness (5). This 
will require to challenge the semantic assumption that underlies the displacement of 
the question of appropriateness outside the theory of meaning or semantic theory 
(5.1), thus bringing the crucial moment of adjudication back to the question about 
the internal applicability of the rule (5.2)—only then we would be in position to 
provide a viable scheme of adjudication that, dealing simultaneously with both 
vagueness and defeasibility, stays within law’s boundaries (5.3). The last part 
constitutes an attempt to model judicial decisions on the Sellarsian distinction 
between different patterns of linguistic activity (6). To do this, I will first examine 
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these three patterns (6.1); then, the empirical or extensional content of language-
entry transitions will be addressed (6.2), and finally a relation between the 
particularity void and observational freedom will be presented as a defining feature 
of the judicial moment (6.3), rendering the notion of JRL an analytical impossibility 
(6.4). 
!
1. A familiar starting point 
!
It is a plateau in legal reasoning to say that deductive reasoning through a legal 
syllogism is a substantial part of adjudication, but that it is—of course—not all 
there is to it. The scheme is well known: a legal norm works as a major premise; the 
facts of the case form the minor one and the decision corresponds to the conclusion 
that follows deductively from them . Some might say, probably with Neil 191
MacCormick , that sometimes the whole legal reasoning can be deductive in its 192
essence, others could say that such picture is never enough by itself, but that it is 
nevertheless characteristic of most instances of adjudication . So, the general 193
discussion is not about whether or not this model adequately captures adjudication 
but has to do with the extent to which is insufficient—the syllogistic structure plays 
a role in legal reasoning, but legal reasoning as a whole goes beyond it.  
!
Using John Gardner’s example , the basis or rough structure of adjudication 194
according to the legal syllogism could look like something like this: 
!
Law: If X then Y —> Tortfeasors are liable to pay full reparative 
damages to those whom they tortuously injure; 
!
Case: X —> Jones tortuously injured Smith to the tune of $50; 
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!
Decision: Y —> Therefore, Jones is liable to pay Smith $50 in 
reparative damages. 
!
But, the whole point of the current debate about this topic is that such model is 
inadequate to fully grasp what is going on the applicative moment. ‘Most of legal 
reasoning’—Brian Leiter tells us— ‘is given over to explaining why the applicable 
rule of law is, in fact, the applicable rule of law, and what the legally significant 
facts are. And such reasoning is rarely ‘“mechanical” in the sense of “obvious” or 
machine-like’ : there are previous steps that have to be taken before the legal 195
syllogism can play a role in the judge’s legal reasoning. 
!
The case can be terribly complex and not adequately defined only by some property 
X. Also, it might be very obscure whether the case is actually an X or not, or if the 
operative facts of the law are actually X. We are told that there are too many 
delicate considerations that this model cannot give account for. Addressing the 
issue, MacCormick says that the problem of interpretation must on occasion arise, 
and with it, a choice has to be made, choice for which a deductive justification as 
the one presented is ‘evidently’ impossible . He adds that a ‘problem of relevance’ 196
can arise too, problem that questions the legal status of the major premise involved; 
in such case it is not enough justification to present the syllogistic structure, since it 
is crucial that the syllogism discloses in the plea in law ‘a legally valid major 
premise’—a formula which will be ‘a sufficient legal “warrant” for claiming that 
conclusion given those averments of fact by way of a minor premise’ . Only once 197
the interpretative choice is made and/or the warrant is established, the conclusion 
offered by the syllogism is deductively justified, but—MacCormick argues—in 
neither case the justification can adopt the indicated deductive in form. This 
mechanical picture would only be referring to part of the general structure of 
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adjudication but wouldn’t actually describe all the steps and problems that need to 
be solved in order to apply the law. As a corollary, the general consensus seems to 
be that adjudication would be characterised by a form of legal reasoning that 
includes, but is not exhausted, in the kind of reasoning that is explicitated by the 
legal syllogism .  198
!
Allow me to start from this familiar territory: I plan to examine the main reasons 
given to assert that this scheme is not satisfactory. My goal with this is not so much 
to assess the soundness of those objections, nor to present new ones, as it is to use 
them in order to grasp the underpinning understanding of adjudication that lies 
behind them—understanding the shortcomings of the mechanical approach to 
judicial decisions we can identify what is the challenge or problem that 
characterises adjudication and what are the proper tools to solve it. The aim of 
engaging in this examination is to assess to what extent, the judicial function can be 
performed in JRL cases. 
!
2. The objections 
!
There seem to be two obvious ways in which a mechanical description of 
adjudication is insufficient. 
!
The first objection can be presented in terms of language’s inherent indeterminacy. 
It is usually presented in one of two forms: the first one has to do with ambiguity, 
with the possibility of the piece of legislation that is taken to be relevant to support 
more than one sense or intension . If this is the case, then the major premise of the 199
syllogism cannot be identified just by identifying the legislative statement that is 
supposedly applicable, since it lends itself to two or more rules . Until a decision 200
about the proper interpretation is asserted, the syllogism cannot operate, and no 
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legal conclusion is obtained. The second manifestation of language’s indeterminacy 
can be properly studied by looking at the current discussion about ‘vagueness’ in 
law. Now, the problem is not that of fixing the major premise based on a legal 
statement that admits multiple interpretations, but that of identifying the extension 
of a rule whose intension is clear.  
!
Besides these problems associated with language, defeasibility also appears as an 
invincible obstacle for the ‘mechanical’ approach, for it seems to require the judge 
to decide on the appropriateness of applying the rule that serves as the major 
premise of the syllogism. 
!
In this chapter I will deal extensively (and hopefully convincingly) with vagueness 
and defeasibility. The problem of ambiguity will be succinctly addressed at the 
beginning of the following chapter. 
!
2.1. Indeterminacy of language 
!
The syllogistic form allows to identify an answer that corresponds to a ‘singular 
proposition of law’ —i.e., a proposition that, referring to the particular relation 201
between specific people, is suitable to decide a particular case—that deductively 
follows from a major premise that is informed by the content of a ‘general 
proposition of law’—i.e., a law or a piece of legislation . For this to work, of 202
course, it is necessary to connect, by means of a minor premise (or a factual 
proposition ), the general law with the facts of the case. This later step requires the 203
judge to subsume the facts of the case under the extension of the rule to be applied, 
subsumption that in turn depends on the meaning of the expression employed by the 
rule at issue. 
!
 109
 Moore (2003), 25-6, Moore (2016), 127.201
 Moore (2003), 24, Moore (2016), 128.202
 Moore (2003), 24203
The problem that arises from language’s indeterminacy has to do with the process 
of identifying the concrete cases in which the propositional content of the rule is 
instantiated—it affects the external justification of the judgement based on the legal 
syllogism . 204
!
And it is here when vagueness appears as an obvious obstacle : we can think of 205
concrete cases in which it is indeterminate if they instantiate the properties included 
by the general proposition of law. With Hart, we can understand this indeterminacy 
as a ‘penumbra’ that covers the space between instances of clear applicability of an 
expression and instances of clear inapplicability. Following this line of thought, it is 
traditionally understood that a predicate is vague if there are borderline cases for its 
application , so ‘there are cases in which one just does not know whether to apply 206
the expression or to withhold it, and one’s not knowing is not due to ignorance of 
the facts’—even if you are told exactly how many hairs a man has on his head, you 
could still not know whether to describe him as ‘bald’ . This is why, traditionally, 207
the extension of vague predicates is divided into a three-fold partition, with a 
borderline section that separates its extension from its anti-extension, a section in 
which the expression has no definitive truth-value . In those cases, what the judge 208
finds can be called a ‘gap of recognition’: individual cases in which, given a lack of 
semantic determination, it is not known if the individual case belongs to the generic 
case established by the rule . 209
!
This line of thought can be taken one step further: some concepts, or expressions 
employing those concepts, do not allow clearly to identify any concrete case as 
falling under their extension. According to this approach, we would not only have 
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concepts whose application is problematic on borderline cases, but also, within that 
group, we would find concepts that lack clear instances at all.  
!
That seems to be the position taken by Schauer: with the terms employed by the 
constitution in the establishment of fundamental rights, the indetermination is 
absolute, so while ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ do have meaning, every instance, 
application or concretisation of them requires an additional premise for the 
particular case. In this way, ‘freedom’ never resolves by itself a particular 
application .  210
!
On cases like this, Schauer speaks of pervasive vagueness, so just by focusing on 
the language ‘we find that on occasion legal language is so vague by itself that there 
is nothing clear at all’. There might be no clear instances of ‘unreasonable’ searches 
and seizures, no clear cases of equal protection, restraint of trade or of decision that 
are in the child’s best interest . 211
!
Opposing this view, and with Russell, we can reject a qualitative distinction 
between vague and not vague concepts: ‘The fact is that all words are attributable 
without doubt over a certain area, but become questionable within a penumbra, 
outside which they are again certainly not attributable’ . Here there is no such 212
thing as pervasive vagueness, since for all words there are cases to which they are 
unproblematically attributable, but at the same time, all expressions admit 
vagueness on some concrete cases—since ‘all non-logical words have this kind of 
vagueness’, even a seemingly unproblematic expression as ‘this is a man’ will lead 
us to the same problem when faced with some particular prehistoric ancestor; and 
therefore ‘the conceptions of truth and falsehood, as applied to propositions 
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composed of or containing non-logical words, are themselves more or less 
vague’ .  213
!
The correction of Russell’s point would lead to conclude that for all expressions we 
can find borderline cases, concrete instances to which it is not clear if the 
expression applies, and so regarding them it is neither true nor false that they 
instantiate the employed propositional content. This means that this is not a problem 
that correlates with the level of specificity of the terms employed, so that every time 
that a more general term is replaced by a more specific one the problem of 
vagueness is reduced . 214
!
If Russell is right, then, to every rule or general proposition of law we could apply 
the following ‘three-candidates’ model: ‘The objects to which a legal term refers 
can be categorised into positive candidates to which the term undoubtedly refers, 
negative candidates to which the term undoubtedly does not refer, and neutral 
candidates where there is doubt whether the term refers to them’ . With this 215
model, when it comes to neutral candidates the meaning of the expression that 
configures the major premise is not enough to either classify or abstain from 
classifying the concrete case as an instance of the operative facts of the rule. 
Despite this, the judge has to resolve anyway, so she faces this challenge: the 
semantic content of the rule leaves open if the case at hand is a token of the legal 
type, but she still has to decide if it is or it is not . 216
!
This is the obstacle that indeterminacy, and specially vagueness, puts forward to a 
mechanical process of adjudication: a key part of the judicial decision rests on 
deciding if the operative facts of the rule have been instantiated by the case at hand, 
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and the fact that they do, when it comes to vague instances, does not depend on the 
meaning of the provision to be applied. Focusing on the syllogistic structure loses 
sight of the crucial step that precedes it, that of properly identifying the premises on 
which the conclusion hinges. Schauer claims that when it comes to pervasively 
vague rules there is no possibility of mechanical adjudication, and so, the 
constitution, being plethoric of them, does not offer the kind of legal material that 
can be applied without a value judgement —i.e., the kind of judgement that is not 217
grasped by the mechanical model. But even if we deny the existence of this radical 
type of vagueness, the problem remains, only circumscribed: the syllogistic 
structure would always be incapable of addressing borderline cases, whether all 
expressions admit different levels of vagueness or just some. 
!
To deal with this problem, the judge needs to decide if the concrete case at hand is 
to be subsumed under the operative facts of the rule—the pure meaning of the latter 
is insufficient to settle such question. It is only after that decision is made that ‘a 
simple deductive justification of a particular decision follows’ , so the complete 218
justification of the decision hinges on the choice taken within the alternatives that 
the rule left open. 
!
If we use this line of criticism to bring light to the appropriate understanding of 
adjudication, then we should arrive at something like this: given the openness of 
meaning, law’s provisions cannot be applied, in order to arrive at a particular 
decision, without an antecedent move that consists in deciding, within the 
alternatives left open by the linguistic meaning of the legal rules, if the case is to be 
subsumed under its terms. So even though the syllogistic structure explains the 
judge’s legal reasoning once she has made a linguistically not-constrained decision, 
it is silent regarding an essential part of her function—it does not explains how 
adjudication operates in that previous step in which the meaning of the terms is not 
enough to define for every case and by themselves if they have been instantiated. 
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Since adjudication is characterised, at least partially, by the type of reasoning that 
lies behind judicial decisions, the indeterminacy of language entails that the 
mechanical approach falls short from providing a suitable general image of it. 
!
Confronted with a case in which vagueness blocks the form of legal reasoning 
exemplified by the legal syllogism, what the judge needs can be understood, 
following Alexy, as a rule for the usage of words , a rule that elaborates on the 219
legal property whose application is vague in the concrete case by providing a 
catalogue of alternative or cumulative criteria whose verification entitles to 
subsume the concrete case under the extension of the rule at issue . By doing this, 220
vagueness is productively displaced from the current case at issue to an hypothetical 
new one: let us take the traditional example of a rule prohibiting vehicles from a 
public park and a concrete case in which the object that enters the park is a bicycle, 
a pair of roller skates or a toy automobile . A new legal rule can specify that only 221
motorised vehicles are to be considered vehicles for the application of the previous 
one. With this, the concrete case can be now easily decided; but different ones, ones 
in which it is vague if the object at issue counts as a motorised vehicle are left in the 
new penumbra. And once the judge runs out of this type of rules, vagueness comes 
back to block the operation of the legal syllogism, and then she might need to create 
her own rule of interpretation for the case at hand, one that serves her to make the 
choice between the open alternatives. This might seem like a reasonable alternative, 
maybe the judge has no other option and is forced to put forward a judicially 
created rule to justify her decision. The question that arises with this move has to do 
with the function the judge would be performing in whose cases: Would the creation 
of those rules for the usage of words count as part of the judicial activity or should 
it be understood as a legislative function performed by the judge? 
These remarks about vagueness points us into taking, as an essential feature of 
adjudication, the judge’s need to confront the indeterminacy of language in order to 
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subsume the particular case under the terms of the applicable rule. They have also 
presented us with a question regarding the legislative or judicial nature of a 
semantic rule required to face such indeterminacy. To answer it, we need to move 
forward in identifying some essential features of the judicial moment, and to do 




The previous remarks about language’s inherent indeterminacy does not exhaust the 
obstacles faced by a purely syllogistic approach to adjudication. Moreover, with the 
distinction between vague and not-vague cases at hand, it is possible to identify 
cases on which the legal reasoning seems to be fully captured by the syllogistic 
model: when the classification of the case under the terms of the rule is not 
problematic, the case can be decided in a more or less ‘mechanical’ way, since the 
‘singular proposition of law’ can be derived by logical deduction—the arguments 
put forward by the judge would be ‘logically watertight’ . If vagueness were the 222
one problem that makes the ‘mechanical’ understanding incomplete, such 
incompleteness would not prevent the syllogistic model to fully capture the judge’s 
legal reasoning in the semantically clear cases. 
!
But there is another obstacle in the horizon of the mechanical approach, one that has 
to do with the strength of the connection between the rule’s antecedent and its 
consequent. The debate on rule’s defeasibility is usually traced back to Hart’s work. 
In ‘The Adscription of Responsibility and Rights’ , the idea is presented in 223
relation to the effect that the verification of exceptional circumstances has in 
judicial decisions regarding breaches of contracts. There, he argued that the legally 
established conditions that serve to ground a duty to pay damages are not always 
sufficient , for there are defences that can defeat the plaintiff’s claim. ‘In 224
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consequence’, Hart continues, ‘it is usually not possible to define a legal concept 
such as " trespass" or "contract" by specifying the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for its application. For any set of conditions may be adequate in some 
cases but not in others’ .  225
!
From there on, the problem of defeasibility of legal rules connects the force of the 
conditional form expressed in the rule at issue with the context of its application, 
relating it to the notion of normality. ‘When we express a conditional assertion’—
Rodriguez tell us— ‘we assume the circumstances are normal but admit that under 
abnormal circumstances the assertion may become false’ . This point is not about 226
subsuming the event that serves as the object of adjudication under the universal 
terms of the rule, it is not immediately about the instantiation of its operative facts, 
but it has to do with the status of the rule as a reason for the judicial decision: since 
being a reason for something depends on the context in which practical reasoning 
takes place, to define whether the rule actually can serve as a reason for the decision 
requires to consider the context, the circumstances in which the decision is being 
made . In normal contexts, the rule stands but, given the appropriate abnormal 227
situation, its force might decay—contextual considerations might prevent the rule 
from being a reason. And since the context of application is not included in the 
operative facts of the rule, but it nevertheless serves to determine the solution to be 
adopted, the judge necessarily has to reason outside the syllogistic structure to 
arrive at its decision: even if the case at hand is clearly subsumed under the terms of 
the rule, an additional piece of evaluation is required, one that by hypothesis stands 
outside the semantic constrainments of the rule. Now, since the decision hinges on 
the normality of the context of application, the rule is not serving as a standard to be 
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The previous problem admits being thematised in terms of the logical relation 
between the operative facts of the rule and the consequence it establishes. For a 
legal rule with the conditional form ‘if A then B’, A can be understood as a 
sufficient condition for deciding B. So, to every case that instantiates A corresponds 
a solution B. But, using the standard definition in logic of defeasible conditionals, 
the rule’s defeasibility obtains when the truth of ‘If A then B’ does not exclude the 
falsity of ‘If A and C then B’. When this is the case, circumstance C can be seen as 
an exception that defeats the conditional ‘If A then B’, so now A is no longer a 
sufficient condition for B. This defeasible understanding of the rules, it is claimed, 
follows from a general feature of our assertoric practice: conditionals constructions 
are used in a way that is not intended to assert that the antecedent is a sufficient 
condition of the consequent, ‘but only that the antecedent jointly with a set of 
assumptions (…) is sufficient for the consequent’, so we find that the inference 
from ‘If A then B’ to ‘If A and C then B’ is invalid . The most popular examples 228
of this type of defeasibility correspond to Lon Fuller’s truck entering a park and the 
Bolognian surgeon that saves a man by drawing his blood in the street: the World 
War II military truck seems to undoubtfully instantiate the concept ‘vehicle’ of the 
‘no vehicles in the park’ rule, and the surgeon seems to have undoubtfully verified 
the antecedent of the rule according to which ‘whoever drew blood in the streets 
should be punished’. But in neither case, according to the defeasibility argument, 
the legally established consequence is to be applied. 
!
If on the previous cases the status of the antecedent as a sufficient condition is 
challenged by the defeasible nature of the rule, the inverse problem can also be 
presented: the consequence is asserted even though the antecedent is not verified. 
Here the problem is less apparent: in ‘if A then B’, A does not seem to specify a 
necessary condition for B. On the contrary, there is nothing uncommon in having 
multiple rules that assign the same consequence to different operative facts: suppose 
the legislation assigns identical punishment to both murder and rape; if that were 
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the case, then it wouldn't make sense to say that assigning such punishment to 
someone who has committed rape, but not murder, counts as defeating the murder 
rule. In a case like that, the murder rule could only be taken as defeated if the 
decision cannot be grounded on another rule whose operative facts have been 
verified. This shows us that when we look at the status of the antecedent as a 
necessary condition, defeasibility only arises if there is no other rule whose 
antecedent had been verified. 
!
But notice that if we look back at the status of the antecedent as a sufficient 
condition, we can also see that leaving a rule unapplied in consideration to the 
verification of the antecedent of a different rule doesn't need to be particularly 
problematic: suppose we have our rule that establishes that ‘if A then B’ and also 
another rule according to which ‘if C then -B’. The verification of an AC case 
configures a normative conflict that has to be resolved by employing a rule of 
preference, and the judge will have to leave a rule unapplied: if the concrete case is 
both a ‘killing’ and a ‘legitimate defence’, then we could say that the rule that 
punishes murder is defeated when the rule of legitimate defence is preferred. But if 
this is a case of defeasibility, then defeasibility does not entail a serious problem for 
the judge: it is unproblematic for criminal judges to prefer justification rules over 
sanctioning ones—that’s the whole point of the former. These cases point to a form 
of defeasibility in which the displacement of the rule is conditioned to the operation 
of another one whose antecedent obtains, to the instantiation of a property legally 
recognised in a different rule. This form of defeasibility is benign, not in the sense 
that hard cases cannot arise out of them (they obviously can), nor in the sense that 
explaining the relation between the conflicting rules is a simple task (as we saw in 
Section 2.1 of the previous chapter, we can discuss if the conflict is to be 
interpretatively de-activated  or if a preference rule is to be invoked), but it is 229
benign in the sense that they do not entail the configuration of a hard case : from 230
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the judicial perspective, a case that is clearly both a murder and a legitimate defence 
is an easy one, and it is easy even if it is problematic to give a compelling account 
of the distinction between the operative conditions of the legitimate defence rule 
and negative conditions of the murder rule. 
!
But there is another way of understanding defeasibility that presents a more 
menacing challenge to rule following in general and adjudication in particular. This 
corresponds to cases in which a rule’s defeat does not depend on the operation of 
another one. Here the rule whose operative facts have been verified would be left 
unapplied for reasons that cannot be grounded on the preference of another 
internally applicable rule, on the verification of other legally relevant properties. 
This is a malign defeasibility whose operation configures a crucial challenge to the 
judge. Take Hart’s remarks about unexpected cases: in The Concept of Law  he 231
writes that it is not desirable such a rule that the question of its application to every 
case is always resolved beforehand without requiring a new election between open 
alternatives. Once we have established a rule, we can always face an unexpected 
case that demands us to resolve considering the most satisfying balance of the 
conflicting interest, so when those abnormal cases appear we understand that for 
them the rule was formulated blindly: just applying the rule if the case falls under 
‘the clear sense of its text’ would ‘secure a measure of certainty or predictability’, 
but at the cost of ‘resolving in the dark issues which can only reasonably be settled 
when they arise and are identify’ . 232
!
What is crucial in the previous remarks is the idea of rules that, regarding certain 
cases, are blind—and such blindness arises from the fact that the lawmaker ‘can 
have no such knowledge of all the possible combinations of circumstances which 
the future might bring’ . The problem is precisely understood as one regarding 233
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‘unforeseen’ circumstances, but not unforeseen just by individuated rules, but by 
the legislation in general. So what worries Hart is not the idea of defeasibility as a 
rule’s defeat in consideration to a property legally recognised in a different piece of 
legislation. When he claims that ‘a rule that ends with the clause “unless…” is still 
a rule’, the conditions that would trigger such clause are outside the repertoire of 
legislated properties. He is not talking about benign defeasibility: there, all the 
relevant properties were considered by the lawmaker , actually, it is only because 234
they were foreseen that the conflict is configured—had the legislator not considered 
cases of legitimate defence, there would be no rule to oppose the one that sanctions 
murder. 
!
The defeasibility of a rule, in this deeper, malign sense, is characterised by the 
conjunction of two properties regarding conditions under which it is defeated: first, 
they do not correspond to properties recognised by other rules that displace it, and 
second, they cannot be exhaustively listed in advance . Defeasibility, thus 235
understood, seems to lead to understand the antecedent of the conditional rule as 
establishing only a contributory condition for the consequent—the latter can be 
attained without the verification of the former, but also, the instantiation of the 
antecedent only entails the consequent if other conditions are fulfilled . To secure 236
the consequent, then, the judge would need to verify the instantiation of these other 
properties, which—ex hypothesi—are not established in the content of the 
applicable rules. And it is from these remarks that the main objection to the 
‘mechanical’ approach arises: from the conjunction of the rule at issue and a case 
that falls on its extension, nothing follows as a conclusion, there is no valid 
inference—‘if legal rules are defeasible then it would follow that one of the reasons 
the deductive model in law is inadequate is that such rules fail to meet a prime 
condition for the applicability of the deductive model’ . This, of course, was 237
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adverted by Hart. That was the way in which he understood the impossibility of 
‘mechanical jurisprudence’: we do not live in a world characterised by a ‘finite 
number of features’, and the full set of modes in which they can combine are 
unknown . If rules are defeasible in this malign sense, then a concrete and 238
unforeseen combination of properties in a particular legal issue might very well 
defeat the applicable rule, and it would be part of the judge’s function to assess if 
that is the case. Understood like this, defeasibility constitutes an impossible 
challenge to a ‘mechanical’ approach, for the very basis of the legal syllogism is per 
definition cut at the root: besides the correspondence between the linguistic content 
of the applicable rules and a true description of the facts of the case, another step 
has to be taken—properties outside the ones recognised in their content have a role 
to play in the final ‘singular proposition of law’, so the answer is not ultimately 
dependent on a legal rule .  239
!
Now, one might ask, why is this so important? After all, isn’t it a starting point of 
the discussion that the judge’s legal reasoning is not exhaustedly thematised in the 
inferentially deductive movement from a major premise, configured by the content 
of an applicable rule, to a conclusion that refers to individual subjects and particular 
consequences? Defeasibility of legal rules posits a threat to the ‘mechanical’ 
account, but what is at stake with this threat goes beyond the pure syllogistic 
structure. To properly understand the gravity of the problem is to notice that the 
syllogistic method aims to give an account of what is taken to be an essential 
function of the judge—that of deciding the case according to law. The syllogistic 
account of adjudication aims to ‘secure’ that judicial, particular decision counts as 
an instance of application of legally established rules, i.e. that the outcome of the 
trial corresponds to law’s decision, and so the parties involved are subjected to the 
rules of law and not to the judge’s will. Of course, a purely ‘mechanical’ 
understanding of adjudication achieves subjection to law at a rather high price, that 
 121
 Hart (2012), 128; also, in (1949), 172.238
 Marmor (1990), 72-79. Something similar is true of Lyons (1984).239
of invisibilising everything outside the legally established rules . Defeasibility 240
allows the judge to avoid this horn of the dilemma, but it does it in a way that 
appears to send us directly to the other: that of making impossible for the legal rules 
to constrain the decision at the moment of their application. 
 
If this is correct, then our analysis of the objections to the mechanical approach 
have served us to identify the main challenge that a theory of adjudication has to 
overcome—that of combining these two seemingly irreconcilable aspects of judicial 
decisions: subjection to law and attention to particularities. Aligned with this, the 
aim of the following section is to deepen on these issues, and by doing so, I will 
argue that both linguistic indeterminacy and defeasibility, the main objections to the 
mechanical approach, can be traced back to one essential feature of adjudication: it 
has to manage the distance between the universal terms of the rule’s intension and 
the extensionality of the particular case to be decided. We have seen that vagueness 
and defeasibility arise out of this distance, so the shortcomings of the mechanical 
approach can be explained in terms of its incapacity to provide a suitable account of 
how to cross it. If this is the case, then a theory of adjudication should be in the 
right track if it can adequately address this intension/extension relation—it is the 
same extensionality that in the previous chapter served us to ground the distinction 
between JRA and JRL what comes now to extend a gap between the rule and its 
application. It will be the intensional/extensional binomial what will allow us to 
distinguish between application and justification discourses; and such distinction, in 
turn, will serve as the basis for differentiating between legislation and adjudication. 
Once we have those differentiations at hand, the extensionality of adjudication will 
allow us to model, up to some extent, the judge’s legal reasoning on a general 
scheme of practical reasoning: defeasibility of the rules to be applied in the former, 
can be understood in terms of the ‘language-entry transitions’ in the latter. 
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It is this characterisation of the judicial moment what will then be contrasted against 
the position of the constitutional judge in JRL cases.  
!
3. A non-semantic approach 
!
The mechanical approach allowed us to identify an essential feature of judicial 
decisions: they must cross the distance between the intensionality of the rule to 
which the judge is bound and the particularity of the case that constitutes the object 
of the judicial judgement—both objections to the mechanical approach arise from 
this distance between rule and concrete case. Now I will examine a non-semantic 
approach to deal with this problem. 
!
‘The judiciary is bound to the clear wording of the statute and is not authorised to 
realise their own political opinions by means of an exchange of concepts’. The very 
possibility of rule of law hinges on this bounding , which in turn is incompatible 241
with the power of the judge to alter the content of the rules to which she is bound. If 
a theory of adjudication is to live up to this standard, then it has to explain how the 
attention to the non-legally recognised properties is compatible with it—it cannot 
deal with the distance between intension and extension by altering the rule to be 
applied; otherwise, it would just have to renounce to the possibility of judges 
deciding in consideration to legally irrelevant properties. The dilemma can be 
presented as a question: if a property of the concrete case that is irrelevant 
according to the rule to be applied, can nevertheless dictate that such rule is not to 
be considered for its solution, then in what sense can it be said that the judge is still 
attached to the law? 
!
Fernando Atria has noticed that this problem is suitably captured in Friedrich Von 
Savigny’s notion of improper expression, and an example taken from the latter’s 
System of the Modern Roman Law is useful to make patent the point: suppose that 
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in 1840 the legal regulation declares infamous the widow that, during mourning, 
celebrates a new marriage ; suppose also the case of a woman that, after her 242
husband’s death—but still during mourning—gives birth to the child that she begot 
with the deceased man. Given those assumptions, should such a widow be declared 
infamous if she celebrates a new marriage during mourning but after the birth of the 
child? Von Savigny tell us that the answer must be negative, that this is a case in 
which the clear and determined sense expressed by the text of the law has 
disengaged from its true thought. The reason for this distance between sense and 
thought lies on the goal of the regulation: the reason to declare infamous a widow 
that celebrates a new marriage during mourning is to be found in the interest to 
avoid confusions regarding the paternity of a child, but such goal its already secured 
on this concrete case because the child was born before the second marriage . 243
Because of that, Von Savigny argues in favour of a restrictive interpretation, 
considering that law’s real thought is to forbid second marriages in which a 
confusion of paternity could occur, confusion that in this case cannot be configured 
given the birth of the child prior to the death of the father. This way, the goal that 
the law aims to secure is not at stake when it comes to this widow, even though the 
case actually falls under the scope of the rule according to its text. Here lies the 
anti-semantic stance towards adjudication: the crucial question to be answered in 
the judicial seat doesn't have to do with assessing the correlation between the 
semantic content of the rule and the case at hand—what is typically blocked in 
cases of vagueness—; on the contrary, the problem arises precisely because it is 
semantically clear: the widow’s case is one that is clearly subsumed under the 
operative facts of the rule. The relevant question is whether or not it is appropriate 
to decide the case based on the rule. 
!
This is a case in which subjection to law seems incompatible with being attentive to 
the particularities of the case: law—in principle at least—would forbid the second 
marriage because it doesn’t distinguish, in order to define its applicability, if the 
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birth of a child has taken place between the death of the husband and the new 
marriage. Such birth does not constitute a property recognised by law as a negative 
condition for its application, so subjection to law would seem to force the judge to 
decide in favour of the prohibition of the marriage. But it is precisely the attention 
to the particularities that are verified on that particular case and that are ignored by 
the universality of the rule, what would allow the judge to assess the adequacy of 
deciding the case according to it. It is only when we see the particularities of the 
widow herself that we could say—using Hart’s terms—that regarding her, the rule 
was established ‘blindly’. Predictability at the cost of deciding in the dark. 
!
The first thing to be noticed is that Von Savigny’s problem is not configured by the 
simultaneous (internal) applicability of another rule: the widow’s case is not one in 
which there is a second applicable rule that excludes the possibility of declaring her 
infamous in consideration to the verification of a birth prior to the second marriage. 
In the same way, Fuller’s case is not a hard one because there is a conflicting rule 
that allows the actions that the ‘no vehicles’ rule forbids; and the Bolognian law’s 
problem is not configured by the existence of a justificatory or exculpatory rule that 
covers the surgeon’s actions. On the contrary, if those conflicting rules had existed, 
we would have easy cases of benign defeasibility: were those rules available, the 
judge would have no problem in leaving the surgeon unpunished and claiming that 
the veterans were allowed to perform their homage. In these examples, the 
defeasibility at issue is not the benign one, but the one that operates within the 
applicable rule itself. 
!
The second thing to advert is the key one for our current analysis: all these cases 
can be adequately thematised as presenting the judge with a question about the 
appropriateness of the legally established solution for the concrete case—the 
solution given by the rule seems inappropriate vis-à-vis the facts that constitute the 
object of the adjudicating process. But, of course, the judge cannot be bound to the 
law if she can put it aside when she takes it to be inadequate. This seems to be an 
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obvious point, but what has to be problematised is if every displacement of a rule in 
consideration to the adequacy of its solution to a given case entails a judgment on 
the rule’s appropriateness. At first sight, it might seem that it does: why would it be 
inappropriate to apply a rule to a case that falls under its scope, if it is not because 
the rule itself is inappropriate? In other words: Is it possible to assert that, despite 
the fact that in this concrete case the verification of A should not be followed by the 
application of B, the rule that correlates B with A is still a justified rule? 
!
For Detmold, Günther and Atria, it is on a positive answer to this last question 
where we can find the key to identify a judicial moment that can balance both 
subjection to law and sensitivity to the particular—i.e., on the possibility of 
understanding that the judge can make a decision about the adequacy of a rule 
regarding a concrete case, without such call entailing a judgement about the rule’s 
justification . With them, it can be claimed that the judge’s bounding to the law 244
cannot extend beyond its scope of justification—limit that is not to be understood as 
a moral one (as if it were in some sense wrong to be bound in some cases), but as a 
fact about what is to be subjected to a legal rules: properly understood, they simply 
would not offer solutions to cases that escape a horizon of considerations defined in 
the legislative, justificatory discourse; and if no solution is offered, then no 
bounding is possible. Thus, the judge is still subjected to the law if it can be 
understood that her decision, even if it departs from the legally established one, 
does not question the legislative justification—the appropriateness of the rule itself. 
!
3.1. Universals and particulars: the particularity void 
!
As it has been stated this far, the problem to be faced is that of explaining how the 
particularities of a case that verifies the operative facts of a rule can justify the 
judge in not deciding the former according to the solution provided by the latter 
without breaking her subjection to the rule at issue. The alternative that will be now 
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examined claims that this harmonisation is possible as long as the rejection of the 
legally established solution for the concrete case does not entail a questioning of the 
justification of the internally applicable rule—bounding is maintained if we can 
assert that on a concrete case it is inappropriate to correlate B with A without being 
committed to assert that the rule that correlates B with A is inappropriate. 
!
The obvious starting point of this alternative is to be found in the work of Michael 
Detmold. He claims that we must distinguish between the non-application of a rule 
because the rule is inadequate and the non-application of it because it is 
inappropriate to apply it. The reason Detmold offers for this is based on the 
distinction between universals and particulars . As far as the judge has to decide 245
on the application of a rule to a concrete case, the rationality problem that is faced 
in the exercise of the jurisdictional function is referred to particulars, so its solution 
depends on the properties of the concrete event with which the judge has to deal, 
and because of that, the judge is in a position in which the legislator can never be: 
the judge has to offer a practical solution that indicates what is to be done in 
consideration to what has previously happened—she has to decide that J, a concrete 
individual, is to be imprisoned for 5 years because he killed Q, another particular 
human being. The legislator also has to resolve a rationality problem, but his answer 
to it is not a practical one, for he will only provide a hypothetical or theoretical 
conclusion that correlates one universal with another—that is what legislated, 
universal rules do . The practical reasoning problem that the judge faces cannot be 246
solved by means of a theoretical reasoning as the one that characterises the 
legislative function: universals—which are correlated in the formulation of a 
legislated rule: ‘if A, then B’—do not include any particular; the lawmaker never 
referred in his rules to J o Q, nor the concrete event of J’s firing a gun and Q’s dying 
after the shot hits him, he only decided in universal terms: ‘whoever kills is to be 
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imprisoned for 5 years’. Both the judge and the legislator have to provide an 
answer, but they are qualitatively different. And it is from that difference where this 
approach hopes to ground the contours of the bounding force of rules: Detmold 
claims that the solution given at the level of universals and attained in the legislative 
moment, cannot resolve the judge’s problem as it is configured in the adjudicatory 
stage . 247
!
The distance that the judge has to cross is configured by the difference between the 
finitude of a description that refers to fact-in-the-extensional-sense and the 
infinitude of possible true descriptions of it: on every concrete case infinite 
properties are simultaneously actualized, but the rule defines by way of a 
description a finite set of properties as the relevant ones, so each particular case that 
instantiates the properties that are established on the rule necessarily also 
instantiates other properties that are not considered by it. That is the particularity 
void to which Detmold refers: the distance between a description of a fact and the 
horizon of its infinite possible descriptions —it emerges precisely in the relation 248
between a fact-in-the-extensional-sense, one that conserves its identity throughout 
all its possible true descriptions, and the infinite set of possible intensions, 
propositional contents that refer to it and thus serve to identify it. 
!
The existence of this void creates a problem, but only to the judge, not to the 
lawmaker, because only the first one has to perform the function of assigning a 
consequence to a concrete case that in its particularity is irreducible to the 
description employed by the rule that is in principle applicable to it. The lawmaker 
never faces this void, because his powers always refer to the correlation of 
universals, without ever having to decide regarding radical particulars. With this 
distinction at hand, Detmold claims that what defines the role of the judge, and 
therefore distinguishes it from the legislator, is his confrontation with the particular, 
with that which cannot be exhausted by its descriptions. It is precisely that 
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particularity, which is hidden behind the universal categories of the rule, what has to 
be considered by the judge; she has to look at the man regarding who she is going to 
decide as the particular human being that he is, not as a member of a category or a 
class, not as an instance of a universal, but as a radical particular . Freed from the 249
pre-existing schemes, the judge will be able to listen to the human being she has in 
front of her speaking with his own voice and not having it distorted by external 
mediations and of an imposed theory, and only then she can decide the case without 
deciding for him . 250
!
And that last one is the key point for Detmold to overcome an apparent excess of 
his thesis: up to this point, he has claimed that the distance between the universality 
of the legislative decision and the particularity of the practical one is such that no 
particular is included in the universality of the rule. The distance between extension 
and intension would mean that the rule ‘whoever murders is to be imprisoned’ 
would be irrelevant for a particular decision regarding the concrete, extensional case 
of J’s killing of Q. If something is not added to that scheme, then Detmold’s thesis 
would be proving too much—the rule’s solution wouldn’t just be inapplicable to 
concrete cases in which it turns to be contextually inappropriate, but the law’s 
intensionality would render it sterile tout court in the judge’s reasoning regarding 
extensional facts: no case could be decided on its basis. But now a bridge is built, 
one that connects intension with extension in a practical, fruitful fashion. Detmold 
understands that the condition on which depends the legitimacy of the application of 
a rule for the decision of a concrete case consists in the possibility of understanding 
that the rule is one that properly belongs to the particular person to which it is going 
to be applied. If that is the case, then the particularity void is crossed by means of 
his authorisation . Before she lets the case to ‘speak by itself’, the rule is for the 251
judge only a theory, one that asserts that ‘If A, then B’ and that has to be proven 
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correct also in the concrete case at issue . And so the extension and limits of the 252
rules’ bounding power is intrinsic to its structure: being hypothetical, they cannot 
just cross and solve the problems faced in the practical reasoning stage, since only 
in the judicial stage the ‘radical autonomy’ of human beings is involved  and it is 253
such autonomy what has intervened to close the gap. 
!
The importance of this distinction between rationalities and the connecting role of 
the subject’s authorisation, is that given the difference between the type of decision 
that characterises the exercise of jurisdictional powers and the type of decision that 
is taken in exercise of legislative powers, then it is possible to assert that the 
reasonability of the correlation established at hypothetical level—between operative 
facts and consequence—does not guarantee that it is also reasonable to establish 
that same correlation at the practical level: the verification of a deficit of 
authorisation at the applicative moment does not preempt the question regarding the 
rationality of the hypothetical conclusion to which the lawmaker arrived. The judge 
could refrain from applying the law because it is irrational to apply it and remain 
silent about the rationality of the law itself. 
!
3.2. Justification and application discourse 
!
It is at this point when Klaus Günther’s work becomes especially relevant. By 




 Habermas (1990), 65. As Wellmer points out, this ‘rule for argument’ arises from Habermas attempt to 254
translate the Kantian question regarding the morally correct action to the justification of a norm. By doing 
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works out the distinction between justification and application discourses, as two 
moments in which the impartiality of a rule is evaluated, gives the theory the 
grounds to define the contours of the judicial function. Under ideal conditions, the 
justification of a rule’s validity would require considering whether all the 
consequences and effects of its general observation are acceptable in attention to all 
possible interests. If such demanding premises were accomplished, then once the 
validity of a rule were established it would also be secured the appropriateness of 
the application of the rule to every case that falls under its extension: the 
consequences and effects of following the rule under the particular conditions of 
every possible situation would had already been considered in the justification 
discourse . The relation between application and justification would be such that 255
the appropriateness of the application on every occasion would be a necessary 
condition of the validity of the rule, or what is the same, that the validity of the rule 
would imply the appropriateness of its application on every instance. 
!
Since the operation of a strong test of universality as a condition of justification 
would mean that each justified rule would have to be either so general that it would 
be applicable to any possible situation or so specific that it would only be applicable 
in one case, Günther proposes a weak test of universality. In this version, the 
standard that has to be satisfied by a rule in order to be valid has an index built in 
that ties its application to a level of knowledge, so in the justificatory discourse only 
the consequences of the general observation that we can anticipate are considered, 
and the same goes for the interest—only the ones that we can expect to be affected 
by the application of the rule are included in the evaluation. Therefore, norms 
justified under this weak principle are valid ceteris paribus, because of the 
exclusion of some considerations that would be relevant in application situations : 256
since not all interest and consequences are to be considered when a rule has to be 
justified, the scope of its validity is conditioned by the exclusion, at the level of 
justification, of some considerations that at the moment of application could end up 
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being relevant . The function of this discourse is to be understood not as providing 257
answers to concrete cases, but as deciding the set of norms to be included in our 
deliberations about concrete cases. At this stage we are only defining the norms to 
be used in the justification of singular normative propositions about what is to be 
done in particular cases . 258
!
Now a gap might open between what was considered, at the legislative stage, when 
the validity of the rule was being discussed and the conditions under which the rule 
is supposed to be applied: since in the justification discourse not all possible 
interests and consequences were considered, it could be the case that in a particular 
case there is an unchecked interest, a relevant unforeseen property that was not 
evaluated by the lawmaker. It is for this reason that Schauer claims that all rules are 
both over and under inclusive in relation to their justifications —they are never 259
coextensive . This distance marks the moment of adjudication, for we need 260
another principle that allows us to examine in every opportunity if, given the 
particularities of the case at hand, the demands of the rule are legitimate . That is, 261
a principle is required to indicate when a valid reason justifies a singular normative 
proposition, so the application discourse deals with the question regarding the 
operation of already justified norms in order to secure an impartial application of 
them . With this, a purely judicial moment emerges, one that does not delve into 262
the same questions that the lawmaker already decided, but that focuses on what the 
latter did not see: the particularities of the concrete case. 
!
According to Günther’s picture, impartiality, at the applicative level requires the 
different possible interpretations of the situation to be thematised  in order to be 263
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capable of seeing the case in its particularity. The problem, again, is the gap 
between intension and extension: on the one hand, the legislator deals with interests 
and consequences as intensional objects—it has to consider the relation between ‘a 
woman that was raped and wants to abort’ and ‘intrauterine life’ with a prohibition 
of abortion, but it will not face a concrete raped and pregnant woman that wants to 
abort. On the other hand, the judge faces the concrete, extensional woman; and just 
as the concept ‘chair’ is not a chair, the actual woman is not something that can be 
exhausted by any set of applicable descriptions that might have entered into the 
justification discourse—she is extensional because she maintains her identity 
throughout all of them, and so the set of interests that were considered at the 
justifying stage is not co-extensional with those that are actualized in her case. 
Without an application discourse, all properties not considered in the legislative 
stage would already be suppressed  for the judge.  264
!
If not giving attention to these other properties is what Hart described as resolving 
blindly in the dark, then avoiding this darkness requires to consider in the 
application discourse a complete description of the situation —law’s blindness 265
cannot be absolute or otherwise the norm would be pointless. A norm ‘controls a 
situation only so far as the situation has not become completely abnormal and so 
long as the normal presupposed concrete type has not disappeared’ . In line with 266
this, Günther argues that to decide whether or not it is adequate to apply the rule to 
the particular case, all properties of the case must be considered, and therefore the 
justification of the singular proposition requires a description of the case that refers 
to all the relevant reasons and a coherent interpretation of the valid relevant ones . 267
!
It is here when the openness to all the properties of a case—openness that 
characterises the adjudicatory moment as one of application—connects with 
 133
 Schauer (1991), 25. A similar idea can be found in Schmitt (2004), 52.264
 Dwars (1992), 68.265
 Schmitt (2004), 52.266
 Günther (1993a), 151; (1995), 48.267
Detmold’s demand to apply only a rule that it is of the very subject to whom it is to 
be applied. Only this openness to observe all the properties that are actualised on 
the case allows the radical human being to speak by himself, and it is only because 
of that disengagement from the restrictions imposed by the universals of the rule 
that it is possible to evaluate if the rule can be seen, under the conditions of the 
concrete case, as one of the subject to whom it is supposed to be applied. To decide 
that it is his rule requires to consider the particular interests of the concrete subject 
that is in front of the judge: the rule at issue can only be understood as his rule if his 
interests are taken into account. And the problem with which we are left by 
adopting the weak justification model is that we have no guarantee that the interests 
that are verified on a concrete case were actually considered at the moment of 
justification. If they weren't, then applying the rule becomes a theft . 268
 
By distinguishing between the type of considerations that enter in a justificatory/
legislative discourse and those that are discussed in an application/adjudicative 
discourse, what is being achieved is a triple movement: first, a theory of 
defeasibility is presented in a way that commits to the attention to the particularities 
of the case. Second, it renders the mechanical approach defective not only in cases 
of semantic vagueness, for it is always insufficient for the judge to corroborate the 
correlation between rule and case. But—and this is the third point—this is not done 
at the expense of subjection to law. Regarding the first, the question the judge faces 
goes beyond asking if the legally established properties are verified or not, since it 
is under the light of all the relevant properties that the adequacy of applying a rule 
whose validity is not disputed must be decided . If this is actually a requirement 269
for the legal adjudication, then it might seem that it can never be just a mechanical 
process of analysing the correspondence between the operative facts of the rule and 
the case at hand. There will always be one more step to make that is not decided in 
advance by the rule itself: to check whether or not it is appropriate to apply the rule 
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to this case, to determine if in its particularity there is some special interest, relevant 
but not seen by the rule, that considerations of impartiality demands to be taken into 
account . Finally, by focusing on the particularities of the case, the judge is not 270
questioning the validity of the rule nor engaging in the legislative function of 
justification and because of that she is still obeying the law, but from that same 
position she can now evaluate the appropriateness of the application of the rule to 
the concrete case. Subjection and attention to the particular are two faces of the 
same coin, because, with Detmold, Atria argues that the rule to which the judge is 
bound has not decided the solution to a particular conflict in which a relevant but 
not legally recognised property is verified . 271
!
As a corollary, while legislation is identified with universal rules that are grounded 
on justification discourses under the light of abstract and foreseeable interests and 
consequences, the judicial moment is characterised by the attention to a fact-in-the-
extensional-sense, to concrete interests that are to be thematised in an application 
discourse that aims to ground a particular rule. With this two-step operation of 
impartiality, the model aims to honour the ‘only normative justification for the trial’ 
by including ‘the citizen in the creation of the norm’ and then giving him or her ‘a 
voice during the process of deliberation as to whether the norm applies’ .  272
!
Within this approach, defeasibility is not thematised as being dependent on a 
linguistic problem, and that is why the mechanical approach is always insufficient: 
the semantic analysis regarding the correlation between rule and case is already 
done by the time the question about the appropriateness is presented. This de-
semanticalisation of defeasibility entails that it cannot affect the internal 
applicability of the rule at issue, so it has to be pushed upwards as a question about 
its external applicability. 
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Before exploring the ‘external’ aspect of this form of defeasibility, it would be 
useful to briefly connect these ideas with the topic of the previous chapter. While 
the characteristic challenge of adjudication was identified by looking at the 
objections raised against the mechanical approach, now we have used these 
discourse theory considerations—that connect different types of judgements with 
different types of justifications—to ground the distinction between the kinds of 
reasons that are appropriate at the legislative level and those that operate at the 
adjudicative one. By proceeding this way, I have attempted to differentiate between 
judicial and legislative arguments without immediately resorting to the democratic 
principle: what makes it the case that the judge’s decision has to be grounded in an 
application discourse is the fact that she is deciding a particular, extensional case 
involving radical human beings. At this point, and by bringing back our remarks 
about the difference between review of application and review of legislation, we 
can see how these considerations are slowly allowing us to notice the anomalous 
character of JRL vis-à-vis the judicial function: JRL is about the validity of a piece 
of legislation, and validity—as it was argued in the previous chapter—depends on 
the stable relations between the intensions of the rules at issue, there is no 
extensional dimension to it, it is not distributed in consideration to the instantiation 
of a concrete, particular case. But, as we are now seeing, such concrete case is 
precisely what is serving us to characterise the judicial position. This is why judicial 
review of legislation is an anomalous procedure, because it lacks the extensional 
dimension of the judicial moment—extensionality that constitutes a precondition to 
perform an application discourse. Without this base, it seems that the only way to 
ground the Court’s decision is by engaging in a justification discourse, which—as 
we have seen—serves to characterise the legislative moment. And given the way in 
which we have proceeded, this particularity of JRL—of a supposedly judicial 
decision that cannot be grounded in the judicial manner—can be notice even before 




3.3. An ‘external’ application discourse 
 
An application discourse in which the judge decides whether it is appropriate to 
apply a rule whose validity is not questioned, is what serves Atria to characterise the 
judicial function as one compatibilises both subjection to law, on the one hand, and 
the possibility to consider the particularities of the concrete case, on the other . 273
!
Facing this challenge, Atria’s proposal is not to give the judge the power to modify 
the rule in order to include as a negative condition for its application the 
instantiation of a relevant, but not originally considered interest. What is at stake is 
something different: a rule’s defeasibility is not solved by means of a more precise 
formulation, for it doesn’t matter how precise the employed description is, it will 
always be possible that a concrete case occurs in which a previously not considered 
interest is identified. Thus understood, defeasibility does not lead to a modification 
of the rule’s content, but to its displacement: its content remains unchanged and 
therefore the case still instantiates its operative facts, but the application discourse 
demands to leave the rule unapplied.  
!
By denying the judge the power to alter the rule’s content by incorporating a new 
condition for its application, the alternative defended by Atria is not only attempting 
to explain the irreducible defeasibility of rules, but also trying to block the way to a 
new justification discourse, now on the judicial seat, whose aim is to determine—no 
longer the applicability of the original rule, but—the validity of the newly 
formulated rule for the decision of the case. This problem is similar to the one that 
Alexy rightly puts forward against Günther when the last one attempts to explain 
how cases with conflicting norms should be solved. Günther proposes that on those 
cases the judge should create a new norm that includes an exception to its 
conditions of application, so when the conditions that trigger the original collision 
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obtain, the new norm is no longer applicable. But, how is the judge supposed to 
create this new norm? Günther denies that it has to be subjected to the justification 
test, arguing that a new norm that allows to balance two previously justified norms 
does not itself require a new justification. I believe Alexy is right in this point: if the 
norm created by the judge has its own content that it is not already included in the 
original norms, i.e. if the new norm is not from the beginning entailed in the 
conjunction of the two or more norms that it purports to harmonise, then in order to 
assert its validity it is necessary a new premise to be added to the original set of 
norms. For Günther the extra premise corresponds to the ideal of a coherent 
normative system, but Alexy rightly replies that such ideal ‘is either a magician’s 
hat one can draw anything out of (…) or it refers to the procedure of justification in 
a system’ ; in other words: in a situation of collision, Günther’s application 274
discourse turns into a justification-as-coherence discourse whose object is 
configured by the new norm that is supposed to deactivate the normative conflict. 
!
Atria’s option seems to avoid this: if the judge, when deciding the appropriateness 
of a rule were to modify in anyway its content, such modification would count as 
the formulation of a new rule whose validity would have to be justified, and with 
that, the judge would be abandoning the application discourse and entering a 
justificatory one regarding the new rule with the judicially included exception or 
addition. That is why it is key for Atria to understand that the object of the 
appropriateness-judgement corresponds to an already defined and justified rule. 
!
So, if we look at the adequacy judgement in relation to its incidence on the legal 
syllogism, we can say that Atria’s way of thematising the defeasibility of a rule does 
not affect the movement from the premises to the conclusion: 
!
What is mobilised by the special circumstances is not the possibility to subsume the 
concrete case under the operative facts of the prima facie applicable rule, and so 
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defeasibility is not a semantic problem that blocks the deductive reasoning in the 
legal syllogism. As Atria sees it, our widow presents a difficult case despite being 
clear that the terms of the rule are verified—such rule is internally applicable: that a 
particular interest is verified on her case does not impede to arrive at the conclusion 
that follows from the premises, so according to the syllogism that particular woman 
actually is infamous. If we add to this the impossibility of modifying the content of 
the rule, then it seems that the only option left in order to escape the rule-established 
conclusion is by defeating the rule’s external applicability—hence, I will label this 
type of application discourse as an ‘external’ application discourse: here, the norm 
is internally applicable but has to be displaced, and therefore the conclusion of the 
syllogism does not define the judicial decision of the case. Despite defeasibility, the 
syllogism is nevertheless right, but it does not exhaust the legal reasoning—the 
judge still has to decide if appropriateness-related considerations demand a different 
solution. 
!
The judgement of appropriateness, understood as such, takes place after it has been 
assessed if the operative facts of the rule have been verified, so considering relevant 
interests that were not foreseen during the justification discourse either takes place 
outside the legal syllogism or not at all. But here Atria doesn’t consider the 
possibility of locating the judgement of appropriateness—and with it, defeasibility 
itself—within the analysis of the correspondence between operative facts and the 
particular case. We will see that his position, although not explicitly stated, rests on 
a problematic understanding of semantics, one that if left aside, allows putting 
forward a different theory of defeasibility that locates the sensibility to the 
particular circumstances within the scope of the minor premise of the legal 
syllogism and is therefore better suited to address challenges that the current theory 
faces. In other words, with two different semantics, come two different 
understandings of defeasibility and two possible ways of dealing, in the judicial 
moment, with the intension/extension binomial. 
!
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In this section I will evaluate the success of Atria’s attempt to make subjection to 
law and attention to the particular compatible; and with it, I will analyse the extent 
to which his proposal secures a properly applicative space that maintains a 
separation from justificatory discourses and that is compatible with law boundaries. 
However, I don’t want to deny the relevance of the particularity void nor the 
importance of the question about appropriateness—the objections that I will put 
forward are only directed towards the concrete configuration that these features 
adopt in the non-semantic approach. 
!
In Atria’s model, the judicial judgement has not as its object the fairness of the 
correlation between universals that is established in the law (its validity), but only 
whether the concrete case is abnormal , i.e. one that actualises interests that were 
not foreseen in the justificatory moment: the judge examines the case and if the 
interests of whoever is being judged were taken into consideration at the legislative 
moment, then the decision of the case is contained in the rule; if they weren’t, the 
judge considers them now and decides the case without applying the rule . That is 275
what constitutes the non-political moment of adjudication: the case is decided based 
on reasons whose merit is not under discussion . 276
!
In Atria’s model, the distinction between not applying the rule in consideration to 
unforeseen interests, and questioning the rule’s validity—i.e., leaving it without 
application because the judge thinks the rule itself is irrational—is substantive, 
formless: it is not possible to give the judge the power to do the first without 
 140
 Atria (2016), 225.275
 Atria (2016), 220.276
simultaneously granting her the power to do the second . And of course, if the 277
judge leaves a law without application because she takes it to be incorrect, if instead 
of deciding on its applicability she questions its validity, if, in the end, she engages 
on a justification discourse regarding the law, then she is not bound to it . As such, 278
the distinction can only be noticed from an institutional approach, and so the focus 
is turned on the institutional design whereby it is likely that judges only decide on 
the application and not on the validity of the rule. The structural features of the 
judicial power are explained in terms of making it probable for judges to engage in 
one function and not the other. 
!
However, before scrutinising these institutional structures, it is necessary to ask how 
the judge could determine if a property not addressed by the law and instantiated in 
a concrete case was actually taken into consideration in the justificatory moment. 
Atria says that in an abnormal case the judge leaves the rule without application 
indicating that at the legislative stage the ‘considered interests were others’ . But, 279
how can the judge determine the set of considered interests? I will claim that 
without determining the interests, consequences or properties that were evaluated in 
the justification discourse the judge cannot identify the abnormal cases. And 
therefore, the application discourse that focuses on the particularities of the case and 
decouples the judicial moment from the legislative one, entails a judgement 
regarding the foreseeable interests that would serve to justify the rule. I will argue 
that an ‘external’ application discourse entails a justificatory one —i.e., the type 280
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4.1. Justification in the applicative moment 
!
What I fear is that this approach, that relies on the distinction between abstract and 
foreseeable interests, on the one hand, and concrete and ex-ante unforeseeable 
interests, on the other, does not evade, but replicates the problem faced by the 
general understanding of defeasibility. According to the latter, defeasibility is also 
defended in consideration to the gap between a rule and its justification, but this 
general formulation—unlike Atria’s approach—does not go as far as providing a 
qualitative difference between the type of arguments that justify displacing of the 
rule at the judicial moment and those that justify it on the legislative one. 
!
In the conventional approach, it is claimed that since the rule is justified in 
consideration to a goal, i.e. in consideration to underlying reasons in favour of 
adopting it , then such goal that is made probable by the former cannot be 281
completely ignored when it comes to the application of the rule . This is the basis 282
to argue that in those cases where the application of the rule would betray its aim, 
where text and thought do not overlap, the judge would be entitled to leave the 
former unapplied. With this in mind, it has been proposed that norms should be 
understood as essentially defeasible , something that would not depend on the 283
explicit inclusion in the content of the norm of a clause that establishes as a 
condition of application the verification of ‘normal circumstances’ or ‘the 
achievement of the norm’s goal’. The idea is that norms would be implicitly 
integrated by a defeater  according to which they are not to be applied under 284
certain circumstances. The point of the defeater being implicit and not explicit in 
the content of the norm is precisely an attempt to express the correct form of 
application of the norm through a reference to its content, despite the fact that the 
defeasibility of the norm depends not on such content but on the way it is treated . 285
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That the rule excludes but only within certain limits would allow legal reasoning to 
be formal but not formalistic . So, in certain extreme cases, in situations that are 286
‘specially compelling’  regarding the extent to which the aim of the rule is 287
frustrated by its application, the rule is to be left unapplied.  
!
To notice the problem with this simpler understanding is enough to consider Raz’s 
remarks regarding rule ‘opaqueness’: ‘they [rules] do not point to any value in the 
action for which they are reasons’ —‘forbidden to enter vehicles into the park’ is 288
a reason to abstain from doing so, but it does not point to a good in abstaining from 
entering vehicles into the park. This, of course, is inevitable as long as the reasons 
for the rules are not part of their content, and it goes hand in hand with the fact that 
‘rules normally represent the result of considering the application of a variety of 
conflicting considerations to a generic situation (…) norms do not carry their 
desirability in their faces’ . So in order to defeat the rule, the judge first needs to 289
define its justification, but since the rules are opaque to them, the judge either 
engages in a justification discourse or simply lacks a standard that can constrain the 
conditions of defeat and then any of the potentially conflicting considerations would 
be equally capable of pushing the rule aside. 
!
Notice too that the problem is not only that of identifying one among many possible 
reasons that simultaneously stand as alternative justification, but the judge would 
also face the threat of regress: regarding any reason that is taken as the relevant one, 
a further questions can be asked about the possibility of defeating it in consideration 
to a second-order reason. So, from all the competing reasons, we could agree that 
vehicles are not allowed in the park because they affect the peace and quiet of the 
people enjoying the place, but why stop there? Why not ask for the reasons in 
favour of protecting the peace and quiet in the park? And once identified, the 
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question can be pushed once more: we could assume that the park is to be kept quiet 
because it is mostly visited by elders that dislike loud noises. But in that case, if 
there were no elders in the park or all of them were deaf, then would it be O.K. to 
enter with loud motorcycles? The problem is that the underlying justification can 
only serve as an standard once it is fixed in a canonical form, and if such canonical 
form serves to make the rule inapplicable, then the defeasibility question can be 
directed towards it—only not reduced to a fixed expression the aim can keep its 
sensibility to special cases, but if not fixed it cannot guide the application of the 
rule. 
!
Schauer adverts this when he claims that there will always be the possibility of a 
tension between an aim and its concretisation on a rule, because you can always 
keep asking for a deeper and deeper justification. So, if the standard for applications 
is that the concretisation cannot frustrate the aim, then the former is always and ad 
eternum defeasible by the aim, and by moving in that direction the very notion of 
‘rule’ is lost . But despite recognising the problem, Schauer’s proposal in order to 290
constrain defeasibility to ‘specially compelling’ situations does nothing to avoid it: 
it still has no way to grapple with the lack of a standard to identify the relevant 
reasons according to which a situation can be understood as ‘specially compelling’. 
And as long as there is no parameter to distinguish those considerations, everything 
is still on the table, capable of taking the rule down regarding the concrete case; and
—using Schauer’s own expression—‘a world in which decision makers consider 
everything that they feel relevant and ignore, or at least slight, any inconsistent 
external instruction in making their decision’  is not the world of law. 291
!
Let us state our problem one more time before going back to Atria’s theory. Our 
problem was that defeasibility turns on the justification of the rule, but since the 
rule does not express its justification, any reason against the behaviour required by 
the rule could take it down—and this could be constantly reiterated regarding the 
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reasons underlying every new justification given. In other words, without a standard 
for defeasibility, any condition C that is taken to justify the rule ‘if A, then B’ could 
serve to leave it unapplied; but since we don’t have a way to identify C besides a 
justification discourse, the judge has no measure to determine when to displace the 
rule. Even more, regarding a reason C already identified, we could question the 
defeasibility of it—if the interest in ‘keeping the peace and quiet in the park’ can 
defeat the rule that forbids vehicles because it justifies it, then the interest in ‘not 
making noises that bothers the elders’ can displace it if it justifies the previous 
justification: the condition that is supposed to govern defeasibility requires a 
condition to govern its own defeasibility. 
!
What interests us now is to see if the distinction between justificatory and 
applicative considerations can provide the theory with a standard for the 
identification of the judicially relevant interests that avoids leaving the rule at the 
mercy of any consideration that could work as a reason in its favour. If that were the 
case, then such standard would constrain the judge’s decision about the rule’s 
displacement and keep it separated from the question about the rule’s justification. 
Arguing that the judge and the lawmaker look at different things when making their 
decisions point to a qualitative difference between the considerations that operate at 
each stage, and that does seem to avoid the problem: only certain kind of interests 
can justify the displacement of the rule, and those interests are, by their particular 
and unforeseeable nature, not apt to figure in the legislative, justificatory moment. 
So, in this theory, not just anything can be a ‘property C’, but only particular 
interests that are actually verified in the concrete case. And the law, being universal, 
cannot refer concrete interests of particular subjects in its content. The conditions 
that the judge identifies on the application discourse and serve to take the rule 
down, as long as they refer to the particular subjects to which it is supposed to be 
applied, cannot be part of a legislated and weakly justified rule—no proper names 
nor concrete states or events in legislation. On the contrary, there is nothing in the 
general theory of defeasibility entailing that the movement from ‘if A, then B’, to ‘if 
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A & -C, then B’ is a movement that changes the nature of the rule; ‘C’, in that 
theory, can be just another consideration that could have been included in the 
legislated rule from the very beginning. But if the judge is supposed to decide on 
the particularity, then in Atria’s proposal ‘C’ is a concrete interest that remains 
outside the justification discourse. And there seems to be no possibility of eternal 
regress either, for what defeats the rule is the concrete interest that obtains in the 
particular case, so we could rest on the involved ‘radical human beings’ and define 
the interests at stake using the formulation that they, on their own words, state. 
!
But things are not that simple. The properly judicial moment rests on the judge 
identifying particular interests that were not considered on the legislative stage. As 
long as she decides the case based on them, she is not entering in a justificatory 
discourse that challenges the validity of the rule. For this to work, the question that 
must be positively answered is whether it is possible to perform one judgement and 
not the other, whether it can be determined that a concrete interest that is verified on 
a particular case is a special one, without simultaneously being committed to a set 
of interests that are to be considered normal. In other words, the theory would fall if 
the justification problem re-arises, if the judgement about the appropriateness 
hinges on a judgement about the interests that were considered by the lawmaker at 
the justificatory stage. To displace the rule, the judge must identify an interest that is 
disadvantaged by its application, but that was not considered at the justificatory 
stage, so she has to define the set of interests that typically would be affected either 
positively or negatively by the general observation of the rule—those are the ones 
that can be understood as entering into the justificatory discourse. But since there is 
no list of the considered interest, nor they come already labeled as ‘typical’ or 
‘atypical’, the judge has a problem: how can she know if the concrete interest that is 
being wave by one party is typical or not? Atria’s scheme, if I understand correctly, 
presents the judge with a twofold challenge: the first one has to do with the 
identification of the concrete interest that is verified on the case, the second one 
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refers to the identification of the set of relevant interests in the justificatory moment. 
The way they interlock is particularly problematic. 
!
When it comes to the first question, what has to be noticed is that the interest of 
whoever is trying to defeat the rule can always support infinite specifications: 
regarding the ‘forbidden vehicles’ rule, Atria asserts that what was considered and 
defeated was the interest ‘of those who want to use vehicles in the park’, that we are 
to assume that the legislator gave a thought about them and decided that the interest 
in ‘keeping the peace of the place’ was more important; but—he continues—such 
decision is not key ‘regarding the question on whether or not it is permissible to use 
a vehicle on a memorial in the park’, for this one is an interest that is ‘different from 
those that are involved in typical cases of application’ . The reply that could be 292
expected from those claiming that the rule is to be applied, on the other hand, would 
argue that the veteran’s interest is an interest precisely in ‘using a vehicle in the 
park’, the one that was taken into account and lost. They could also add that anyone 
who wants to use a vehicle in the park can present their claim as one different from 
the ‘typical one’: a group of bikers that want to make a motorcycle show in the park 
could claim that their interest is that of ‘organising a sporting event’ , interest that 293
was not foreseen and has only now surfaced, one that, vis-à-vis ‘using a vehicle in 
the park’, is as unusual as the interest in ‘homaging war heroes’. 
!
In this scenario, we are starting with one defined, justificatory interest that is taken 
to be typical (‘using a vehicle in the park’) and thus serves as a standard for the 
assessment of the concrete, applicative one. But since this concrete interest can be 
described in different ways, in order to contrast it with the justificatory one the 
judge has to fix one formulation of it, one from the many that could be predicated 
for the concrete case—she has to determine if the interest can be reduced to the one 
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that was considered and defeated in the legislative moment. And as the previous 
example shows, the interests of both the veterans and the bikers can 
unproblematically be described as ‘typical’ (they both want to use a vehicle in the 
park) or ‘atypical’ (the first want to homage the fallen, the latter, to organise a 
sporting event) vis-à-vis the considered and defeated justificatory interest.  
!
Now, of course, it might be replied that the whole point of Atria’s argument is that 
what characterises the judicial moment is precisely the task of defining the 
appropriate description of the concrete interest that is to be assessed: the veterans’ 
interest is correctly described as an interest in ‘homaging the fallen’, so it is special 
and it defeats the rule; the bikers’ interest, on the other hand, is correctly described 
as ‘wanting to use vehicles in the park’, so it is typical and it was defeated. The 
problem is that, ex hypothesi, neither the interest in homaging dead soldiers nor the 
interest in arraying a motorcycle spectacle were addressed in the justificatory 
moment, so taking one as special but not the other requires putting forward a 
different standard, one that allows reducing the latter but not the former to what is 
‘typical’. Adducing that special interests defeat the rule but do not challenge its 
validity is compatible with understanding that whatever interest the judge is 
presented with is a special one. 
!
On the other hand, the second question addresses the reliability of the previously 
mentioned hypothesis—i.e., the identification of the justificatory reasons. This task 
is not less complex. The reason for this lies on the fact that what can be taken to be 
a typical interest regarding a rule is sensible to the aim that is attributed to it. Allow 
me to use a remarkable case studied by Atria in order to make the point clear: here 
we find a CEO that does not write his own labor contract and then demands the 
application of a legal presumption according to which ‘lacking a written labor 
contract it is legally assumed that the stipulations of the contract are those declared 
by the worker’ . The particularity of the situation, which for Atria makes 294
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inapplicable the rule that establishes the presumption even though its operative facts 
are verified, is that the worker in this case is the company’s manager, so both the 
subject in whose favour the presumption is established and the one with the power 
to decide the writing of the contract are the same person. Atria says that in this case, 
the reason that justifies the rule does not obtain: a worker that isn’t on equal footing 
to negotiate the labor conditions with his employer. So far so good, but things get 
complicated once we realise that there might be other reasons too in favour of this 
regulation. Maybe, the justification of the rule includes considerations related to 
incentivise the company’s boards or owners to respect workers’ rights, or to punish 
them when they fail to properly exert surveillance on their CEOs. Maybe even 
practical considerations regarding the daily operation of the labour authority that 
intervenes in the signing of the contract were also taken into account. To make it 
simpler, just take the case of traffic restrictions: are they established to improve 
pollution conditions or in order to fight traffic congestions? There is no reason to 
assume that it has to be only one of them, maybe all those aims and many more 
were discussed in the legislative stage. 
!
The obvious fact that rules are not transparent to their aim, their opaqueness, 
becomes a crucial one once it is noticed that the status of an interest as special is 
sensitive to the aim that is attributed to the rule, since the latter defines the 
background against which special and ordinary interests are distinguished: if the 
justification of the rule is that of protecting the weaker party in labour contracts, 
then the case of the CEO/worker is atypical, but the same case will be typical if we 
take that the justification of the rule is to force the board to be more acute in 
examining what the managers are doing—if that is taken to be the goal, then the 
interest of the manager in using his position at the expense of the company is one 
that can be unproblematically taken as foreseeable, and the interest of the company 
in not being abused by management is one that was considered and defeated. 
!
The same happens with traffic restrictions: in a case regarding someone how wants 
to drive a car that not only does not pollute, but that actually cleans the air while it 
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moves, the status of his interest hinges on a decision about the rule’s aim—if 
restriction is there to avoid pollution, then the interest in driving this supper-
advance-clean-car can claim to be undefeated and special vis-à-vis the ordinary one 
of just driving a car; but if the goal is to fight congestion, then this interest is 
ordinary. 
!
The malleability of the description that refers to the particular interest in the judicial 
moment, finds its correlative in the malleability of the justification of the rule in the 
legislative one, and the combination of both proves the distinction between 
ordinary, justificatory interests and special, judicial ones to be insufficiently stable 
to differentiate between legislative and judicial stages. By claiming that the 
particular interest that is verified on the concrete case is a special one, the judge is 
committing to a justification of the rule whose applicability is being discussed. This, 
I think, cannot be any other way: the special interests are precisely those which 
were not considered in the justificatory stage, so the judge can only identify them if 
she first addresses the justification of the rule—otherwise, she lacks a background 
against which her qualification of an interest as a special one can pivot. Unless we 
adopt a psychological and empirical position about the identification of the 
considered interests , the judge has to define the reasons that justify the rule in 295
order to contrast the concrete interest she identifies on the case and thus decide if it 
is a special one. The corollary would be presented as follows: deciding on the 
special interests (applicative moment) seems to require identifying the ordinary 
ones (justificatory moment); it is not possible to draw a line on the ground and point 
to one side without simultaneously identifying the other. This does not mean that we 
can never know the aim of a rule or if its application to a case would be 
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The malleability of the interest’s description together with the malleability of the 
rule’s justification leaves us in a complicated spot. Savigny feared that the power to 
correct the ‘improper expression’ could be used as a pretext to change the 
established law for one that is preferred by the judge. But the problem runs deeper, 
because it is not about the possibility of a badly willed action. The judge can 
honestly think that the concrete interest is relevant-but-not-considered. But then she 
would necessarily be questioning the justification of the rule by asserting that it is 
not justified in light of that interest. And since every rule is defeasible, then every 
application demands a judgement on the rule’s justification, and so recognising the 
validity of the rule is compatible with understanding that in every particular case the 
judge faces, there is an interest that defeats it. 
!
The non-political moment of adjudication is at stake. Atria correctly insists that 
jurisdiction corresponds to the power to settle conflicts by means of the impartial 
application of rules that are common to the parties . But between the defendant 296
that claims that in his particular case there is a relevant but unforeseen interest and 
the plaintiff that asserts that such interest is an ordinary one that was considered and 
defeated at the legislative stage, the judge’s stand is not impartial, but aligns her 
with one of them. And her decision depends precisely on whether or not she 
considers that the rule to be applied is justified in light of the adduced interest. 
!
4.2. Law’s reductions 
!
Allowing the rule to be displaced in consideration to factors external to the legally 
recognised ones puts at risk law’s own formality. A judgement is a legal one only to 
the extent that everything that is thematised by law is reduced to already established 
categories. With Hans Lindahl we can say that law operates by ‘disclosing 
something as something* anew’ , as the instantiation of a possibility that has 297
already been fixed on legally defined schemes of interpretation. Those schemes, 
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categories, possibilities, descriptions, are the mechanisms on which law rests in 
order to reduce complexity and assign meaning. But such job can only be done as 
long as what remains outside them cannot block the legal thematisation—opening 
up to consider external properties, being willing to take into consideration that 
which lies outside the legal categories, entails retracing what was advanced and 
therefore reestablishing the complexity that was reduced . 298
!
Therefore, the properties that can arise within law are limited to the ones that are 
legally expected. To this we must add a second consideration: the expected 
properties are in turn determined by the language of law’s rules. The 
semanticalization intrinsic to a rule entails descontextualizating from the specific 
circumstances on which the rule is to be applied —rules suppress all the 299
properties that are not relevant in consideration to the language employed by them, 
so there is an essential allness in them . This means that it is the force of the 300
language employed in the establishment of the rules what excludes other 
considerations from the operation. If this is the case, then norms have to work on 
what Schauer calls the ‘entrenched model’: existing legal generalizations block all 
other descriptive possibilities, and therefore the recalcitrant experience of finding a 
particular case to which the application of the rule would frustrate its aim does not 
give way to an exemption . If we stand with this characterisation of legal 301
operation, then the judge’s problem is not just that without a commitment to a 
certain justification she cannot apply the rule, but even more, conditioning the 
application to the justification—conditioning it, that is, in properties that have not 
been previously recognised by the relevant legal rules—makes the decision 
contingent on ‘tapping something that has not already been elevated as salient’; and 
‘this is unworkable in law’, for ‘what can emerge legally, has to have been expected 
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legally. And what can be expected legally depends on reductions to role and rule, 
the exclusionary language of law’ . If we stand with this characterisation of legal 302
operation, defeasibility demands the impossible: a ‘legal judgement over 
appropriateness of the application of law’ .  303
!
We could use Raz’s theory to ground this objection. I do not want to provide an 
exhaustive explanation of the theory, so I’ll keep it brief: rules  are second-order 304
exclusionary reasons for action—i.e., ‘a reason to refrain from acting for some 
reason’ . They usually do not exclude every other possible reason, so in the 305
majority of cases, but not all, we need not know which reasons justify them in order 
to apply . Up to this point, the exclusionary nature of norms does not prevent a 306
defeasible understanding of them, for they would be compatible with a conflicting 
reason of an exceptional nature not being excluded . Thus, if the behaviour that 307
the rule requires is omitted in consideration to ‘an overriding reason not meant to be 
excluded by the order’, then the addressee of the rule ‘is not regarded as having 
disobeyed the order’ . 308
!
But legal rules are different. They exclude every conflicting reason that is not legal 
or legally recognised , and the legally recognised reasons are determined by the 309
rules of the system —outside the rules’ categories, there are no legal reasons. This 310
radical exclusionary effect of legal rules follows from ‘the legal system’s claim to 
be supreme’—i.e., its claim ‘to have authority to regulate the setting up and 
application of other institutionalised systems’. And it can only do that if its rules 
displace the reasons arising from other sources. 
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!
With this understanding of the exclusionary nature of legal rules, what vanishes is 
the possibility of them being defeated, in the judicial moment, in consideration to 
the verification of properties that lie beyond the ones established in the content of 
the system’s rules . In Practical Reasons and Norms, Raz offers the following 311
characterisation of courts: they ‘are institutions which (…) are subject to an 
exclusionary reason not to act on certain reasons (…) The standards on which 
primary organs ought to act (…) are the rules of the system under which they 
operate and they ought to exclude standards which are not part of the system’ . 312
That being the case, ‘If a man is legally required to do A in C then the courts are 
bound to hold that he failed to do what he ought to have done if he fails to do A in 
C. They will refuse to listen to arguments to the effect that failing to do A in C is 
really what he ought to have done since there were extra-legal reasons which 
override the reasons that the legal requirement provides’ . 313
!
Within this scheme, benign defeasibility is manageable. Raz’s theory can allocate 
conflicts between second-order reasons: legal rules only exclude non-legal 
contradictory reasons, so neither of the conflicting legal rules displaces by itself the 
other, and therefore a preference rule has to be invoked. Things are different with 
malign defeasibility: one cannot endorse it and maintain a commitment to Raz’s 
theory—if a property is not considered, if law has ‘suppressed’  it by way of its 314
abstractions, then, how could the judge know that such property was actually 
considered in the legislative moment without engaging in a justification discourse? 
And how could she know that such property is relevant for the decision of the 
case?  Claiming that there are other considerations to take into account is to reject 315
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the exclusionary effect—we would have to abandon the exclusionary level and 
examine the justification of the rule to know how to apply it.  
!
This, of course, doesn’t prove the defeasibility theory wrong. It could very well be 
the other way around: since defeasibility is an essential part of an adequate 
characterization of the judicial moment, it is the exclusionary understanding of legal 
rules what needs to be abandoned—otherwise we would be committed to a theory 
of adjudication that does not give an account of the crucial challenge that the judge 
faces . But notice that accepting the exclusionary nature of rules only entails a 316
mechanistic understanding of the judge's function—an understanding in which the 
particularities of the case that are not legally recognised are irrelevant—if the only 
way to defeat a rule is by cutting its external applicability to a case that falls within 
its internal scope of applicability: if the only way in which all features of a situation 
can be considered at the moment of application is by allowing them to displace an 
internally applicable rule (by an ‘external’ application discourse), then a 
commitment to the exclusionary nature of legal rules prevents the judge from 
attending those unforeseen features and consequentially commits to the mechanical 
approach that ignores them. But, if we were to endorse a semantics that allows to 
thematise the particularities of the case as a problem of internal applicability, we 
might be able to have our cake and eat it, we could keep the sensitivity to the 
particularities of the case, without giving away the exclusionary force of rules that 
prevents turning questions of application into questions of justification. That is the 
alternative that will be discussed in Section 5. The possibility of modelling the 
judge’s position on that of an observer who is open to other categories without 
overstepping these limits will be tackled in Section 6.3. 
!
If the characterisation and objections that I’ve put forward to a non-semantic 
approach to adjudication are correct, then Atria is right in noticing the challenge that 
the particularity void presents to adjudication, in remarking the fact that the 
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concrete properties that are verified in the particular case have to be addressed in 
order to assess the appropriateness of the application: the claim that we are to find a 
distinctive quality of the judicial moment in these features is on point, and taken in 
this work as an essential part in characterising adjudication. The problem lies in the 
particular way in which the distance between intension and extension are dealt in 
this model. Atria made an early displacement of semantic considerations, and thus 
pushed vagueness aside before dealing with defeasibility—that’s more or less the 
route we have followed this far. By doing this, he assumed that these were two 
distinct problems and thus deprived himself of a valuable tool to deal with 
defeasibility. In what comes next, I will argue that if the semantic considerations are 
brought back, we should be able to relate defeasibility and vagueness in a 
productive fashion. 
!
5. A semantic approach 
!
To defend the exclusionary nature of rules without giving up the sensibility to 
unforeseen but concretely verified properties, what we need is an expansive 
semantics—one that allows understanding the judgement of appropriateness as a 
semantic problem, one that takes the identification of the circumstances of 
appropriate application of a concept as a semantic issue and understands those 
circumstances as being themselves defeasible and open to debate and disagreement 
among speakers. The richness of Robert Brandom’s inferential semantics allows us 
to do this: it understands that the meaning of an assertion is constituted by the 
material, nonmonotonic inferential relations between the circumstances and 
consequences of its application, both of which correspond to entitlements and 
commitments that can be linguistic and non-linguistic and are differently specified 
from the perspective of each speaker . Here, semantics is all about the perspectival 317
and defeasible nature of the material inferential relations that each speaker endorses 
regarding each assertion.  
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But even a less powerful semantics can be employed to extend the scope of 
semantic analysis. Nicos Stavropoulos, resorting to Hilary Putnam’s realism, has 
made this move, including the question of appropriateness within a semantic 
framework: in an ingenious move, he has defended that both open texture and 
defeasibility are two different ways in which Hart wrongfully tries to give an 
account of the openness of legal concepts . Since Putnam’s semantics is 318
considerably weaker that Brandom’s—while the former’s work focuses on the role 
that empirical conditions of application have in defining the meaning of a concept, 
Brandom’s inferentialism includes both circumstances and consequences that also 
can be linguistic—, although Putnam cannot give an account of Brandom’s 
semantic, Brandom can give an account of Putnam’s . This allows accommodating 319
Stavropoulos’ key remarks regarding defeasible conditions of application, which I 
will use to construct a different, ‘internal’ form of application discourse, into 
Brandomnian circumstances of correct usage. 
!
5.1. Towards a different semantics 
!
We saw that the non-semantic model addressed special circumstances as affecting 
the external applicability of the rule. The option that we are now considering 
consists in directing the adequacy judgement to the minor premise of the legal 
syllogism, making the description of the facts of the case sensible to its 
particularities. 
!
The first step in Stavropoulos’ route to do this is to reject the definitional or criterial 
model of meaning according to which concepts could be explained and adequately 
employed through a closed scheme of shared necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The semantic assumption that underlies the rejected model asserts that the meaning 
of a concept is defined by a shared list of (descriptions of) the properties that 
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something has to exemplify in order to fall under its extension—by a shared 
criterion. Being that the case, ‘lawyers cannot genuinely disagree over whether 
something is, say, a contract. To disagree is to cease employing shared criteria’. 
Since agreement defines what contracts are , whoever claims that the disputed 320
object is actually a contract is either analytically mistaken or using a different 
concept of ‘contract’—lack of clarity among norm subjects entails that the rule 
offers no solution . The real discussion, then, is not about ‘whether something is 321
in fact within the extension of the concept of a contract, but only on whether the 
concept ought to be extended, for reasons independent of “contracthood”, to cover 
it’ . If the meaning of the term is exhausted by the shared criteria, our discussion, 322
ex hypothesis, cannot be semantic—there cannot be a debate about the properties 
that have to be verified with respect to an object or state of affairs in order to count 
as part of the extension of a concept . 323
!
Once it is denied that meanings depend on a defined set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, Stavropoulos has the door open to tackle, as semantic issues, both 
defeasibility and open texture: on the one hand, since the criteria for the use of 
concepts are not closed, there will always be the possibility that our list of the 
conditions that normally define the application of the concept are defeated by an 
unforeseen condition. On the other, open texture tries to provide an answer to the 
same lack of definition: the conditions for the adequate application will inevitably 
fall short to determine the applicability of the concept in every possible situation .  324
!
He will move forward starting from a critic to Hart’s approach, who even though 
rightly rejects the criterial model, errs on the conclusions that follow from such 
rejection. In Hart’s reading, the use of concepts would be constrained by conditions 
of application that would guarantee the adequacy of their employment, but such 
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guarantee would in turn be defeasible if an extraordinary circumstance is obtained. 
Stavropoulos’ option, on the other hand, will try to deny that what is considered by 
Hart under special circumstances as ‘defeated criteria’ is actually a criteria for the 
employment of the concept under those circumstances . That will provide space to 325
introduce the question of appropriateness within the semantic judgement about the 
applicability—not of the rule, but—of the legal concepts included in the operative 
facts of the rule. 
 
Hart’s understanding of the way in which the conditions for application support the 
use of a concept is similar to the way in which G. P. Baker understands the 
operation of criteria in Wittgenstein: meaning is not ineffable because there are 
‘criteria’ for the correct understanding of an expression, so the specification of them 
results in a non-trivial explanation of the expression . Now, from the fact that 326
those criteria are defeasible follows that they cannot be understood as establishing 
truth conditions for the employed expressions, because even if they are satisfied 
there can always be new evidence obtained that weakens the support that the criteria 
offers to the assertion. 
!
The crucial point for Baker is that despite their defeasibility, satisfaction of the 
criteria does entail certainty regarding the assertion, so the ‘criterial’ evidence that 
supports a conclusion is conclusive, but not incontrovertible ; and that possibility 327
to controvert the support that is offered by the criteria is inevitable because the 
conditions of defeasibility are infinite. That is why it would be a mistake to present 
them as negative conditions of application: it is not that the criteria (C) support the 
assertion (S) under a circumstance (R), because if that were the case, then CR 
would always support S. Against that, what should be said is that whatever the 
criteria are—C or CR—it can always stop supporting the assertion. This is, for both 
Baker and Hart, on cases of defeasibility the criterion for the use of a concept (its 
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conditions of application) are fulfilled but defeated. Defeasibility is external to the 
criteria. 
!
John McDowell’s opposition to this tries to move sensibility to the special 
circumstances inside the criteria themselves: it is no longer that a criterion is 
constituted by a condition independent from the assertion that is supposed to be 
guaranteed and that can be defeated in certain context, but that whether or not that 
condition is actually a criterion for the assertion depends on the context. In this way, 
certain curvature on someone’s mouth would be the criterion to assert that such 
person is smiling, but if we find a second face that despite having the same 
curvature is not smiling, what we should do, according to McDowell, is to deny that 
on that case the curvature in the mouth is a criterion to assert that the face is 
smiling. It is not the case, as with Baker, that the curve is also a criterion in the 
second case that turns out to be defeated, but that the curvature is defeated as a 
criterion . The way in which Baker understands the criteria’s defeasibility rests on 328
the understanding of them as assertability conditions, as state of affairs that can be 
determined regardless of the certainty that we can have about the assertion that they 
guarantee; if that is the case, then the distance between the verification of the 
criterion and the assertion that they support entail that such support is 
controvertible . That would be the case if we understand that the criteria to assert 329
that someone is on certain mental state are constituted by what she says or does: if 
someone says that she is in pain, then we have satisfied the criteria to assert that she 
is in pain. However, because the subject can always be simulating, one option 
seems to be to understand that on cases of simulation the criterion has been satisfied 
and defeated, and therefore there is a distance between the criteria—an appearance 
that ‘is embraced within the scope of experience’ —and the fact itself of someone 330
being in pain. From that it would follow a general impossibility for our experience 
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to reach the facts themselves—it would only go as far as the verification of the 
defeasible criterion of those facts . 331
!
Against that, McDowell proposes to understand that even though it is true that on 
cases of deceit the experience perceives only the appearance of something being the 
case without reaching to the case itself; on cases of lucidity the appearance that is 
experienced corresponds to the case itself becoming perceptually manifested to 
someone : ‘when perception is veridical, the content of perceptual experience just 332
is the fact perceived’ —the appearance, on this second case, does not fall short 333
from what it looks like . This scheme allows McDowell to assert that on cases of 334
defeasibility the criteria has not been satisfied, that an illusion of satisfaction has 
been generated: when someone simulates being in pain, he is simulating the 
verification of the criteria to assert that he is in pain . 335
!
This is the idea that Stavropoulos takes against Hart. Defeasibility thesis, 
Stavropoulos tells us, asserts that when the conditions for the application of a 
concept are verified but the application is nevertheless inadequate, those conditions 
‘maintain their status as conditions of application: they are satisfied, but special 
circumstances give us an independent reason not to apply the concept’. Such 
conclusion is counterintuitive: ‘The natural thing to say is that the circumstances 
show that what we took to be conditions of correct application are not really such—
that, in the light of these circumstances, the satisfied conditions lose their status as 
conditions of application of the relevant concept’ . Faced with a special case, what 336
should be done—according to Stavropoulos—is to understand that the conditions 
that we had to determine the application of the concept have to be modified—what 
the special case is showing is that our original set of conditions was defective, and 
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so the conditions have to be revised so that our set gives a proper account of the fact 
that the new circumstances are relevant to the concept . 337
!
Here we find the crucial difference with Atria’s theory: for him, defeasibility leads 
to the displacement of an internally applicable rule in consideration to the 
particularities of the case, but the alternative we are now exploring understands that 
those particularities can alter (or defeat) what we take to be the conditions of 
application of the concepts included in the content of rule at issue.  
!
We are shifting from defeating the rule by attacking its external applicability, to 
defeating the conditions of application of the concepts of the rule and therefore 
attacking its internal applicability. This is the crucial movement that will allow me 
to propose an ‘internal’ form of application discourse that does not collapse into a 
justificatory one.  
!
And this internal defeasibility is inescapable, because the conditions of application 
are understood as conclusions of a theory about the point of the concept—following 
Putnam, he understands that the meaning of a concept is to be explained in terms of 
the best theory regarding the true nature of what is referred by it . This means that 338
we are starting from a theory that aims to explain and justify the concept, so the 
conditions are established in consideration to such justification: the conditions of 
applications are those that, if verified, allow to achieve its normative point. 
Therefore, the conditions are grounded on the paradigmatic or stereotypical cases of 
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application of the concept, so what is constructed is a theory that tries to justify and 
explain why the concept is properly applied in those cases—the content of ‘gold’, 
and with it, its extension, is not defined by a shared description, as it could be 
‘yellow and precious metal’, but it depends on our theory of what paradigmatic 
instances of ‘gold' share, i.e. being composed by the chemical element of atomic 
number 79; and since this is a theory about ‘gold’, and not its definition, it could be 
proven wrong. ‘Normal conditions’, those in which there is no defeasibility, ‘are 
nothing but specifications attempting to capture what is essential about the 
paradigms (the property that collects the together) and are therefore responsible to 
counterexamples, i.e. cases that do not match the conditions, yet are arguably 
instances of the same property’ . 339
!
By following Putnam, Stavropoulos understands that the conceptual analysis is 
directed towards the identification of requisite properties that make an object or 
state of affairs instantiate a concept, so ‘different views of what it is for something 
to be X’  stand in substantive and semantic disagreement. While on the criterial 340
model the meaning of ‘worker’ is exhausted on shared criteria, so every discussion 
that lies beyond them escapes the semantics of the concept, here the substantive 
disagreement on whether some subject is a worker is a semantic issue: we are 
discussing the meaning of ‘worker’, the properties that have to be verified in order 
to be part of its extension, not if ‘worker’ should be extended to cover cases that are 
similar to those that constitute its extension . 341
!
Therefore, instead of saying that there are two independent sources of support for an 
assertion (conditions of application and the circumstances in which it takes place), 
so that they can be decoupled (and therefore in order to decide on the application of 
a concept one first has to analyse the conditions independent of the context and then 
 163
 Stavropoulos (1996), 64.339
 Stavropoulos (1996),125.340
 Thus, while Dworkin claims that substantive theories related to the ‘point’ of a practice are separated from 341
semantic analysis, which depends on conventional agreement, for Stavropoulos both aspects go together. And 
in understanding that these are different issues, Dworkin is aligned with Raz— (1986), 1110, footnote nº 23.
evaluate the weight of contextual considerations), Stavropoulos’ alternative is to 
deny that there are conditions of applications independent of the contextual 
circumstances. Because of this he accuses Hart of not seeing that his rejection to a 
conception of meaning based on a closed set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
should naturally lead him to an understanding of the conditions as being themselves 
revisable . On cases of defeasibility we are not facing a fulfilled but defeated 342
condition of application, but a situation in which the conditions are not really 
fulfilled. 
!
Open texture, on the other hand, falls for the same reasons. Hart understood that the 
conditions of application work mechanically, ‘hence, only clear, paradigmatic cases 
are certainly captured by a rule, so its application is “automatic”, whereas in other 
cases “no firm convention or general agreement dictates its use”’ . Because of 343
that, faced to a special case, conditions of application do not work at all: they either 
automatically guarantee the application, or are silent; and therefore, on hard cases in 
which such form of operation is impossible, they are defeated and thus fail to 
provide an answer. For Hart this means that extraordinary circumstances do not lead 
to revise the conditions of application—the novel circumstances do not alter the 
conditions, but the latter can’t be accommodated into the former. So, Hart ‘accepts 
that the rule’s content is, in effect, the definition’, being committed to understand 
that such definition is given by conditions of application that are silent on special 
cases. On the latter, we would have to discuss—with discretion and in consideration 
to substantive judgements—if the rule should be extended beyond its extension 
which remains defined by the defeated conditions. Hart, Stavropoulos concludes, 
maintains the prejudice of the definitional model: ‘the content of a concept should 
be captured in incontrovertible conditions rendering application automatic’ , and 344
when that is not possible because of unforeseen circumstances, the conditions are 
not revised. 
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!
Against this, Stavropoulos proposes to understand that on these cases what is being 
discussed is precisely the conditions of application: it is not that they resolve the 
application on normal cases and that on special ones we have to debate whether or 
not to extend the use of the concept regardless of its definition, but that we are 
always discussing which are the conditions for the use of the concept given the 
concrete circumstances. 
!
5.2. Appropriateness as a minor premise problem: an ‘internal’ 
application discourse  
 
With an expansive semantics that includes the problem of appropriateness within 
the identification of the circumstances of application of concepts, it is possible to 
propose a different form of application discourse, one that can be labeled as 
‘internal’ since it addresses the internal applicability of the rule at issue—i.e., the 
possibility of subsuming the case under the semantic content of its operative facts. 
Now we can understand that the question about the adequacy does not alter the 
major premise of the syllogism, but it also does not demand displacing the rule for 
the decision of the case. Once the particular case challenges our current conditions 
of application, what is affected is not only our semantic understanding of the rule’s 
content , but as a consequence of this, also the description of the facts that 345
configure the minor premise of the syllogism. 
!
A recent Chilean case of high public connotation could serve to show how this 
alternative seems to pick up a side of the legal practice: a man stabs his spouse with 
pruning shears after she revealed an infidelity to him. Besides the justified shock 
that the event caused, the legal discussion among law scholars and practicing 
lawyers focused on the correction of grating the author of femicide the mitigating 
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circumstance of ‘acting for such powerful stimuli that they naturally produced a fit 
of rage and stubbornness’. 
!
The question about the adequate application of the rule of mitigation can be 
understood as referring to whether or not it is appropriate to alleviately reproach a 
crime whose speciality vis-a-vis homicide is justified on the expression of 
machismo by way of the criminal act, considering that the author’s motivation is 
explained precisely with reference to such machismo: if the speciality of the crime 
consists in the fact that it manifests an attitude of oppression against the victim in 
consideration to her gender, can the reproach be simultaneously mitigated on the 
basis that such attitude reduced the author’s capacity to act according to law? 
Adopting a semantic argument, we could agree with Atria that the judge lacks the 
power to modify the clause that establishes the mitigating circumstance by way of 
introducing an exception for the case in which the action is expressive of sexist 
violence. But the options that each theory offers to prevent granting the mitigation 
are different. 
!
On the one hand, we might accept—as the Court did—that finding out about an 
infidelity can constitute ‘such powerful stimuli that it naturally produced a fit of 
rage and stubbornness’, but simultaneously sustain that the particularities of the 
concrete situation serve as basis to deny the applicability of the rule at issue. On the 
other hand, the question about adequacy could be answered when assessing whether 
or not on this concrete situation it is possible to assert that the offender has ‘acted 
motivated by such powerful stimuli that they naturally produced a fit of rage and 
stubbornness’. 
!
In both alternatives what is being addressed is the question about the proper way of 
thematising the impact of the particular on the judicial decision. This can be 
approached both as an answer to the question on whether the rule at issue is 
externally applicable to the case or not, or as an answer to the question on whether 
the facts of the case can be subsumed under such rule. If we go back to the CEO’s 
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case, we will find that according to the non-semantic approach, this case is clearly 
subsumed under the terms of the rule whose external applicability could be 
contextually defeated by the operation of the ‘external’ application discourse; but 
with a semantic theory according to which the special circumstances affect the 
possibility of applying the concepts of the rule to the case at hand, an ‘internal’ 
application discourse could allow us to polemicise if the CEO is actually a worker 
or if it has been the employer who hasn’t used his right to write down the labor 
contract—we could discuss if the verification of the properties of being a CEO, 
taken together with the others that are prima facie instantiated in this case, shows 
that our original conditions of application were defective, that what prima facie was 
a worker wasn’t really one. Engaging in this analysis regarding the application of 
the concepts employed by the operative facts of the rule is what constitutes an 
‘internal’ application discourse. The current discussion about gender identity can be 
understood in this sense: we took the property of having two X chromosomes as the 
relevant one to fix the extension of ‘being a woman’; but faced with transgender 
subjects our theory changes, and so a law that a refers to ‘women’ is not to be 
displaced when it comes to them (as it could be the case with an ‘external’ 
application discourse), instead we claim that such rule is no longer internally 
applicable. As long as the case is not a paradigmatic one, this way of opening up to 
consider all the properties of the case allows us to turn the definitionally clear case 
into a vague one; vagueness, that was originally excluded from the analysis of 
defeasibility, re-enters the stage by carving a space to allocate the question of 
appropriateness inside the legal category. Vagueness is therefore understood in 
relation to the possibility of defeating the instantiation of the legal category based 
on the current criteria, by showing that the previous understanding of the term’s 







5.3. Staying within boundaries 
!
With an ‘internal’ application discourse we have shifted the rules’ defeasibility for 
the defeasibility of the instantiation of its operative facts, and what we gain by this 
movement is that we get to keep the legal categories safe from onslaughts coming 
from external ones—we protect law’s capacity to reduce complexity. This secures 
that only are legally relevant properties those determined by law’s rules, the 
exclusion of all others constitutes a presupposition for the reduction of complexity 
and, to that extent, for law’s very operation. Blocking the displacement of legal 
categories secures that what can arise in the judicial moment is restricted to ‘limited 
pool of possibilities’, so a ‘commonality of named events’ is conserved . But 346
another consideration has to be addressed: not everything can be included or 
excluded from those names—if that were the case, then the meaning of the terms 
would dissolve, and rules would be render useless. In order to orientate the 
judgement in consideration to the particularities of the case, without overflowing 
the legal borders, the openness of legal categories cannot be absolute. What we need 
is to explain how the verification of an extra-legal property can defeat the initial 
adscription of the legal category (we notice that the subject is the CEO, and 
therefore we withdraw the initially ascribed ‘worker’ description; we consider the 
personal sense of someone’s own gender and refrain from taking the chromosomic 
information as establishing the conditions of application of ‘being a man’), without 
losing all constraints—without emptying the concepts ‘worker’ or ‘woman’. The 
problem can be presented as follows: the content of the concept is explained by the 
shared properties of paradigmatic instances, e.g., a, b and c; but since these are just 
the conclusions of a theory, it is possible that the ascription is defeated in a case in 
which a fourth property, d, also obtains. Now, how are the conditions of defeat 
constrained? What limits the capability of a property to take down the ascription? 
!
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To keep complexity reduced, the constrainment cannot be external to the legal 
categories that are being applied, but has to come built into them. The meaning of 
the concept has to be malleable enough so certain prima facie ascriptions made in 
consideration to the current identified properties can be defeated by a change in the 
theory, but solid enough that it prevents an ‘anything goes’ scenario. These margins 
can be identified by looking at the aim of the theory whose conclusions are to be 
challenged: if the conditions of application of an expression aim to give an account 
and justify the application of such expression to the paradigmatic cases, indicating 
what is common to all of them, then on those paradigmatic cases there is no 
possibility of revision, for if there were, then the branch on which the whole 
discussion is sitting would be cut. There have to be un-doubted cases of application 
if a theory about what all of them have in common is to be elaborated—they serve 
as a basis to assert the criteria for the application of the concept to other cases. By 
rejecting the definitional model of meaning, the margins of concepts have been 
extended, but not diluted, and within them extra-legal properties can defeat the 
prima facie conditions of application of the legal properties. If we go back to 
‘gender politics’, we can now understand that gender does not correlate with 
chromosomic considerations, we could challenge the genetic basis of the conditions 
of application in favour of considerations regarding the personal sense of one’s own 
gender, thus defeating the original gender ascription, but by doing this we are still 
able to explain the commonality among our paradigmatic instances of ‘being a 
woman’ and ‘being a man’. 
!
Deepening on these notions will take a central part of the following chapter; for 
now, something less demanding will suffice. The basic idea in which the internal 
constraintment rests is a Wittgensteinian one: the defeating movement can only be 
performed on the back of some common ground, and, for Stavropoulos, this key 
feature that prevents from falling into skepticism is to be found in the complexity of 
the concepts involved: their meaning depends upon others, so ‘a characteristic form 
of disagreement then obtains where there is agreement as to what sort of other 
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concepts applications of the complex concept depends upon (…) Further, the parties 
to the dispute will typically agree on at least some of the applications of the concept 
as exemplary’. So substantive disagreement, as the one between defenders and 
objectors of gender identity policies regarding what is it to be a woman or a man, 
rests on shared interpretations ‘of at least some of the concept’s features’ . 347
 
Now the application discourse can be understood as one in which all prima facie 
instantiated properties of the case, identified in consideration to the currently 
established conditions of application, are considered in order to decide how they 
interact in the particular case in relation to the ascription to the legally relevant 
ones: the discourse, then, aims to provide a theory according to which, given the 
prima facie verified properties, it is justified to assert, or refrain from asserting, the 
legally relevant property of the particular case. Understood like this, the application 
discourse doesn’t turn into a justificatory one: whether—considering all features of 
the concrete situation—we can describe the particular subject as ‘a woman’ or ‘an 
employee’ doesn't require to analyse the foreseeable interests and consequences of 
the general observation of a rule that defines obligations and rights for women and 
employees—the decision regarding the description of the subject (and therefore, 
about the rule’s internal applicability) depends on the semantics of the concepts 
involved. 
!
Being open to all possible descriptions is still crucial to the application discourse, 
but it serves a different purpose from the one that was originally intended: the 
applicability of the rules depends only on the verification of the properties 
established in its content, but to define if such property is verified, all others are to 
be considered in a discourse that pivots, and therefore does not question, the 
paradigmatic instances. This constitutes an internal form of application discourse 
that is compatible with law’s operation, for it doesn’t overflow its rule-established 
schemes of interpretation. This has consequences regarding law’s capably of living 
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up to the standards of legitimacy set by discourse theory as it was discussed in 
Section 3.2, since it is precisely because its performance takes place within the 
legally established categories, that the judgement is constrained by law in a way that 
undercuts the reflexive underpinnings of its legitimacy: the discursive conditions 
that provide ‘the only normative justification’ of the judicial decision  are 348
incompatible with the inherent impossibility of legal judgement to allow 
challenging its categories and reductions, so the only way in which the position of 
the judge can address the standards of legitimation provided by the conditions of 
discourse is by constraining the application discourse to the legal categories—the 
judicial position is the result of translating into the legal operation the requirement 
of giving the citizen a voice in the debate about the application of a rule to him or 
her and therefore, to consider the all the properties instantiated in object of 
judgement. Adjudication is here understood as the way in which law can give an 
account of that normative justification. 
!
So it can be accepted, with Emilios Christodoulidis, an argument for 
appropriateness within law’s operation, but the possibility of guiding the application 
in consideration to the particularity of the case can only be understood as ‘a case of 
“fine-tuning” within given co-ordinates, and not as revisability in the context of 
application (…) Given the exclusionary and reductive (more accurately 
exclusionary as reductive) nature of law, considerations of formal justice cannot 
yield to considerations of appropriateness—i.e. of revocability in application—’ . 349
This internal form of thematising the particular will be once again address and 
compared with its external counterpart in Section 6.3 in order to argue that the 
judge’s position can be modelled into that of an observer without exceeding law’s 
exclusions. 
!
Notice, of course, that despite the differences, here and just as it was the case with 
the non-semantic approach, the essential features of adjudication that were 
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established at the end of Section 3.2—the ones that stand at odds with JRL cases—
remain stable: first, the crucial problem is that of crossing the distance between the 
rules’ meaning—i.e., its intension—and the case’s extension. Second, the way to do 
this requires the judge to be attentive precisely to particular properties of the case: it 
depends on them whether the distance is crossed. 
!
6. The judge as an observer 
 
Until this point, I have resorted to Putnam’s realism to defend an ‘incorporationist’ 
strategy that aims to include, as semantic issues, considerations of appropriateness. I 
have done this because this is the approach used by Stavropoulos in order to bring 
together vagueness and defeasibility as semantic problems, which in turn constitutes 
the capital contribution that has allowed me to propose a different, ‘internal’ 
application discourse. Now, I will attempt to model the judicial position into that of 
an observer, and to do this a different semantic framework has to be invoked. I will 
resort to inferential semantics to distinguish between different patterns of linguistic 
activity and claim that one of these patterns serves to understand the operation of 
application discourses—and with it, the judicial moment. This inferential model 
allows us to integrate and expand Putnam’s theory, understanding that the empirical 
conditions of application of a concept are just a small—although crucial—
component of semantic content: its full extent is only properly grasped once the role 
of consequences of application is also taken into account and the linguistic (non-
empirical) features are incorporated. 
!
Adopting a semantic analysis that goes beyond non-linguistic circumstances of 
application has two immediate advantages: first, it makes patent that ‘an account, 
however accurate, of the conditions under which some predicate is rightly applied 
may thus miss important intuitive features of its meaning’ . This should be 350
particularly easy to accept in the legal domain: one does not grasp what ‘property’ 
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means by just knowing when someone has become the owner of something—just as 
important is to know what follows from such acquisition and the capability of 
distinguishing the former from the latter. An inferential analysis acknowledges this 
by explaining the relation of both linguistic, and non-linguistic, circumstances and 
consequences of an assertion in constituting its meaning. It is based on these 
differentiations that the different patterns of linguistic activity that are studied in 
Section 6.1. are distinguished.  
!
Second, since it is a semantics that resorts to the discursive practice to coordinate 
both linguistic and non-linguistic circumstances and consequences, and takes the 
inferences among them as defeasible, it allows to retain the notion of defeasible and 
semantically relevant conditions of application, without having to accept some 
undesired consequences of Stavropoulos position: his way of explaining the 
meaning of concepts relies on a commitment to a certain essence or nature of law, 
which includes moral facts independent of the social practice. This leads him to 
understand that our legal obligations do not reflect the content of rules: to identify 
how the enactment of a rule affects the content of our obligations, the social fact of 
its enactment must be considered together with moral facts that determine the 
relevance of the former (its legal impact) in the set of legal obligations . With 351
inferential semantics, on the other hand, judgements of appropriateness and 
justification are included in the semantic analysis by the social-perspectival 
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unnoticed: we are supposed to identify legal obligations, powers, permissions, etc., by looking at the actions 
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obligations, powers, permissions, etc.—addressing the point by claiming that ‘there is a great deal of 
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character of the inferential, non-monotonic  articulation of conceptual content, so 352
the disagreement among speakers regarding the circumstances of application and 
the reasons they can offer are—as with Stavropoulos—part of the propositional 
content of the involved concepts; but—unlike Stavropoulos—the inclusion does not 
require a commitment to an essence or nature of law. 
!
Based on the previous considerations, what I will argue now is that the moment of 
adjudication, as far as it pivots on an openness to all possible descriptions of the 
state of affairs that serves as the object on which the decision is made, can 
adequately be understood as an attempt to perform what in philosophy of language 
is called a ‘language-entry transition’. This is the analytical category in which a 
speaker has available all his linguistic repertoire to refer, and therefore to assign 
meaning to an external event. The aim of modelling the judicial moment in this 
transition is to claim that the latter is impossible in cases of JRL—review of 
legislation presents the judge with a question whose answer can only correspond to 
an ‘intra-linguistic move’, so a judicial decision on it, is analytically unachievable. 
!
6.1. Patterns of linguistic activity 
!
With Wilfrid Sellars, language-entry transition corresponds to a type of activity that 
is performed within a language game, which in turn is characterised as moving 
‘from position to position in a system of moves and positions’ . A position in the 353
game consists, paradigmatically, in endorsing a claim , e.g. taking-true that ‘it is 354
raining’. And the player can be in a particular position either because he moved 
there from another one, or because he endorses a claim without having moved to it 
from a previous position. Let us look at this distinction. If occupying a position is to 
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think, judge or assert that so-and-so , for Sellars ‘to make a move in a language is 355
to infer from so-and-so, that so-and-so’—this movement does not need to 
correspond to a deductively logical inference in order to be sound, it can correspond 
to a ‘material inference’ (concept that will be analysed in Section 3.1 of the 
following chapter): I endorse the claim ‘J just came into the office all wet’, and 
from there I infer that ‘it is raining’. But a player can assert that something is the 
case without inferring it from another assertion: if it is raining outside the office, I 
can just look out the window and come to that same last position. The transition 
from the visual experience to the position is not a move in the language, since the 
visual sensation that serves as starting point is not the endorsement of a claim—the 
endorsement is only configured at the end of the transition. While the transition 
from the visual stimulus received by looking out the window to asserting or 
endorsing the assertion ‘it is raining’ belongs to the language, its starting point does 
not correspond to a premise in an inference . Within this scheme, ‘observation 356
sentences’ are understood as paradigmatic cases of positions that are occupied not 
as result of a movement from a previous position in language. 
Having made that distinction, Sellars differentiates between three types of roles 
expressions can play, three distinct patterns of linguistic activity : 357
!
• Intra-linguistic moves consist in inferential moves, moves in which a position in 
the language game is responded to by adopting another position in the language 
game. Here, both the stimulus and the response, the initial and final steps in the 
movement, are positions in the game. 
!
• Language-entry transitions consist in noninferential reports of observation, moves 
in which a nonlinguistic situation is responded to by adopting a position in the 
language game. We transit from perceptual experience to linguistic responses by 
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reporting what is perceived. Here, the stimulus is not a position in the game, but 
the response to it is—the world connects with language by means of the 
conceptual content of the linguistic response.  
!
• Language-exit transitions consist of deliberate actions, moves in which a position 
within the language game is responded to by bringing about a nonlinguistic 
situation. We transit from linguistic expression to action by performing an 
appropriate behaviour that is not a position in the game—language connects with 
the world by means of the nonlinguistic response to the conceptual content of the 
linguistic stimulus. 
!
With Sellars’ classification at hand, the parallel between entry and exit transitions 
constitutes the basis in which Brandom aims to model action on perception and 
intention on belief . To do this, the responses that constitute the language-end of 358
entry transitions are taken as beliefs—takings-true, while the stimulus that 
constitutes the language-end of exit transitions are taken as intentions—makings-
true. 
!
This way, entry transitions depend on ‘reliable disposition to respond differentially 
to states of affairs’ by adopting a belief—so if the state of affairs is that of raining, a 
reliable observer responds linguistically to it by believing ‘that it is raining’. On the 
other side, exit transitions depend on ‘reliable dispositions to respond differentially’ 
to an intention by bringing about a state of affairs—so if the linguistic position of 
the reliable agent is that of ‘I shall take my umbrella’, he will respond 
nonlinguistically to it by taking his umbrella .  359
!
The corollary is this: perceiving is adopting the linguistic position of 
acknowledging a doxastic commitment (a belief) as response to a nonlinguistic state 
of affairs; and, conversely, acting is responding nonlinguistically by bringing about 
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a state of affairs to the linguistic position of acknowledging a practical commitment 
(an intention). Once both linguistic positions (belief and intention) are inferentially 
related, a general scheme practical reasoning—going from the nonlinguistic world 
to the language, and from language back to the nonlinguistic world—can be 











A) Belief: ‘it is 
raining’ 
__________________ 
∴ Intention: ‘I shall 
take my umbrella’
Nonlinguistic 
state of affairs: 
It is raining
Nonlinguistic  





This non-monotonic picture of practical reasoning  relates, noninferentially and by 360
way of entry transitions (or observation/perception), the nonlinguistic world to 
language in the form of a belief those content corresponds to the observation 
sentence ‘it is raining’ (this is the acknowledgment of a doxastic commitment). 
Next, inferentially and by way of intra-linguistic moves, the belief, as premise, is 
connected to an intention, as conclusion, whose content corresponds to ‘I shall take 
my umbrella’ (this is the acknowledgement of a practical commitment). This 
intention, in turn is connected noninferentially to the nonlinguistic world by way of 
an exit transition whose terminus ad quem corresponds to a behaviour that, being an 
action under any description, constitutes an intentional action once the description 
‘taking the umbrella’ is privileged. 
!
There is a non-inferential world-language transition (W-L), that leads to an 
inferential language-language movement (L-L), and then to a non-inferential 
language-world transition (L-W): acting intentionally, then, ‘is to respond to a 
commitment acknowledged by producing a performance that corresponds to the 
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that it should be treated just like the theoretical one: !
B) It is raining. 
___________________ 
∴ The streets will be wet. 
He immediately recognises that, with Davidson—(2001), 3 ff., and the same stands with Von Wright (1983), 
1 ff.—, an objection can be presented: the reason is incomplete, for, in the first case (A), the inference would 
no go through if I didn’t want to stay dry: while the theoretical reasoning would require the addition of a 
conditional, a desire would be necessary for a good piece of practical reasoning—some logical or normative 
vocabulary, which serves to express ‘pro-attitudes’, has to be included on the premises. But, with Sellars, 
Brandom claims that such inclusion is not necessary, it only seems that way if we endorse an illicit 
entailment: from the fact that we arrive to a bad inference if we conjoin a premise incompatible with the 
desire to stay dry, does not follow that such desire was all along functioning as an implicit premise—ordinary 
reasoning is never monotonic. ‘So the fact that if I add “I want to get wet”, as a second premise to inference 
(A) above the resulting inference no longer goes through does not show that the denial of that premise was 
already implicit’ (at 133). And the same goes for theoretical reasoning (B): presenting it as a formally valid 
inference requires adding the conditional. But there is no need to treat them as correct in virtue of their form, 
‘we can treat inferences such as that from “Pittsburgh is to theWest of Philadelphia”, to “Philadelphia is to 
the East of Pittsburgh”, or from “It is raining”, to “The streets will be wet”, as materially good inferences—
that is inferences that are good because of the content of their non logical vocabulary’ (at 131). What is at 
stake here, is the role of logic: Brandom defends an expressionist understanding of logic, in which formal 
validity serves to make explicit patterns of good inferences; but such explicitation is only possible because 
the inferences thus constructed are already materially good in consideration to content of their premises—of 
their nonlogical vocabulary. From this follows that what makes some pieces of vocabulary distinctively 
logical is precisely that expressive role they play. There is nothing wrong with presenting the inference as 
Davidson would have them, but even with the conditional, the nonmonotonic nature of the explicitated 
reasoning still stands: we could add a new premise that would infirm the inference.
content of the intention, and perception is to respond to the presence of, say, red 
things, by acknowledging a commitment with the corresponding content . 361
!
Here we can see how Putnam’s realism can be incorporated by a broadly inferential 
approach that integrates both linguistic and non-linguistic circumstances and 
consequences of an assertion. Regarding red ball, its circumstances include the non-
linguistic, empirical existence of a red ball. Thus, non-inferential, non-linguistic 
empirical preconditions, on which Putnam focuses, are part of a semantics that goes 
beyond them: the circumstances of a concept ‘can include not only other claims 
(…) but also perceptual circumstances’. And, when it comes to the consequences, 
they ‘can include not only the inferential acquisition of further beliefs’ but also ‘the 
noninferential responsive performance of actions, under the descriptions by which 
they can be exhibited as the conclusions of practical inferences’ . 362
!
This allows to give an account, within inferential semantics, of Putnam’s Twin-
Earth thought experiment—this is planet identical to Earth in every respect but one: 
the liquid called ‘water’, despite being indistinguishable from to Earth’s water, is 
not H2O but XYZ . Putnam, understanding that the meaning of ‘water’ depends 363
on the actual empirical properties of the stuff that is called ‘water’, claims that 
‘water’ has different meaning in Earth and Twin-Earth; and inferential semantics 
allows to arrive precisely to the same conclusion: ‘water’ has different inferential 
contents in each planet, because in each case there are involved ‘different 
circumstances of application, and hence different transitions from those 
circumstances to their consequences’ . 364
!
Thus, the previously proposed ‘internal’ application discourse can be explained in 
inferential terms: deciding the correct description of the case (whether or not it falls 
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under the extension of the rule) requires to identify the circumstances of application 
of the propositional content of the rule, and these circumstances, which can be both 
linguistic and non-linguistic, are understood as essentially non-monotonic, since the 
inclusion of further evidence or new premises can infirm the originally good 
inference or transition.  
 
6.2. Empirical content 
!
What has to be remarked at this point is the empirical content of the minor premise
— ‘it is raining’ refers to a nonlinguistic state of affairs, it ‘picks it up’. The 
relevant question has to do with the type of activity in which the conferral of 
empirical content rests. Sellars claims that the possibility of a discursive practice of 
achieving this depends on the inclusion, within such practice, of language-entry 
transitions, they are what makes it possible for our language to refer to the world. 
While it is possible to engage in a discourse that only involves intralinguistic 
movements, this would be a practice in which some axioms serve as a basis for 
further moves that never achieve any empirical content. But it is essential to the 
contents of the ordinary concepts we employ that they stand in relation to others 
that figure in entry and exit transitions: ‘the sorts of contents our claims have cannot 
be conferred by assertional practices that do not acknowledge some claims as 
having empirical authority stemming from their status as reports of observations’ . 365
These reports, that result from noninferential exercise of perceptual language-entry 
capacities, play an ‘essential semantic role in determining the contents of the 
empirical concepts applied in such judgements’ , so the meaning of the 366
expressions that describe the perceptual characteristics of objects and events 
depends ‘on a significant degree of how they are used in language entry 
transitions’ : expressions like ‘it is raining’ are capable of ‘picking up’ an 367
extensional fragment of the world because they can play the role of being the 
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language-end of language-entry transitions—by being the outcome of a reliable 
disposition to respond differentially to nonlinguistic states of affairs such as 
‘raining’. 
!
It is by transiting from a perceptual experience to a linguistic expression that our 
discursive practice gains its W-L dimension, and this entails both a cost and a 
particular form of freedom for the speaker. To advert their particularity, the attention 
has to be directed towards the asymmetry between W-L transitions and L-L moves: 
by contrasting these two patterns we can identify a gap, the particularity void that 
has to be crossed in order to connect the extensional world with language. 
!
6.3. Distance and freedom 
!
While in W-L transitions the speaker makes a move from some object on a 
perceptual or observational situation to a linguistic response, thus connecting a 
concrete fragment of the world with language—by way of a proposition; in the 
second one, the movement corresponds to a connection between propositions, a 
movement within language—between linguistic entities. The essential difference 
lies on the extensional dimension that distinguishes the first type of activity but that 
is absent in the second: any concrete fragment of the world that constitutes the 
world-end of a language-entry transition can only be identified by means of a 
description—a propositional content, but its identity (that it is that fragment and no 
other) is maintained through all of its possible true descriptions, all of which serve 
to identify the same extension . This means that we can (and do) use descriptions 368
that employ different propositional contents to identify one and the same concrete 
piece of the world. Thus, there is a distance that extends from that fragment of the 
world to the horizon of the possible propositional contents, i.e., of observational 
sentences that refer to it. This is the particularity void that we have examined 
through the previous sections. 
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When it comes to L-L movements things are different: now on both ends of the 
transition we have linguistic entities whose identities are defined by their 
propositional content, so a change at the propositional level entails a change in the 
linguistic entity itself. Since rules constitute paradigmatic cases of linguistic 
entities, we can say with Max Black: ‘the propositional content determines what the 
rule is’, so ‘[t]he relation between the rule and its statement in words is not 
something external and contingent, as in the case of the relation between anything 
and its verbal designation: the rule is, in some way, constituted by its 
formulation’ . Unlike language-entry transitions, in intra-linguistic movements 369
there is no distance between the propositional content used for the identification of 
the entities involved and individuation of the entities themselves. 
!
The fact that the nonlinguistic world only enters the game once a language-entry 
transition has picked it up, is essential to assess the viability of Detmold’s 
understanding of the way in which the particularity void is crossed: the demand to 
‘hear’ the radical particular freed from pre-existing categories is conceptually 
impossible. As N.E. Simmonds has pointed out , a radical escape from 370
categorisations makes the particular—‘the rich complexity of real life’ —371
unintelligible; so, regarding the pure particularity, no judgement could be made. 
Since perceptual experience itself requires the grasp of concepts , only once a 372
fragment of the world is submitted to categories, such fragment can be ‘heard’. But 
rejecting the idea of a judgement emptied from categories does not disprove the 
existence of a gap between the employed category and the horizon of possible 
ones .  373
!
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This far we have seen the cost of crossing the void: one description is privileged 
and thus others are suppressed. Now the focus is to be put in the freedom the 
speaker enjoys before making the transition to language, and how it is curtailed 
afterwards. As an observer, the speaker has available every one of the possible 
descriptions that he grasps to address the world he faces, for the connection between 
world and language in entry transitions is not inferential, but depends on the non-
linguistic properties of the state of affairs that is being observed and to which he has 
been trained to react, so all the ways in which the observer can reliably 
differentially respond to the nonlinguistic state of affairs by non-inferentially 
making an observational report are at his disposal—the only constraint to the 
spectrum of W-L transitions that can be made by an observer is given by ‘what the 
reporter can be trained under some circumstances reliably to differentiate, and what 
concepts the reporter can then key the application of to those responsive 
dispositions’ .  374
!
Therefore, before making the connection between world and language, every 
property of the state of affairs to which the observer has been reliably trained to 
differentially react can be included in the content of the language-entry transition. 
But once the transition is completed, the intralinguistic moves that can be made 
using the report as an initial position are partially detached from the properties of 
the described fragment of the world—now, after the entry, the positions in language 
available to refer to the state of affairs are dependent on the linguistic, inferential 
properties of the observational report, and thus are circumscribed by the properties 
identified in the original claim: from the claim ‘a vehicle entered the park’, the 
claim ‘an homage to war veterans took place in the park’ cannot be inferred, even if 
an homage to war veterans took place in the park. While for an observer both claims 
were available to make an entry transition, the inference from the former to the 
latter is not sound: the set of possible descriptions of, and properties to be ascribed 
to the state of affairs in an intra-linguistic movement, is curtailed by the inferential 
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properties of the assertion that serves as starting position in the movement. The 
propositional content that assigns meaning to the nonlinguistic world and thus 
serves as the basis for subsequent linguistic moves, not only actualises some 
categories and thus suppresses others, but in the same move determines what other 
possibilities are now available and which have been precluded. 
!
It is in this sense that the demand of a ‘radical openness’ in the judicial moment is 
to be understood, as the attempt to attain observational knowledge from the state of 
affairs on which the decision will fall, for it is only in this type of linguistic activity 
that the judge can refer to the fragment of world whose subsumption under the 
terms of the rule is at issue by employing all his linguistic repertoire. As long as the 
application discourse requires to consider all the properties instantiated in the 
concrete case, it is only the position of the observer what allows the judge to attain 
the materials required to perform the discourse that justifies her decision about the 
rule’s applicability. This is how Detmold’s idea of letting the radical human being 
speak by himself makes sense: not as an attempt to address the particular devoid 
from categories, but by observing it, so all its properties can be perceived. In any 
other way of referring to it, in which what is asserted about the case constitutes the 
conclusion of previous claims, the judge’s assertion will have been overdetermined 
by the content of the antecedent linguistic moves and transitions. If we go back to 
Gardner’s example used at the beginning of this Chapter, that of a legal syllogism in 
which the major premise is configured by the assertion ‘Tortfeasors are liable to pay 
full reparative damages to those whom they tortuously injure’, and the minor one 
corresponds to ‘Jones tortuously injured Smith to the tune of $50’; the lesson we get 
from the Sellarsian model is that this latter premise can be taken as discursively 
justified only if the judge arrives to it as a result of having performed a W-L 
transition, for otherwise, if it is the outcome of L-L movements, the properties 
attributed to Jones’ actions would have been predetermined by the properties 




The fact that judges can’t actually observe the event which they are deciding is no 
obstacle to understand that this position constitutes the ideal on which the notion on 
the judicial moment is constructed. And it is possible to do this because the 
observer’s position configures a standard whose satisfaction by a judge, although 
being practically impossible, does not undercut law’s operation. According to the 
argument of Section 4.2, what is incompatible with law is the possibility to displace 
legal categories in consideration to external ones (an ‘external’ application 
discourse), but such displacement is not entailed by an application that hinges on 
observation: as it was argued in Section 5.3, the attention to all categories can be 
directed precisely towards the identification of the verification of the legally 
recognized properties (an ‘internal’ application discourse). This means that a theory 
that characterises the judge’s position in relation to the performance of a language-
entry transition can remain agnostic regarding the form in which the perceived 
properties interact, and only if observation points to justify the yielding of the legal 
schemes it becomes incompatible with law’s exclusionary force. In Section 5.3, it 
was argued that the judicial position is the outcome of an attempt, that of translating 
into law’s exclusionary operation the justificatory standards constituted by the 
conditions of discourse, standards that provide ‘the only normative justification’ of 
the judicial decision —legal adjudication was therefore construed as the refraction 375
of those discursive standards once they enter the legal domain. So, while the 
refraction impedes the revocability of legal categories in an ‘external’ application 
discourse, it does not exclude the observer’s position and, with it, attending to the 
particularities of the case in order to operate ‘within given co-ordinates’. In other 
words, law’s ‘exclusionary as reductive’ nature stands at odds with a judicial power 
to push aside a rule based on considerations of appropriateness , but does not 376
prevent the judge from observing the concrete case and its particular subjects, and 
thus deciding about the instantiation of the legal properties in consideration to the 
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interactions between all the prima facie perceived ones—analysis that is performed 
within the margins given by the semantic content of the rules. 
!
The previous considerations allow us to claim that, remaining inside law’s 
boundaries, the judge can be modelled on an observer, and so the judicial moment 
can be characterised as the attempt to cross the particularity void by making a 
language-entry transition that rests on an ‘internal’ application discourse. On the 
other hand, justification discourses—the type of discourse that serves to justify 
universal rules and thus characterises the legislative moment—are performed in 
absence of a concrete, extensional case that could be observed, they consist in intra-
linguistic movements. By distinguishing these patterns of linguistic activity, 
inferential semantics has allowed us to differentiate both types of discourse, and 
with them, legislation from adjudication, within the same semantic framework: 
while legislation aims to ground universal rules by means of justification discourse 
that take into account foreseeable interests and consequences that do not depend on 
the particularities of concrete cases, and therefore consist in intra-linguistic 
movements (there is no extensional case to be observed); adjudication aims to 
ground particular rules by means of application discourses that take into account 
concrete interests and consequences that are involved in particular cases, and 
therefore can be modelled on language-entry transitions (there is an extensional 
case to be observed). 
!
6.4. Judicial Review of Legislation? 
!
Finally, the model also serves to make explicit the abnormality of what in the 
previous chapter was characterised as JRL. This is the key point to consider before 
moving to the final part of the thesis: if adjudication is construed on the image of an 
observer who perceives the features of some non-linguistic state of affairs and its 
concrete subjects, then a case can only be a judicial case if it is one regarding which 
language-entry transition is possible—otherwise, the ideal on which the judge’s 
position is construed is conceptually impossible. And here lies the obstacle to the 
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notion of Judicial Review of Legislation. In the previous chapter I argued that these 
cases present to the judge a problem regarding the configuration of a normative 
contradiction, the assessment of whether or not there is an incompatibility between 
a piece of legislation and a constitutional provision. I claimed that these correspond 
to relations between the intensions of the relevant legal and constitutional rules, that 
was independent of any contingent, extensional fact, for it only depended on the 
semantic content of the norms involved.  
!
If that is the case, then in JRL the object on which the decision falls is not one that 
can be addressed by a language-entry transition, there is no possible observational 
position directed towards the semantic relations between two or more rules, there is 
no distance—no particularity void—between the law whose constitutionality is 
being scrutinised and an horizon of its possible propositional contents, since the 
law’s semantic content defines its identity. The judge’s position is not available for 
this kind of problems, for they ask an intra-linguistic question regarding the 
inferential relations between legal and constitutional rules—a question whose 
answer, resting on L-L relations between universal rules, characterises the 
legislative moment. While the minor premise of an ordinary judge—e.g., ‘J entered 
a vehicle into the park’—will not be the result of a language-entry transition, but 
can nevertheless work as one since it refers to a nonlinguistic state of affairs, the 
constitutional court’s minor premise—asserting that some law is incompatible with 
a constitutional provision—is not just an intralinguistic movement, but more 
radically, it cannot serve as a language-entry transition, its content is not one to 
which a speaker can arrive from the observation of a nonlinguistic situation.  
!
If we go back to Section 2.2 of the previous chapter, we will see that Marshall’s 
assertion according to which ‘it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to “say what the law is”’ was ambiguous, since it could be understood 
as a duty to ‘say if a law is valid’ or as a duty to ‘say if a law is applicable to a 
concrete case’. It was also argued that while the first sense correlates with JRL, the 
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second one does it with JRA. If we now apply the Sellarsian distinction to both 
senses, we will notice that review of legislation asks the judge a question that 
demands the intra-linguistic answer of saying if a law is valid; but the 
characterisation of the judge’s position requires her to reply with the language-entry 
transition of saying which law is applicable. Both senses of the expression ‘saying 
the law’, each one defined by a different type of linguistic activity, meet in ‘Judicial 
Review of Legislation’ as a grammatical dissonance between question and answer. 
!




























The previous chapter ended by positing a dilemma at the core of JRL, a dilemma 
characterised by the conjunction of two properties, one that arises from the nature of 
adjudication (Ch. 3) and another that arises from the nature of the question that is 
put forward in cases of review of legislation (Ch. 2). I argued that the difference 
between them can be reconstructed in a highly explicative way with the aid of the 
analytical distinction between language-entry transitions and intra-linguistic 
movements. I will now resort to the syllogistic structure to show how this dilemma 
expresses itself in the different ways in which the ordinary judge and the 
constitutional court can address the identification of the object on which they are 
deciding. This will allow me to show how JRL demands to the constitutional court a 
decision that doesn’t seem to be judicially reachable (1). After this, I will put 
forward the basic idea on which a solution can be attained: that natural meaning in 
language allows unjustified assertions (2). Next, I will present Brandom’s theory of 
inferential semantic (3), which will then be applied to the constitutional court’s 
position (4) in order to identify the commitments undertaken by a judge by 
declaring the unconstitutionality of a law (4.1) and thus articulate in Brandom’s 
categories her justificatory dilemma (4.2). Once the problem is made explicit, I will 
move towards a solution (5) by resorting to the notion of analyticity and to 
Wittgenstein’s work as a way to deactivate the demand for justifications (5.1 to 5.3). 
After rejecting the way in which history is addressed by the living constitutional 
approach (6.), Wittgenstein’s remarks on custom and agreement, together with 
Brandom’s prima facie entitlements will serve me to clarify the role of 
constitutional tradition in constitutional cases (7). Finally, and as a consequence of 
the previous steps, I will claim that constitutional meaning and reasoning are 




1. Stating the dilemma 
!
I have argued that part of what characterises adjudication is the particularity void—
i.e. the need to address a particular case (that supports infinite true descriptions and 
actualises an infinite set of properties) by means of a rule (a linguistic entity, 
defined by its propositional content) that by way of its formulation only identifies as 
relevant one description and one set of properties. The ordinary judge, then, has to 
relate a particular event (with concrete subjects, interests and consequences) with 
one or more pieces of legislation—with a universal rule that is justified in the light 
of the interests and consequences that, in the legislative process, were foreseen to be 
affected by its general observance. The nature of the question that the constitutional 
judge is called to answer, on the other hand, is not about establishing a relation 
between a universal rule and a concrete case, but one about the relation between 
two universal rules, a constitutional one and a legislative one. 
!
Framed as a syllogism, the ordinary judge starts with a major premise constituted by 
a legal rule and has to identify the minor one that corresponds to a true description 
of the fact-in-the-extensional-sense that serves as the object of the adjudicative 
process: regarding a legal rule that asserts ‘Whoever kills is to be imprisoned’ and a 
concrete case in which it is not clear that the event can be properly described as a 
killing, the ordinary judge can justify his minor premise (whether it is ‘J killed’ or 
‘J didn’t killed’) in consideration to the concrete interests and consequences that are 
verified in this particular instance. Such indeterminacy, that opens the door to a 
decision about whether or not this case is a killing, can be resolved and therefore a 
minor premise stated, resting on an application discourse: as a judge, she is 
grounding her decision—describing the event as a killing or not—on an application 
discourse that justifies describing the object of adjudication as either ‘J killed’ or ‘J 
didn’t killed’. Her minor premise could work as language-entry transitions, since it 
will be referring to a particular event, with concrete subjects, interests and 
consequences; and so she can justify it on them. 
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The constitutional judge, on the other hand, also starts with a rule, a constitutional 
one, that works as a major premise, but she has no fact-in-the-extensional-sense to 
work with, for the object of her decision is configured by another rule, only now it 
corresponds to a legal one. The court is not to decide the relation between a state of 
affairs and the content of a rule, but if a piece of legislation contradicts or not a 
constitutional provision. If her major premise can be roughly stated like this: ‘A 
legal disposition that is incompatible with the right to equality is unconstitutional/
not valid’ , her minor premise would probably be configured as ‘A prohibition of 377
same-sex-marriage is incompatible with the right to equality’. Because of this, all 
what is in front of the constitutional judge are universals; so while the ordinary 
judge can address her problem of fixing her minor premise by means of an 
application discourse that focusses on the particularities of the event she has to deal 
with, the constitutional judge cannot enter into that type of analysis, since she has 
no radical particulars involved—there is no non-linguistic state of affairs to address, 
but a semantic relation whose assessment is a matter of intralinguistic movements. 
Now it seems that the court can only ground its minor premise on a justification 
discourse, which, as we have seen, serves to characterise legislative decisions. 
!
This difference between the ordinary and the constitutional judge stands even if we 
recognise that some times ordinary judges actually have to engage in legislative 
activity. Besides the two objections that were examined in Section 2 of the previous 
chapter against a ‘mechanical’ model of adjudication, a third one was mentioned, 
that arising from the possibility of an ambiguous use of language by the 
lawmaker . Now we are in a better position to address it. Every time that a piece 378
of legislation is ambiguous the judge will have to assert an interpretation of it in 
order to adjudicate—she will have to assert a universal proposition that, being a 
universal, cannot be grounded on an applicative discourse. A recent Chilean case 
serves to illustrates the point: a group of representatives wanted to impeach 
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Supreme Court justices who granted penitentiary benefits to some of Pinochet’s 
minions that are imprisoned for committing crimes against humanity. The left-wing 
congressmen argued that by ruling in favour of these criminals, the judges infringed 
valid and applicable international law, what in turn would constitute an infraction of 
their [the judges] constitutional duties. The problem arose because Chilean law 
forbids the Congress ‘to review judicial decisions’. Based on that disposition the 
defenders of the Supreme Court justices argued that the impeachment itself was an 
infringement of chilean legislation, since it entailed a revision of the court’s ruling. 
But this prohibition to ‘review judicial decisions’ is ambiguous: ‘to review’ (in 
spanish ‘revisar’) can be understood both as ‘carefully studying the decision’ or as 
‘examining it in order to change it’. 
!
Now, if a judge were to asses if the impeachment actually entailed an infringement 
of the prohibition to review judicial decisions, she would first have to define how to 
understand the disposition—either as a rule that forbids Congress to change judicial 
decisions or as a rule that forbids even analysing them. In this case, the 
interpretation the judge gives seems to constitute an instance of legislation, for she 
would’t be (immediately) engaged in analysing the correspondence between a rule 
and a concrete particular event—before that she would have to define which is the 
rule to be applied, she would have to determine what is the propositional content 
that constitutes the rule that is then to be applied in order to assess the actions of 
Congress. 
!
Despite appearances, this judge would not be on the same position as our 
constitutional court that has to decide if a law contradicts the constitution. The 
difference lies not only in the fact that the need to perform a substantively 
legislative activity will only arise in certain marginal cases, due to what can be 
understood as a defective legislative technique. More importantly, for the ordinary 
judge the legislative moment is just a necessary step that she has to take in order to 
adjudicate, not her final destination. On the contrary, JRL is just about this: intra-
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linguistic movements are not a previous movement necessary to a subsequent 
world-language transition, but the very goal to be achieve. For the common judge 
the legislative, justificatory moment might be a middle and inevitable step to take so 
that she can actually fulfil the judicial function—after determining the proper 
meaning of the disposition, and whatever interpretation she ends up sustaining, the 
judge still has to decide if the concrete action of the Congress instantiates the 
propositional content of the rule she previously defined. Even in the rare cases in 
which the ordinary judge has to use an ambiguous disposition, at the end of the day 
she will still be attempting to perform a world-language movement—and therefore, 
she will face the particularity void, the one that characterises adjudication and that 
will never appear to the constitutional judge. For the latter, the case is reduced to 
intra-linguistic movements, to linguistic entities that are defined by their 
propositional content. The court has no distance to cross between the defined and 
finite set of properties that is fixed by the propositional content of a rule and the 
infinitude of possible properties and descriptions that are actualised by the object of 
his judgement. And the same is true regarding normative conflicts in which there is 
no preference rule available: both ambiguity and unresolved conflicting regulation 
requires judges to posit rules in order to ground their decisions . While in the 379
debate about positivism some might claim that this judge-made law corresponds to 
a ‘moral norm’ , and others that it can be attained without engaging in moral 380
reasoning , such question is irrelevant for our current point—what matters to us is 381
to distinguish between this law-making activity of the ordinary judge and that of the 
constitutional court: for the former, this is just an inevitable step to take before 
crossing the void; for the second, there is no void to face afterwards. 
!
And a similar difference stands when it comes to judges who have to decide on the 
validity of a contract. Here too the judge will be engaged in two intensional objects
—the contract whose validity is at issue and the legal rules that defines the 
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conditions on whose verification depends the validity of such contract. But a 
contract, unlike a piece of legislation, does refer to particular parties, it includes 
singular terms, and therefore, the relation the judge has to establish between it and 
the legal conditions of its validity can still be grounded on an application discourse. 
!
If the previous arguments are sound, then we can reaffirm the problem of JRL as 
this one: it demands a judicial/language-entry answer to a legislative/intra-linguistic 
question. 
!
2. The first step to a solution 
!
In what comes next, I will try to de-activate this incompatibility, to argue that it is 
not necessary to give a legislative answer to the question that is put forward in JLR 
cases. That even though the judge cannot engage in an application discourse when it 
comes to decide a constitutional query about a piece of legislation, that doesn’t 
imply that she must engage in a justification discourse that would make her a 
constitutional legislator. We have seen that the positions of the ordinary and the 
constitutional judge can be distinguished in relation to their minor premises: while 
the former, facing a concrete case, can ground hers in an application discourse; for 
the latter, who lacks a concrete case, a justification discourse seems the only 
alternative. To avoid entering into the legislative terrain, what the judge needs to 
find are propositions that can serve as minor premises in her decision, but that do 
not demand a justification discourse, assertions that are available in the absence of a 
justification. In the previous Chapter we saw one approach to this issue: it was 
argued that conditions of application could be explained as attempts to make 
explicit what is shared by all paradigmatic instances of an expression. If that is the 
case, then it must be assumed from the get-go that there are undisputed cases on 
which the identification of the conditions pivots, for otherwise the branch on which 
the project is sitting would be cut. Now we need to deepen and expand the analysis, 
we must turn into the discursive practice as a whole and look up for secure-enough 
 194
positions within the language game, for conceptual relations to which the judge can 
unjustifiably cling—for hinge propositions. 
!
These notions—that hitherto have been only superficially addressed here—moves 
us in the direction of Wittgenstein, to his remarks on rule-following, on certainty 
and on grammar. He will provide us with some key insights to defend the possibility 
of a non-legislative review of legislation. But, as it is usually the case with 
Wittgenstein, his ideas on these issues are too theoretically broad and some of his 
assertions so cryptic that they can be unsubstantially used to defend almost any 
position. Because of this, I will not continue immediately with Wittgenstein, but 
with Brandom. This decision is not arbitrary, my reason for the recourse to 
Brandom first and Wittgenstein later lies on the connection between them: 
Brandom’s pragmatism—succinctly expressed in his dictum ‘semantics must 
answer to pragmatics’—, although explicitly constructed following Sellars and 
Michael Dummett’s steps, is rightfully understood as aligned with Wittgenstein’s 
enterprise—succinctly expressed in his usually miss-quoted and miss-understood 
dictum  ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’. Brandom will provide 382
us with a theoretical framework that will allow us to give an account and move way 
beyond Putnam’s semantics, and to fruitfully constrain our use of Wittgenstein. For 
this reason, I will use Brandom’s work to frame the linguistic issues to be addressed 
and to present the problem of justification in analytically clearer terms. Brandom 
will not solve our problem, he will actually leave us with an un-resolved, but clearly 
stated question. But, given the connection between his work and Wittgenstein, he 
will allow us to stage the problem in a way that the latter’s ideas will serve to 
provide an answer. 
!
What justifies the forthcoming extensive recourse to philosophy of language to deal 
with these legal problems is that the latter refer to the relation between rules—a 
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constitutional one and a legal one—that are defined by their propositional content. 
Therefore, a problem regarding the relations of rules is a problem whose object of 
analysis is constituted in part by their meaning, and such meaning will correspond 
to that of ordinary language. For although law can, of course, define some meanings 
by itself—typically by means of a constitutive rule—such process can only go so 
far before it relies on natural language: if a legal rule defines ‘accident’ as 
‘damaging event caused by negligence’, then the legal meaning of this term will be 
different from its ordinary meaning; but such differentiation was only achieved by 
pivoting on the natural meaning of ‘damaging event caused by negligence’. And if 
the defining process is continued by legal definitions of the terms employed on the 
previous ones, eventually the definitions will in the end have to answer to ordinary 
meaning—otherwise law would be isolated. Hence law uses ‘ordinary language as 
regards phonology, syntax, etc., interspersed only with some special terms or words 
which assume a meaning in judicial discourse which differs from the meaning they 
have in everyday speech. The idea of an “autonomous” legal discourse or of an 
operatively closed system would be inconceivable when considered purely in 
relation to language, since of course, this language and its discourse takes place in 
society’ . We could then accept that for law’s operation the relevant meaning is 383
the ‘legal’ meaning, but such legal meaning will usually and always ultimately be 
the natural meaning of the propositions employed by law. Therefore, the way in 
which legal rules are related in the operation of law will depend on the 
identification of the inferential relations that exist in ordinary language between the 
propositional contents of those rules and that of other legal rules that regulate the 
application and relations between them. 
!
My aim in the next section is to use Brandom’s theory of language to explain how 
propositional content is conferred to expressions by way of a structure of inferential 
relations. Because he internally relates propositional content with justification, his 
work provides unique and valuable analytical tools and distinctions to thematise our 
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current dilemma, which lies, precisely, on identifying propositions or intra-language 
movements (inferences) that do not stand in need of justification. After that, I will 
translate Brandom’s categories to the position of a constitutional court that has to 
decide on the constitutionality of a law, identifying the commitments that it would 
undertake if it were to assert the unconstitutionality. This will allow me, in the 
subsequent sections, to analyse to what extent those commitments can be vindicated 
from a judicial position. This is where Wittgenstein’s remarks will be useful—to 
specify the type of propositions that the constitutional judge can legitimately 
employ. 
!
3. Inferential semantics 
!
Our focus will be the analysis of the conceptual content within intra-linguistic 
movements and not language-entry/exit transitions. The reason for this lies on the 
duality that characterises the pragmatic force of assertions: as we’ll see, only once 
the nature of assertions is understood we can make sense of their capability of both 
representing the world (and with it, the possibility to perform W-L transitions) and 
justifying actions (that allows to explain L-W transitions). This will be a somewhat 
extensive and therefore arduous course, one that will extend throughout 12 points 
through which the interlocking of an inferential approach to semantics and a 
pragmatic approach to normativity is achieved, thus rendering a theory of 
propositional content in which meaning depends on inferences that are in turn 
governed by a deontology that rests ultimately in the implicit attitudes of the 




In an inferential approach, the meaning of each assertion depends on the set of 
inferential relations in which that assertion has a role to play in the social game of 
asking and giving reasons, game in which each reason corresponds yet to another 
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assertion. Meaning, then, is configured by the inferential role an assertion plays  384
as a premise for other assertions or as a conclusion that follows from other 
assertions. I will use simple examples for now, but once the theory is fully 
explained I will move to more complex ones. Let us look at the following 
inferences to explain the point: we start with ‘it is raining’, and from there we move 
to ‘everything that is not covered will get wet’, from which we infer that ‘the 
pavement will be slippery’ . Here, the meaning of ‘everything that is not covered 385
will get wet’ is explained by its role both as a conclusion that follows from ‘it is 
raining’, this is, its ‘conditional normative significance’—i.e., the conditions under 
which it is appropriate to use them; and as a premise to conclude ‘the pavement will 
be slippery’, this is, its ‘consequential normative significance’—i.e., the 
consequences of their appropriate use . It arises, that is, from the reasons that 386
support it and from what it supports as a reason. 
!
These inferences, which with Sellars can be called ‘material inferences’, are sound 
not in virtue of their logical structure, but in consideration to the content of their 
nonlogical vocabulary , so they operate through ‘content-based reasoning’ : it is 387 388
the content of the concepts involved what makes the inferences correct , so the 389
force of the transition comes not from formal principles, but from material rules of 
inference. Thus, we can legitimately infer both ‘everything that is not covered will 
get wet’ and ‘I shall open my umbrella’ from ‘it is raining’, and ‘thunder will be 
heard soon’ from ‘lightning is seen now’—they stand because in our world it is true 
that thunder follows lightning and rain gets the streets wet . Here Brandom 390
follows Sellars steps closely. For the latter, material inferences instil meaning—
Sellars defended these movements as sound inferences arguing that ‘there are 
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material as well as formal principles of inference, so that instead of merely being an 
abridged edition of a formally valid argument, "It is raining, therefore the streets 
will be wet" might well be as it stands a valid argument, though warranted by a 
material principle of inference’ . 391
!
These material principles (or rules) are modelled by Sellars on Carnap’s 
‘transformation rules’—which ‘determine under what conditions a sentence is a 
consequence of another sentence or sentences’ : material rules of inference, just as 392
extra-logical transformation rules, authorise an inference that would require an 
additional premise in order to be logically valid : from ‘that car is red’ follows 393
‘that car is coloured’, ‘that car is not blue’, etc.,—the inference hinges on ‘an 
extralogical or material rule of inference in our language that is partially 
constitutive of the meaning of “red” and “colour” and that licenses this 
inference’ ; so ‘endorsing these inferences is part of grasping or mastering those 394
concepts, quite apart from any specifically logical competence’ . These types of 395
inferences are the ones that I will track when analysing a declaration of 
unconstitutionality. By doing that, we will be in position to assess the court’s 
possibilities of vindicating those inferences in a judicial manner.  
!
All this serves to configure a three-step argument: propositional content comes from 
what is pragmatically assertable, what is assertable is something that both 
constitutes a reason (a premise) and is in demand of reasons (a conclusion) , and 396
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3.2. Deontic statuses 
!
The inferential relations of an assertion are determined by the deontic status that 
speakers have as a consequence of asserting it. Thus, the inferential relation 
between ‘it is raining’ and ‘everything that is not covered will get wet’ is explained 
by the fact that, by asserting the first, the speaker acquires the status of being 
committed to the latter; and the same stands between that last one and ‘the 
pavement will be slippery’ . Asserting something thus involves taking a 397
commitment, which is ‘articulated by consequential inferential relations linking the 
asserted sentence to other sentences’ . But, besides acquiring the deontic status of 398
being committed, asserting also entails the acquisition of entitlements—and here the 
direction is reversed: while asserting ‘everything that is not covered will get wet’ 
commits to the conclusion ‘the pavement will be slippery’, claiming the latter 
entitles to assert the former. Using a different example: claiming that ‘J moves’ 
entitles me to claim that ‘J runs’, and claiming that ‘J runs’ commits me to ‘J 
moves’ (a deeper explanation of the type of relations in which predicates and 
singular terms can stand will be the subject of Section 3.6). This allows to 
differentiate a subclass of commitments: those to which the speaker is entitled . 399
 
Distinguishing these two statuses, Brandom differentiates three types of inferential 
relations among assertions. ‘Commitment-preserving inferential relations’  stand 400
between assertions that take place in either a deductive logical inference or a good 
material inference. Here, commitment to the antecedents commits to the assertions 
that follow as their consequential normative significance. ‘Entitlement-preserving 
inferential relations’  stand between assertions that take place in inductive 401
empirical inferences: if you are entitled to the assertion ‘this is a dry, well-made 
match’, then you are entitled—but not committed—to the assertions that follow as 
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its consequential normative significance: ‘the match will light if struck’. Finally, 
since a  commitment to a claim can preclude an entitlement to another , a relation 402
of incompatibility arises by combining the two statuses: you are not entitled to an 
assertion if you are committed to another assertion that has a materially 
incompatible content with it: being committed to the assertion ‘that object is red’ 
precludes the entitlement to assert ‘that object is colourless’. These relations will be 
crucial to identify the commitments involved in the declaration of 
unconstitutionality: by endorsing a relation of incompatibility between the legal and 
constitutional provisions, the court will be endorsing a commitment-preserving 
relation between an explicitly stated right, and an allegedly implicit one.  
!
So, by asserting something the speaker acquires the status of being committed and 
entitled to different assertions, and those status are what define the inferential 
relations between the assertions, these latter being what serves to configure the 
meaning of the assertions involved. Now, what needs to be explained are the source 
of these deontic statuses. 
!
3.3. Deontic attitudes: the problem of naturalism 
!
Having certain deontic status corresponds to a normative fact, and normative facts 
are—for Brandom—dependent on our practices and, in particular, on our attitudes: 
‘Before creatures started taking and treating each other as committed or entitled to 
do various things, there were no such things as commitments and entitlements’ . 403
Thus, the status of being entitled or committed to something has to be explained in 
terms of deontic attitudes, exhibited by the players in the game of ‘taking or treating 
someone as committed or entitled’ : ‘The notion of normative status, and of the 404
significance of performances that alter normative status, is in turn to be understood 
in terms of the practical deontic attitude of taking or treating someone as committed 
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or entitled’ . And since this is a pragmatist approach, then the relevant question 405
has to do with what is done when we treat someone as committed or entitled. 
Brandom’s answer resorts to the notion of sanction: to treat a behaviour as correct 
or mistaken is exhibited in rewards and punishments, so in its simpler form consists 
in positive and negative reinforcements . Attitudes, then, hinges on a disposition 406
to apply sanctions. 
!
But there is a risk involved in moving in this direction: defining normative attitudes 
in terms of dispositions to apply sanctions can lead to reduce the normative to the 
nonnormative, to regularities. This would be the case if attitudes correspond to a 
pure disposition, to a ‘psycho-social product of positive and negative behaviour 
reinforcement’ . This naturalism leads to the problem of gerrymandering, of 407
identifying ‘the regularity that is being reinforced’, conflating what is done with 
what ought to be done. If sanctioning is just a disposition aligned to a regularity, 
then the idea of sanctioning correctly is lost: ‘If the normative status of being 
incorrect is to be understood in terms of the normative attitude of treating as 
incorrect by punishing, it seems that the identification required is not with the status 
of actually being punished but with that of deserving punishment, that is, being 
correctly punished’ . 408
!
The way out of this conundrum requires to allow for the possibility of sanctions that 
have only a normative significance , and so we must distinguish between different 409
types of sanctions: suppose a community in which the infringement of a practical 
norm that requires to display certain leaf in order to enter a specific hut, consist in 
beating the infractor with sticks. This way of acting shows what the members of the 
community ‘take to be appropriate and inappropriate conduct’, and the assessment 
they make can be described in nonnormative terms. But the sanction can adopt a 
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purely normative form, one that consists in granting an extraordinary privilege or in 
withholding a licence to do something else. In Brandom’s example, the sanction 
could consist in making inappropriate to attend a festival, attendance that was 
appropriate until the subject entered the hut without displaying the leaf—the 
response being a punishment is decoupled from a disposition to refrain of 
performing the action that elicited it: ‘the normative significance of transgression is 
itself specified in normative terms (of what is appropriate…)’ . In this second 410
case, the normative attitude is expressed through a sanction that alters the normative 
status with respect to a different norm . And these relations between statuses can 411
be further expanded: performing the second action to which the subject was, but is 
no longer entitled to do, can be sanctioned by the alteration of yet another status, 
forming ‘complex webs of interdependent normative statuses’ . 412
!
With these internal sanctions available, normative attitudes of treating or taking 
someone as committed or entitled to a performance, understood in terms of 
dispositions to apply sanctions to whomever does what is not entitled to do and 
refrains from doing what is committed to do, allows to ground normative statuses in 
a way that is not reducible to the nonnormative . These attitudes constitute ‘the 413
horizon within which both discursive statuses and conceptual contents are to be 
understood’ : conceptual content depends on and is explained in terms of 414
inferential relations, those inferences depend and are explained in terms of 
normative status, and those normative status are explained in terms of deontic 
practical attitudes of the speakers consisting in dispositions to apply internal 
sanctions. 
!
This relation between attitudes and statuses serve to configure the basis of the 
linguistic practice: in Brandom’s model, participants in a linguistic game keep score 
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of the commitments and entitlements that are distributed in consideration to 
assertions. They keep score, that is, of the deontic statuses that themselves and other 
players have as a consequence of asserting something, and this score is kept by 
adopting and altering their deontic attitudes. In other words: the alterations of 
deontic statuses depend on the way speakers treat or take each other in relation to 
an assertion—the idea is aptly expressed by Brandom in the following terms: while 
‘deontic statuses are the counters in terms of which the score is kept, the adoption 
and alteration of deontic attitudes constitute the activity of scorekeeping through 
which those statuses are instituted’ . Normative attitudes, then, constitute an 415
implicit normativity out of which deontic statuses arise, and with them, the 
significance of an assertion is cashed out in terms of the difference it makes in the 
deontic statuses of the participants in the game—the difference depends on the 
‘practical deontic attitude of taking or treating someone as committed or 
entitled’ .  416
!
These deontic attitudes, in turn, come in two flavours, the first one being that of 
attributing to someone else the deontic status of being committed or entitled to 
something (in this case: to an assertion) as a consequence of having done some 
other thing (having asserted something). The second attitude refers to oneself and is 
that of acknowledging or undertaking a commitment or an entitlement to something 
(again: to an assertion) as a consequence of a previous performance (that of 
asserting something). In this scheme, the set of undertaken commitments is not co-
extensional with the set of acknowledged (or self-attributed) commitments: 
attributing a commitment to oneself ‘is only one species of that attitude’ since ‘an 
interlocutor can count as having undertaken a commitment (as being committed) 
whenever others are entitled—perhaps in virtue of that interlocutor's performances
—to attribute that commitment’ ; thus for someone to undertake a commitment ‘is 417
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to do something that makes it appropriate to attribute the commitment to that 
individual’ . 418
 
Distinguishing between attributing and acknowledging inferential commitments 
allows to differentiate between the intrapersonal and interpersonal use of a claim. 
By asserting something, not only the statuses of the speaker are modified, but his 
performance also has significance for interpersonal communication: the speaker is 
making the assertion available for others to use it in their inferences. 
‘Acknowledging the undertaking of an assertional commitment has the social 
consequence of licensing or entitling others to attribute that commitment’. Once the 
speaker claims ‘it is raining’, he or she is making ‘that sentence available for others 
to use in making further assertions’ —by attributing the commitment to the 419
speaker, others can undertake a commitment to it .  420
!
When we discuss the objectivity of language—in Sections 3.11 and 3.12—we’ll see 
why, of these attitudes, ‘attributing is fundamental’ . More importantly, the notion 421
of attributing will allow us to see how, by declaring unconstitutionality, the court 
does something that entitles the attribution of a particular commitment regarding the 
relation between the subsentential terms of the legal and constitutional provisions at 
issue (this type of commitment between subsentential expressions will be addressed 




We have seen that asserting authorises further moves, but it also entails 
responsibility. The consequential normative significance of the assertion is only 
authorised, both to the speaker and others, if there is an entitlement to it, entitlement 
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that in turn depends on its conditional normative significance. Thus, by claiming, 
the speaker undertakes the commitment to vindicate the original claim by showing 
that he is entitled to make it. From this follows that the commitment that is 
undertaken by asserting involves the responsibility to justify what is claimed, so the 
assertion both licenses further assertions and commits to justify the original claim. 
This constitutes a ‘task-responsibility’ that in this case consists in demonstrating the 
entitlement to the claim ‘if that entitlement is brought into question’: ‘If the 
commitment can be defended, entitlement to it demonstrated by justifying the 
claim, then endorsement of it can have genuine authority, an entitlement that can be 
inherited’ . And since ‘only assertions one is entitled to make can serve to entitle 422
anyone to their inferential consequences’ , an internal sanction is attached to a 423
failure in vindication: the un-vindicated assertion does not entitle further moves and 
it is itself taken as an untitled assertion. 
!
There are two ways of fulfilling this responsibility: the speaker can justify her 
assertion by providing a reason for it, reason that in turn consists in making a new 
claim. Speakers who accept the justification accept that the newly offered claim 
serves as premise from which the original can be correctly be inferred as 
conclusion . The other way is by appealing to the authority of another speaker. 424
This possibility is to be explained in terms of the interpersonal use of a claim: by 
asserting something, the speaker licenses others to reassert it and discharge their 
responsibility to vindicate the entitlement by invoking his authority—who reasserts 
can discharge her responsibility by invoking the authority, and thus ‘passing the 
buck’, to the original asserter’ . 425
!
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These two forms of vindication will be considered in order to assess the Court’s 
possibility of living-up to the responsibility involved in declaring the 
unconstitutionality. 
!
3.5. The priority and pragmatic force of asserting 
!
This double binomial—two statuses, two roles—serves as the dynamic force that 
defines the speech act of asserting, its pragmatic force: what makes a performance 
an assertion is the fact that such performance is both ‘givings of reasons, and 
themselves also performances for which reasons can be asked’ . They are 426
justifiers and justified, premises and conclusions, and ‘[t]hat it plays this dual role, 
that it is caught up in justificatory inferences both as premise and as conclusion, is 
what makes it a specifically propositional (= assertible, therefore believable) 
content at all’. In other words, what characterises a certain doing as an assertion is 
the way in which those doings are treated and used: as a type of action that plays 
this dual role. So instead of explaining the use of concepts in consideration to their 
content, Brandom is explaining the content in consideration to their use  —to their 427
inferential properties. 
!
This allows us to explain the analytical priority of intra-linguistic movements vis-a-
vis language-entry and -exit transitions: regarding the capability of an assertion to 
represent, we are to explain it in consideration to our use of it—to its inferential 
role. The first step, then, is not to look at the ‘picking-up’ of an aspect of the world 
by an expression or its representational purport, but to look at what we do when we 
take a thing to be thus-and-so : ‘It is only insofar as something can be taken to be 428
a representation that it can purport to be one’ , it is only because we understand 429
that something is a representation that such thing can represent. Here lies 
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Brandom’s pragmatism: instead of arguing that it is because an assertion represents 
something that we can properly use; he claims that the way we use it is what 
provides representational purport to the assertion—representational purport is 
explained in terms of inferential properties . Semantics must answer to 430
pragmatics, and in this way of doing it, Brandom can give an account of Putnam’s 
semantics and go beyond it: for assertions with empirical content, their conditional 
normative significance include the verification of nonlinguistic factors—since the 
meaning of an assertion depends on its role in language, meaning includes and goes 
beyond inferential, intralinguistic movements . So, Putnam is right in noticing that 431
the properties of the extension of concepts serve to define their meanings , but 432
ignores the properly linguistic inferential articulation of them—it ‘looks at reference 
as sufficient  condition for explaining meaning’ . Nonlinguistic, empirical 433 434
conditions that serve to constitute the conditions of appropriate use are integrated in 
the broad inferential articulation of propositional content.  
!
The status of being a representation is grounded on our attitude of treating it as 
such. The basis of representation is then to be found on intentionality, ‘a specific 
feature of propositional attitudes, namely their property of being representationally 
directed to an object or being about an object’ . The world itself—a state of affairs435
—can constitute a reason, but on its own it cannot be in demand of a reason, the 
duality is only achieved at the level of language: language-entry transitions include 
a ‘world-part’ of which we can only talk about once we put it into words and thus 
turn them into intra-linguistic moves; therefore, a language-entry transition that 
‘picks up’ a fragment of the world only attains meaning if it can be connected with 
another expression by way of an intra-linguistic movement . Expressions that 436
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refer to the world, only express a concept if they can be used—by way of intra-
language movements—in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Here we find 
the distinction between a purely responsive classification of something and a 
conceptual classification by way of which such classification plays a role in the 
practice of making claims and giving and asking for reasons : ‘A word does not 437
express the concept of dog unless it can be used as part of sentences which can in 
turn be used for reasoning, i.e., from which other sentences can be inferred and 
which can be themselves inferred from other sentences’ . Only when the response 438
gets caught in practical properties of inference and justification it becomes a 
conceptual matter: all concepts that have reporting uses must also have non-
reporting ones . And the priority of intra-linguistic movements is confirmed 439
regarding -exit transitions, once actions (their world-end) are understood as just as 
‘performances for which it is appropriate to offer reasons’: actions are not 
intelligible without a context that includes assertions. So, both representation and 
action depend on asserting, and ‘the significance of assertional performances can be 
filled into a considerable extent before it is necessary to look at the role of 
assertions as reasons for anything other than more assertions’ . 440
!
3.6. Subsentential terms 
!
In Brandom’s semantics, the meaning of subsentential terms is derivative, for it 
depends on the inferential articulation of sentences—it is based on the latter that the 
conceptual content of the expressions that occur in them can be explained . Just as 441
the meaning of an assertion is given by its net of inferences, the meaning of 
subsentential expressions is determined by the set of other words with which it can 
be substituted without changing the content of the assertion in which they are being 
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used . So once the inferential relations between assertions is defined, we can 442
figure out what changes can be made at the level of subsentential expressions whilst 
preserving the correctness of the inferences in which they occur: two or more 
subsentential terms constitute their meaning reciprocally to the extent that one can 
be substituted for the other maintaining stable the inferential relations of the 
sentences that include them in their content, or, in other words, they ‘share semantic 
content just in case substituting one for the other preserves the pragmatic potential 
of the sentences in which they occur’ . Thus, to explain the meaning of 443
subsentential expressions, Brandom moves one step down from inferential relations 
among sentences, to substitutive relations regarding singular terms and predicates. 
!
The possibility of performing these non-altering substitutions, and with it, 
connecting in a meaning-constitutive way subsentential expressions, depends on the 
correctness of ‘substitution inferences’, in which there is an inferential movement 
from a premise in which one term occurs, to a conclusion that corresponds to an 
identical claim as the first, except from the substitution of the term at issue for 
another one. The typical example is the inference from ‘Benjamin Franklin invented 
bifocals’ to ‘The first postmaster general of the United States invented bifocals’ . 444
This inference, in which what is substituted is a singular term, is a symmetric 
substitutional inference, being good in both directions; but when it comes to 
predicates things are different: from ‘J runs’ we can infer ‘J moves’, but not the 
other way around—some predicates are substitutionally weaker than others, 
conforming asymmetric substitutional inferences . This allows to group singular 445
terms ‘into equivalent classes by the good substitution inferences in which they are 
materially involved, while predicates are grouped into reflexive, transitive, 
asymmetric structures or families’: the circumstances that configure the conditional 
normative significance of ‘J runs’ form a proper subset of those of ‘J moves’ —446
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singular terms, just as predicates, ‘have an inferential role, represented by the set of 
terms intersubstitutable for them’ . 447
!
These meaning-constitutive relations among subsentential expressions configure 
‘substitution-inferential commitments’ that are made explicit by either identity 
claims, such as ‘Benjamin Franklin is the first postmaster general of the United 
States’, or by the use of quantified conditionals, such as ‘everything that runs 
moves’ ; so whoever endorses these substitution inferences undertakes 448
commitment to the effect that the substituted terms stand in this type of inferential 
relation. Regarding asymmetric substitutional inferences, the commitment-
preserving relation between ‘J runs’ and ‘J moves’, turns into a entitlement-
preserving relation in the opposite direction: asserting that ‘J moves’ entitles but 
does not commit to assert ‘J runs’; entitlement to the former is a necessary condition 
to be entitled to the latter, and, inversely, entitlement to the latter is a sufficient 
condition to be entitled to the former, so a lack of entitlement to claim ‘J moves’ 
entails a lack of entitlement to claim ‘J runs’. These ‘substitution-inferential 
commitments’ are the type of commitment that I will claim the court undertakes 
when it declares the unconstitutionality of a law, a substitutional one between the 
contents of the law and the constitutional provision that the court takes to stand in a 
relation of incompatibility. 
!
3.7. The problem of objectivity 
!
Following David Lewis , Brandom understands that in the game of giving and 449
asking for reasons each speaker is considered to have two deontic scores, one with 
the set of commitments and entitlements that he acknowledges or undertakes for 
himself and one with the set of commitments and entitlements that he attributes to 
other speakers, and ‘[f]or at any stage, what one is permitted or obliged to do 
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depends on the score, as do the consequences that doing has for the score’ . But 450
even more, each scorekeeper can also distinguish within the score that he keeps for 
another interlocutor, what are the commitments that the interlocutor acknowledges 
and what subsequent commitments the other actually has, whether she 
acknowledges them or not. For example, if J tells K that she [J] had sexual 
intercourse with ‘the boy that lives across the street’, and K takes the boy to be only 
14 years old and knows that J doesn’t know his age, then K can distinguish in his 
score for J both the commitment J acknowledges—whose content would be that she 
had sex with the boy across the street —and also a commitment that J really has, but 
hasn’t acknowledged—that she had sex with a 14 years old boy. And from there, K 
can continue mapping J’s deontic status independently from what J acknowledges: 
since for K, but not for J, the latter is committed to have had sex with a minor, from 
the former’s perspective J’s actions had further consequences in her deontic statuses 
that she doesn’t acknowledge—a big set of J’s entitlements has precluded; 
entitlements that J will nevertheless keep in her own score. 
!
In this scheme, the significance of a speech act consists in the way in which it 
modifies the deontic score, so grasping the meaning of an assertion is to be capable 
of mapping, according to the score, its conditional normative significance 
(circumstances of application) and its consequential normative significance 
(consequences of application); this is, to understand to what a speaker has to be 
entitled in order to be entitled to assert something (entitlement preserving inferential 
relations), to what else the speaker is committed by being committed to an assertion 
(commitment preserving inferential relations) and to what he is no longer entitled to 
be committed by committing to an assertion (incompatibility relations). 
!
Each speaker has his own map of inferential relations for each assertion, and so the 
commitments and entitlements that work as premises and conclusions for an 
assertion do not need to be the same across agents: ‘For to each, at each stage, 
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different commitments and different entitlements are assigned. There may be large 
areas of overlap (…) But there will also be large areas of difference, if for no other 
reason than that everyone has noninferentially acquired commitments and 
entitlements corresponding to different observable situations (…) As a result, no 
two individuals have exactly the same beliefs or acknowledge exactly the same 
commitments’ . In other words, since the speakers have different collateral 451
commitments, different consequences (entitlements and commitments) will follow 
for each speaker from the same assertion. 
!
This perspectival nature of scorekeeping seems to entail a loss of objectivity in 
meaning, since each speaker will have different sets of commitments and 
entitlements inferentially related—and they are what defines the meaning of an 
assertion. For each speaker the score will be moved according to its own attitudes of 
treating himself and others as committed or entitled to certain moves, and therefore 
the propositional content of an assertion can only be specified from a perspective—
a doxastic gap arises: ‘the propositional content of a claim or commitment can be 
specified only from some point of view; that it would be differently specified in 
definite ways from other particular possible social perspectives’ . 452
!
Despite this relativity, Brandom does not want to give up objectivity. After all, when 
we take part in the discursive practice and claim, after seeing a lighting, ‘a thunder 
will be heard soon’, we understand that we are actually entitled to such assertion 
whether others take us to be entitled to it or not; and if another speaker doesn't 
endorse the inference from ‘it is raining now’ to ‘the streets will be wet’, we 
understand that such movement is correct regardless of what she thinks. In the game 
of giving and asking reasons we assume from the get-go that we can have rights, 
that we can be entitled to something and not just be taken to be entitled. We 
presuppose a difference between our attitudes regarding our statuses and our actual 
statuses, so the challenge is to reconcile the objectivity of our deontic statuses with 
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the relativity of the deontic attitudes that lie on the base of the game. In line with 
this, Brandom is committed to the idea that some of the commitments undertaken 
by a speaker go beyond the commitments he acknowledges: ‘These consequences 
are assumed to eventually transcend the doxastic horizon of the speaker’ . The 453
speaker is not only committed to what he directly commits, to what he 
acknowledges, but, by virtue of their inferentially articulated contents, also to their 
consequences, to the claims whose contents are its committive inferential 
consequences. And the latter, consequential commitments may not be 
acknowledged by the speaker, but they are commitments nonetheless . To be 454
committed to something despite not acknowledging it, requires assuming that there 
is more than just individual attitudes and dispositions, it is necessary to assume a 
shared content that extends through different perspectives. 
!
3.8. Subjective significance and objective content 
!
To understand how objectivity is achieved, we must distinguish between the 
subjective inferential significance of an assertion and its objective inferential 
content. This difference coincides with the distinction between what a speaker takes 
an assertion to mean, and what the assertion in fact means.  
!
The inferential significance of an assertion is the territory of deontic attitudes. It is 
therefore constituted by the inferential relations that the speaker acknowledges, and 
she acknowledges an inferential commitment from P to Q as far as she has the 
disposition to accept the inference from P to Q. The inferential content of an 
assertion, on the other hand, is the territory of normative statuses. It is, therefore, 
constituted by the inferential relations that the assertion actually has. It depends on 
its objective, valid inferential relations, whether they are acknowledged or not. 
While the inferential significance changes as we move from the doxastic 
perspective of one speaker to the other, since it is determined by the disposition of 
 214
 Knell (2005), 74.453
 Brandom (1994), 194.454
the speaker to draw inferences (by her attitudes), the inferential content remains 
stable through different perspectives, depending on the conceptual norms shared in 
the linguistic community that specify which are the correct inferences . 455
!
The same is the case with subsentential terms: their inferential significance is given 
by the set of other subsentential terms which the speaker takes it to be 
intersubstitutable with—by the substitutional inferences he takes to stand. But its 
substitutional content is defined by the set of singular terms it is correct to 
substitute it with. With this, our problem regarding the relativity of social 
perspectives that characterises the meaning of assertions is mirrored at the 
subsentential level: if two speakers, J and K, endorse different substitutional 
inferences regarding the singular term ‘Yuri Gagarin’—J accepts, but K doesn’t, the 
intersubstitutability between such name and ‘the greatest cosmonaut that ever 
lived’—then any assertion that employs ‘Yuri Gagarin’ will have a different 
meaning for each one: from the assertion ‘Yuri Gagarin was Soviet’, J will draw the 
inference ‘the greatest cosmonaut that ever lived was Soviet’, but K will not. And 
since the meaning of the assertion depends on its net of inferences, then 
communication seems impossible . 456
!
This distance between the inferential significance and the inferential content of 
assertions and subsentential terms, correlates with the difference we recognise, 
willy-nilly, between being taken to be entitled and actually being entitled to 
something, between deontic attitudes and deontic statuses. In order to communicate 
successfully, speakers need to navigate this distance, to cross the doxastic gap that 
arises from their different perspectives. This would be impossible if speaker and 
hearer take their discursive interactions to be irrational, if they didn’t have the 
disposition to understand the words they use as instantiating the same assertion or 
subsentential expression. But that is not the case, they recognise themselves 
committed to a meaningful interaction; and so, an objective, communally shared 
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content—i.e. the existence of inferential content, and not just significance—is 
assumed as a presupposition of the practice itself. In other words, if different 
players map the same assertion with different inferences, then the very practice of 
mapping the expressions of others with our own inferences, can only make sense if 
we all assume that those expressions refer to the same world that we share. This 
assumption is implicit in the discursive practice . 457
!
Impossibility of communication would actually be entailed by the differences 
among speakers if only the players were not able ‘to move back and forth between 
the point of view of the speaker and the audience’ . But we have linguistic 458
expressions that allow us to do that, and with it, the discursive practice can be 
understood not as one in which there are different contents defined by different 
collateral and acknowledge commitments, but as one in which a shared content is 
specified from different perspectives:  
!
The difference in the inferential significance (…) should only be taken to 
mean that the content they both grasp (if all goes well in the communication 
of it) must be differently specified from different points of view. Conceptual 
contents are essentially expressively perspectival; they can be specified 
explicitly only from some point of view, against the background of some 
repertoire of discursive commitments, and how it is correct to specify them 
varies from one discursive point of view to another (…) Conceptual 
contents, paradigmatically propositional ones, can genuinely be shared, but 
their perspectival nature means that doing so is mastering the coordinated 
system of scorekeeping perspectives, not passing something nonperspectival 
from hand to hand (or mouth to mouth) . 459
!
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Having different scores is not an obstacle to communication, on the contrary, the 
possibility of navigating the doxastic gap—of ‘mapping the repertoire of 
commitments of an interpreted interlocutor onto the repertoire of commitments of 
an interpreting interlocutor’ —lies on the base of communication. The key, then, 460




Communication is grounded on the disposition to communicate, and that entails the 
assumption that words in different mouths mean and refer to the same objects. This, 
despite different inferential significances, is not just an ungrounded or esoteric 
assumption. Inasmuch as both hearer and speaker were educated in the same 
community, they will have somewhat similar inferential and substitutive relations 
regarding the same terms, so although they will not use assertions and subsentential 
expressions in identical fashion, the differences shouldn’t be large enough for the 
hearer to be unable of identifying, in his net of inferences, some that she can 
reasonable attribute to the speaker. The attributed collateral commitments will not 
be identical to the set of commitments acknowledged by the speaker , but that 461
difference is what opens the door to a meaningful interaction, since the hearer can 
question the speaker about his inferences: using Brandom’s example, suppose that 
the speaker claimed that ‘J is a trustworthy man’ and that the hearer takes J to be a 
‘pathological liar’—i.e. he endorses a substitutional inference between ‘J’ and ‘a 
pathological liar’ . Being that the case, the hearer takes the speaker committed to 462
the assertion ‘a pathological liar is a trustworthy man’. But the hearer can do more 
than just taking the speaker to be committed to something, he can also assert it and 
tell his interlocutor that she is claiming something absurd. By doing this the 
prospect of navigating the doxastic gap—and thus making explicit the difference 
between their inferential commitments regarding one and the same subject—is 
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open. In other words, the discrepancy between them pivots on both sharing a 
content, since the difference can be thematised as a discrepancy about one 
‘communally shared content, over and above the views of individual speakers as to 
what that content is’ . 463
!
The obstacle they face lies on finding the adequate formulation of the attributed 
commitment: if the hearer claims ‘the speaker claims that a pathological liar is a 
trustworthy man’, then it is not clear who is endorsing the substitutional inference—
it is not clear according to whose repertoire of inferences the content of the 
attributed commitment is being ascribed. But we have linguistic resources that 
allow us to distinguish between (1) the commitments that the ascriber attributes 
according to the collateral commitments undertaken by the speaker—in this case, 
that ‘someone is a trustworthy man’, (2) the commitments attributed to the speaker 
according to the collateral commitments undertaken by the ascriber—‘that a 
pathological liar is a trustworthy man’—and (3) the commitments undertaken by the 
ascriber—an asymmetric substitutional inference between ‘J’ and ‘a pathological 
liar’. 
!
The possibility of achieving a meaningful interaction out of what until this point 
appears to be a structural misunderstanding, is mobilized by the notion of 
recurrence commitments. These are essential to explain the meaning of unrepeatable 
or token reflexive expressions—paradigmatically: pronouns—that occur in 
anaphoric chains. This move constitutes a second step ‘down’ from the level of 
inference: the first one descended from the latter to the notion of substitution in 
order to address meaning for subsentential expressions (singular terms and 
predicates) and introduced substitution-inferential commitments. This second step 
moves from subsentential expressions to unrepeatable tokenings, as ‘the man’ or 
‘it’, using the notion of anaphora and introducing recurrence commitments—these 
devices will allow Brandom to address the meaning of unrepeatable tokenings (‘the 
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use of a word or sing at a particular place and time’ ) that instantiate repeatable 464
expressions . 465
!
The paradigmatic case of anaphora is found in the use of a pronoun in an example 
as this: 
!
Marxism is taught every Monday; it is a difficult theory. 
!
The meaning of the unrepeatable tokening is explained in consideration to the 
anaphoric chain that connects ‘marxism’ and ‘it’ in the previous example; chain 
that, linking tokenings of subsentential expressions, serves as a cross-reference 
mechanism that regulates a ‘sort of inheritance of meaning’: ‘it’, in the previous 
example, inherits its meaning from its anaphoric antecedent, ‘marxism’—‘it’ refers 
to whatever ‘marxism’ refers, and means whatever ‘marxism’ means . And since 466
the meaning of ‘marxism’ corresponds to its role in ‘substitution inferences’, this 
role and the corresponding ‘substitution inferential commitments’ are inherited by 
‘it’. ‘In other words, anaphora is construed as a special mechanism for the 
inheritance of substitution-inferential commitments’ — anaphoric commitments 467
regulate how the meaning of the related tokenings is inherited. 
!
By taking this step, we find that together with assertoric commitments between 
assertions, and substitutional commitments among subsentential expressions, 
recurrence commitments connect unrepeatable tokenings with their antecedents in 
anaphoric chains. These commitments ‘determine which bits of discourse the 
scorekeeper ought to treat as belonging to the same anaphoric chain’ , so they are 468
acknowledged by a speaker by treating parts of a discourse as belonging to the same 
chain. Notice, of course, that co-typicality (being the same symbol or utterance) is 
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therefore neither necessary nor sufficient for two tokenings to be part of the same 
anaphoric chain : ‘it’ is a recurrence of ‘marxism’ in the previous example, but 469
the same symbol ‘it’ (or different utterances of that same word) will not be 
instantiating the same expression when it is accompanied by a different pointing 
gesture. 
!
This might be obvious, but in order to move forward, the crucial thing to advert is 
that speakers unproblematically agree on the anaphoric relations between linguistic 
performances, even though they disagree regarding the substitutional inferences of 
the terms employed: suppose that J and K both attend the same classes, and the 
former claims ‘Marxism is taught every Monday’, there would be no confusion for 
them if K replies ‘it is a difficult theory’. In the terms that we are employing here, 
they would agree on the fact that ‘it’ is a recurrence of ‘marxism’, that it is 
governed by the same substitutive inferences. Here we can start identifying the 
basis for communication despite the doxastic gap: J and K will have different 
substitutional commitments for ‘marxism’, but they (and for that matter, everyone 
else who listens to their conversation) will agree on the anaphoric relations in their 
discourse, on the recurrence commitment between both tokenings, and on the fact 
that the meaning of ‘it’ is defined by the substitutional inferences in which 
‘marxism’ stands, ‘whatever they might be’ . In the same vein, even if one is a 470
marxist and the other a neoliberal, J and K will take their tokenings of ‘marxism’ as 
recurrences of each other—the fact that they have different subjective inferential 
significance regarding ‘marxism’ will not prevent J from acknowledging a 
recurrence commitment between his utterance of marxism and K’s, and viceversa. 
They will recognise tokenings from different mouths as being members of the same 
anaphoric chain. But if anaphoric chains regulate the way in which a tokening 
inherits meaning, if acknowledging a recurrence commitment is to take that the 
anaphoric subsequently inherits its substitutional role or meaning from the 
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anaphoric antecedent , then the agreement regarding membership to anaphoric 471
chains—i.e., agreement in recurrence commitments—entails an implicit agreement 
to the effect that tokenings uttered by different speakers have the same substitution 
inferential significance, and it entails this because endorsing a recurrence 
commitment ‘implies sameness in meaning’ . 472
!
Every participant understands that others accept recurrence commitments between 
tokenings, that K’s ‘it’ in ‘it is a difficult theory’ or ‘marxism is a difficult theory’, 
stand in a recurrence commitment with J’s ‘Marxism is taught every Monday’. This 
agreement in anaphoric chains entails that the participants implicitly agree that 
these tokenings, either co-typical or not, are governed by the same substitutional 
commitments. So in spite of doxastic gaps, ‘interlocutors acknowledge recurrence 
commitments connecting tokenings of the hearer’ : I know that my net of 473
inferences regarding ‘marxism’ is different from that of my friend, I know we will 
both make different inferences from assertions that employ such term—our deontic 
scores will not be altered in the same way. But I nevertheless take his tokenings as a 
recurrence of mine, and viceversa. 
!
Despite the doxastic gap, the conversation will move forward in the background of 
an implicit agreement regarding the substitutional inferences of the speakers 
tokenings—it will advance non-problematically until the difference in collateral 
commitments regarding the same expressions become patent when one of the 
players makes an explicit substitution that is ‘out of sync’ with her interlocutor’s 
acknowledged substitutional commitments regarding the shared anaphoric link. 
They will need to assess each other’s acknowledged substitutional inferences ‘in the 
light of the requirement of sameness in acknowledged substitutional commitment'  474
that is entailed by the agreement in anaphoric commitments. So anaphoric 
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commitments link unrepeatable tokenings regulating the inheritance of 
substitutional inferences that govern the use of them . Now it is necessary to 475
explain how the linguistic practice allows to make explicit the different 
substitutional inferential commitments between speakers that, nevertheless, 
implicitly acknowledge a shared meaning. 
!
3.10. De re ascriptions 
!
Having set out the problem of communication, and the underlying assumptions on 
which it is possible, now it is time to address the linguistic device that allows 
speakers to map the different inferential repertories onto each other, whereby they 
make their differences explicit and thus successfully communicate. This is the task 
of de re ascriptions. An example can help explain how they work. 
!
Some time ago I was talking to a friend about the role of property rights in Marx: 
exploitation, the extraction of surplus value—I was told—would be grounded on 
property rights over the means of production. But this central role of property rights 
didn't seem sound to me. Unlike my friend, most of what I knew of marxism came 
from a lecture concerning the preface of ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy’. Because of our different backgrounds we had quite different 
understandings of the theory—what I took ‘marxism’ to stand for was almost 
completely defined by a certain reading of The Preface; while for my friend, such 
text was just one among many works that served him to constitute a more 
elaborated theory. This leads us to a disagreement. 
!
As I understand it, the materialism of The Preface is incompatible with taking legal 
rights as the basis of material, production relations that bring about exploitation. I 
understood that according to a materialist approach those relations had to be defined 
by alethic modalities, and law could only operate defining deontic positions. As I 
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see it, the compulsory force by means of which a material impossibility is related to 
the deontic status of being forbidden had to come from outside law. In other words, 
law (a superstructure), could not be what defined the relations of production (the 
structure); so the bourgeoisie is not the dominant class because they have property 
rights, but inversely, they have property rights because they are the dominant class; 
and they are the dominant class because they have possession (a material, not legal 
relation of control) over the means of production. Having that factual control, they 
would elevate their possession to the legal status of property that in turn serves as a 
legitimation device that serves as a vehicle for—but does not constitute—their 
power. Being in fact impossible for the workers to use the means of production 
without the consent of the bourgeoise, the latter has the upper hand in a material 
relation that allows them to validate such exploitation under legal institutions 
(private property over the means of production and waged labour) and thus use the 
deontic status of forbidden to conceal and legitimise the material impossibility that 
grounds it: it is because workers cannot use the forces of production that the 
bourgeoise can—by way of property rights—forbid them to do so. 
!
My friend, with a different background, didn’t agree with this understanding of 
Marxism. But mine wasn’t a wild reading of The Preface—actually it was quite fair; 
after all, there Marx actually says that legal superstructures rise based on the 
structure constituted by material relations of production, that property relations are 
just ‘the legal expression’  of existing relations of production—and the expression 476
of something is not that something. Because of this, my friend actually agreed on 
my understanding of that short text. Whether we gave a fair reading of The Preface 
or not, our disagreement was not based on our understanding of it, but on the 
relation that each established between it and the theory in general. Given our 
different interactions with Marxist theory we actually did have quite contrasting 
inferential significances regarding ‘Marxism’. But we were still communicating 
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about the same theory and the conversation seemed to us a perfectly rational 
activity. Even more, we were capable of finding the root of our discrepancy. 
!
The way to make explicit the differences and thus navigating the doxastic gap can 
be explained in terms of the employment of de re ascriptions. When my friend said, 
‘Marxism takes property rights as the grounds of exploitation’, I could have used 
my substitutive inference between ‘Marxism’ and ‘The Preface’ and make an 
ascription: ‘you claim that “The Preface” takes property rights as the grounds of 
exploitation’. My friend, accepting my reading of such text, would have rejected 
such attribution. The problem of such form of ascription is that I’m employing my 
inferential repertoire to ascribe a commitment to the speaker by way of a 
formulation that does not allow us to distinguish which part of the attributed 
commitment is based on the acknowledged commitments of the speaker and which 
part depends on the acknowledged commitments of the hearer—we cannot 
distinguish between the commitment that is being attributed and the commitment 
that is being undertaken by attributing it. Here lies the basis of the problem: 
ascribing a commitment goes beyond doing something, for the agent is not just 
attributing a commitment (he is not just treating someone as committed to 
something), but also claiming it: ‘Ascribing a doxastic commitment is explicitly 
attributing it’ , so ‘attributions are made explicit by ascriptions’ . And since it is 477 478
a claim, and claims entail undertaking a commitment, the performance of ascribing 
a commitment plays a dual role: ‘Ascription always involves attributing one 
doxastic commitment and, since ascriptions are themselves claims or judgments, 
undertaking another’ . In other words, the attribution of a commitment to an 479
interlocutor entails self-acknowledging another doxastic commitment . In the 480
simplest terms: if I attribute to you a commitment to x, then I [the attributor] 
undertake a commitment to the effect that you are committed to x. On the one hand, 
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a commitment is attributed, on the other, a commitment is undertaken. The hybrid 
nature of the deontic attitude of ascribing has to be unraveled.  
!
To do this, we must first identify the location of the problem. The ascription of 
proposition attitudes is configured in three steps: first, we identify a subject; second, 
we specify the performance that is ascribed and then the propositional content of 
such performances is stated. The problem of the formulation ‘you claim that “The 
Preface” takes property rights as the grounds of exploitation’ lies on the third part, 
since both the identification of the subject (you) and the nature of the performance 
(claim) is accepted by the interlocutor. On that third part, my ascription constitutes a 
de dicto ascription, for the content ascribed is specified by all that follows after the 
expression that (in this case: ‘The Preface takes property rights as the grounds of 
exploitation’). But stated like that what is attributed to the speaker is not 
acknowledge by him; and in order to communicate, I have to ascribe attitudes in a 
way that is coherent with the speaker’s collateral commitments. 
!
With a de dicto ascription, the ascriber is taking what was asserted by the speaker 
and then indexing his (but not necessarily the speaker’s) collateral commitments to 
specify the attributed content in a way that does not make explicit who is taking 
responsibility for the substitutional inference—who endorses it: ‘The substitutional 
commitments that govern the expressions used to specify the content of the 
commitment ascribed can similarly either be attributed to the one to whom the 
doxastic commitment is ascribed or be undertaken by the one ascribing it’ , but 481
the de dicto ascription impedes making this distinction: everything after the that is 
ascribed, but within such ascribed content a substitutional inference took place, and 
the ascription does not allow us to know whose inference that is, so it is impossible 
to make the distinction between the content of the commitment being attributed to 
the interlocutor and the commitment being undertaken by the attributor. To avoid 
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this confusion, the expressions occurring in the ascription must somehow specify 
both contents . This is the task of de re ascriptions. 482
!
They operate, just as de dicto ascriptions do, in the third stage of ascribing—that of 
specifying the propositional content of the attributed commitment. While in de dicto 
ascriptions the content is specified in terms of what is said, de re ascriptions 
specifies what the commitment is about: they ‘serve to specify what is represented 
by a belief rather than how it is represented’ and thus ‘any singular term that picks 
out the right object is all right; one specification is as good as another’ . It is only 483
by isolating the object of which it is being talked about that interlocutors can map 
the different inferences that speaker and hearer make regarding such shared content. 
This is done by reformulating the ascription by way of including the preposition of, 
whose scope marks the substitutional commitment undertaken by the ascriber; and 
after it, the new formulation employs the preposition that, on whose scope the 
ascriber repeats the properties of the object originally asserted by the speaker—the 
expressions that occur in that last scope ‘serve to specify how things are represented 
by the one to whom the belief is ascribed . In Sebastian Knell terms: ‘The 484
producer of a de re ascription takes the singular term exported into the scope of the 
‘of’ operator to be a legitimate substitute for another singular term—a term that, in 
connection with the predicate remaining within the scope of the ‘that’ operator, 
would form an assertional sentence through which the ascriber would be able to 
acknowledge the same commitment as the other person does according to the 
ascription’ . 485
!
Now, if the speaker says ‘Marxism takes property rights as the grounds of 
exploitation’, and the hearer endorses an asymmetric substitutional commitment 
between ‘Marxism’ and ‘The Preface’, then we can go from de dicto:  
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!
J claims that ‘The Preface’ takes property rights as the grounds of 
exploitation. 
!
To de re: 
!
J claims of ‘The Preface’ that it takes property rights as the grounds of 
exploitation. 
!
What the ascriber has done in this case was to take the singular term used by the 
speaker (‘marxism’), replace it by a different term that the he [the ascriber] takes to 
stand in a substitutional-inferential relation with it (‘The Preface’) and then 
predicate of it the same property the speaker predicated of the original term. Now 
that we know whose substitutional inference is at work, we know who has to 
vindicate the corresponding substitutional commitment: the ascriber. 
!
With this formulation the doxastic gap is crossed, for it allows unpacking the 
content of the ascription: first, that some theory takes property rights as the grounds 
of exploitation is part of the commitment attributed to the speaker; second, that 
such theory corresponds to ‘The Preface’, is the commitment undertaken by the 
ascriber; and third, the ascriber is explicitly endorsing a substitutional commitment 
between ‘marxism’ (the term employed by the speaker) and ‘The Preface’ (the term 
the ascriber indexes), commitment that does not need to be acknowledged by the 
speaker . 486
!
Thus, by using de re ascriptions we are capable of specifying and keeping track of 
the commitment attributed to the speaker from different points of view: from the 
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speaker’s perspective, the content is that ‘a theory takes property rights as the 
grounds of exploitation’—such content is specified in consideration to what the 
speaker acknowledges, so it corresponds to the speaker’s deontic attitudes. But 
from the hearer’s perspective things are more complicated, since on his score for the 
speaker he can distinguish between the commitments the speaker acknowledges and 
the commitments the speaker really has undertaken. While the first set is defined by 
the speaker’s attitudes (by what the speaker takes himself to be committed to), the 
second depends on the speaker’s deontic status. So, from the ascriber’s point of 
view, the speaker has committed himself—whether he acknowledges it or not—
with a commitment whose content is that ‘“The Preface” takes property rights as the 
grounds of exploitation’—he has undertaken such a commitment subsequentially, 
for it follows from the commitment the speaker explicitly acknowledges: ‘[t]he 
difference arises because one is committed to the inferential consequences of what 
one acknowledges, but one may nevertheless not acknowledge those 
consequences’ . In this way, the ascriber has undertaken a commitment to the 487
effect that the speaker is committed to something (that ‘“The Preface” takes 
property rights as the grounds of exploitation’), but the ascriber is not committed 
with the speaker acknowledging such commitment: I may very well know that my 
friend does not acknowledge being committed to ‘“The Preface” takes property 
rights as the grounds of exploitation’, but I have undertaken a commitment to the 
effect that my friend has undertaken such commitment. 
!
De re ascriptions allow us to do something else: by specifying the commitment in 
that way, the ascriber is making explicit the reference to a shared content (which 
corresponds to what is referred by ‘The Preface’), explicitation through which it is 
possible to distinguish between the objective/representational content of the 
commitment (the theory—marked by the scope of the preposition of) and the 
subjective attitude that the speaker has about it (that such theory takes property 
rights as the grounds of exploitation—marked by the scope of the preposition that). 
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De re ascriptions correspond to a form of speaking in which the assumption that we 
are talking about something has its grammatical origin, for they explicitly express a 
directness to a intersubjectively shared contents (in our case, a theory) that is 
marked by the operator ‘of’ . The ascriber’s substitution makes explicit that there 488
is shared content that is referred by both his and the interlocutor’s terms: they are 
substitutable for they refer to the same thing. This same model will be used in 
Section 4.1 to identify the responsibility entailed by the endorsement of a 
substitutional inference undertaken by the constitutional court in a declaration of 
unconstitutionality. 
!
The disagreement can now be properly understood as a meaningful one: it is about 
whether such theory is ‘The Preface’, not about whether ‘The Preface’ takes 
property rights as the grounds of exploitation. We can now individuate a conceptual 
content that is ‘objective in the sense of transcending the attitudes of the 
practitioners’ , and we can do it because the interlocutors acknowledge recurrence 489
commitments between the tokenings they employ. 
!
Now that these distinctions have been notationally encoded and displayed , the 490
game of giving and asking for reasons can be properly played, for the responsibility 
of vindicating the commitments has been clearly distributed: my friend has to 
defend that such theory takes property rights as the grounds of exploitation; I have 
to justify that such theory corresponds to ‘The Preface’, and thus give reasons to 
back my entitlement to my endorsed substitution. 
!
3.11. Objectivity and perspectival content 
!
Now, this assumption of an intersubjectively shared content, that is made 
grammatically explicit by means of de re ascriptions, doesn’t preclude the 
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perspectival nature of every specification of conceptual content. But the crucial 
thing to look at is the social practice that underlies these individual perspectives: the 
disagreement that arises from our different acknowledged commitments can only 
grow on the back of a previous agreement, so we must now identify what we are 
agreeing on. To do this the first step is to notice that we can understand ourselves as 
disagreeing because we keep track of both our commitments and those of others—
each speaker carries two distinct scores, one for himself and one for every other 
interlocutor, and thus takes his inferences as correct and the inferences of others that 
do not match our own as incorrect: I took the inference from ‘“The Preface” takes 
property rights only as the legal name of a material underlying relation of factual 
power’ to ‘Marxism takes property rights only as the legal name of a material 
underlying relation of factual power’ as a correct inference, as one that also 
precludes a right to assert that ‘Marxism takes property rights as the grounds of 
exploitation’. Because of this, I took myself to be right and my friend to be wrong, 
he was only taking as correct an assertion that was objectively incorrect. 
!
But the inverse was true from my friend’s perspective. By making a de re 
ascription, I treat the ascription as ‘specifying the objective representational content 
of the attributed commitment (as specifying the status in question, and what it is 
really about)’ —the author of the ascription takes the term used within the scope 491
of the operator ‘of’ as the objective content of the speaker’s commitment. In our 
example: I took ‘The Preface’ to be what was the objective content of my friend’s 
commitment, the object regarding which my friend’s claim could be true or false. 
What was specified in the scope of the preposition that, on the other hand, specified 
the subjective attitude of my friend about such previously identified object— ‘that it 
takes property rights as the grounds of exploitation’. Therefore, I treated my de re 
ascription as expressing the objective deontic status of my friend: ‘this is what you 
are talking about, and this is what you are claiming about it’. For the ascriber, then, 
what the speaker claims is just an expression of his deontic attitudes and of his 
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acknowledged commitments; and it is the attribution what expresses the speaker’s 
deontic status and his undertaken commitments. But from my interlocutor’s point of 
view things are reversed: my de re ascription expresses simply my attitude, my 
version of my interlocutor’s status—what was attributed (according to the speaker) 
was not the undertaken commitment and deontic status, but just what was taken to 
be the commitment and an expression of the ascriber’s attitudes . For the speaker, 492
the undertaken commitments are not those attributed, but those acknowledged; for 
the ascriber, the undertaken commitments are not those acknowledged, but those 
attributed. 
!
This allows us to make sense of the distance and relation between deontic attitudes 
and deontic statuses: the status of an interlocutor corresponds not to his immediate 
attitudes, but to those attitudes mediated by way of his consequential and not 
necessarily acknowledged commitments. Since a commitment can be undertaken 
not just by acknowledging it (which constitutes the attribution of the commitment to 
oneself), but also consequentially, as a consequence that follows in a materially 
correct inference from the acknowledged commitment, we can distinguish two 
deontic attitudes, the immediate ones and the consequentially expanded deontic 
attitudes. These last ones correspond to those attitudes that can be said that a 
speaker has as the result of a mediation by means of the collateral commitments of 
someone else. Thus, the consequentially expanded deontic attitudes constitute the 
deontic status of the speaker, and since the mediating function is performed by the 
attitudes of an interlocutor, then ‘Brandom has given a version of normative 
objectivity that doesn’t at any point treat deontic statuses as being ontologically 
independent of deontic attitudes. This is so, since deontic statuses just are mediated 
or consequential attitudes’ :  493
!
The difference between objective normative status and subjective normative 
attitude is construed as a social-perspectival distinction between normative 
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attitudes. In this way the maintenance, from every perspective, of a 
distinction between status and attitude is reconciled with the methodological 
phenomenalism that insists that all that really needs to be considered is 
attitudes—that the normative statuses in terms of which deontic score is kept 
are creatures instituted by the (immediate) normative attitudes whose 
adoption and alteration is the activity of scorekeeping . 494
!
So, the discursive practice entails a symmetry that implicitly constitutes the basis of 
our agreement, for an essential quality of the deontic score that each player keeps 
consists in the fact that it allows the scorekeeper to differentiate between assertions 
that are right and assertions that are only taken to be right, between the objective 
deontic status an interlocutor has and his subjective deontic attitude, between the 
commitments the interlocutor acknowledges and the commitments he really has 
undertaken. Each interlocutor maintains a distinction between the immediate 
normative attitudes of his interlocutors and their actual normative statuses. Since we 
all make this distinction, which in turn presupposes objectively correct inferences 
and objective deontic statuses, we share a common structure in which the discursive 
practice takes place.  
!
The crucial point to be noted in order to avoid collapsing being correct and mere 
being taken to be correct—what would make the attitudes of the ascriber the final 
word on how things really are, at least for him—, is that each player can apply the 
distinction to himself. So it must not just be the case that each scorekeeper 
distinguishes what others take to be correct and what is actually correct, but—more 
demandingly—what is required is the possibility to reflexively submit our own 
beliefs to the distinction: ‘What Brandom needs to show is that it is possible for 
someone to recognise from their own perspective that there is a possible difference 
between what in fact is the case and what they take to be the case . To be in 495
position to recognise such distinction the speaker must exhibit the capability of 
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taking up the perspective of someone else who is keeping score on his discursive 
attitudes ‘while simultaneously maintaining their own’ , capability whereby the 496
possibility of a new perspective is open—i.e. the possibility of ‘taking up 
hypothetically a sort of third-person scorekeeping attitude toward my own present 
commitments and entitlements (much as I must do for my past commitments and 
entitlements in any case)’ . Each speaker that uses his perspective to distinguish 497
between the commitments others acknowledge and those that they have actually 
undertaken is aware that his own perspective constitutes the object to which the 
distinction is applied to from the perspective of his interlocutor. Thus, to take this 
third-person perspective is to attribute commitments to an interlocutor consisting in 
his attribution to me of some commitments: I take him to be entitled to be 
committed to attribute me a commitment. This third-person perspective will become 
crucial, in Section 5.3, in order to explain secured universal propositions that can be 
employed by the constitutional judge. 
!
To avoid collapsing being correct and being taken to be correct is easier than it 
might seem or sound, for to deactivate the threat it is enough to show that we accept 
neither the ‘No first-person ignorance condition’—i.e. that ‘whatever is the case, I 
claim/believe it’— nor the ‘No first-person error condition’—i.e. that ‘whatever I 
claim/believe, is the case’. The rejection of those conditions is done precisely by 
assuming the position of an interlocutor who, from his perspective, judges my 
commitments. And this re-creation of a third-person’s perspective within the first-
person’s perspective allows us to acknowledge a semantic difference between ‘this 
is the case’ and ‘I claim that this is the case’, the recognition of which is possible by 
means of tracking the inferences that this third party would make with those 
propositional contents: if the content of ‘I claim that this is the case’ and ‘this is the 
case’ where the same, then the assertions that would be incompatible with one 
would be incompatible with the other, but—and this is the crucial point—not just 
for me, but also for my interlocutor. 
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!
In other words, I cannot take myself to be entitled to these two claims: 
!
I claim that the way in which ‘Preface’ understands property rights is the 




The way in which ‘Preface’ understands property rights is not the way in 
which is Marxism understands property rights. 
!
On my deontic score for myself those claims are in a relation of incompatibility. But 
that doesn’t show that I take ‘this is the case’ and ‘I claim that this is the case’ to be 
semantically equivalent. That would be the case only if I took them to be 
incompatible also on my deontic score for someone else. But my hypothetical 
interlocutor can be entitled to them—that is, on my deontic score of his entitlements 
I can take him to be entitled to both. So, while if I were to attribute to myself both 
claims I would be attributing me incompatible claims, that is not the case when I 
attribute those claims to a third party. 
!
I can take S to be entitled to a commitment with the following content: 
!
S claims that I claim that the way in which ‘Preface’ understands property 
rights is the way in which is Marxism understands property rights, and S 
claims that the way in which ‘Preface’ understands property rights is not the 
way in which is Marxism understands property rights. 
!
On my score for S, they are not incompatible, for ‘one involves what commitments 
S attributes to me, and the other involves what commitments S undertakes, and 
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these do not collide’ . So ‘P is the case’ and ‘I claim that P is the case’ have 498
different semantic content because they entail different changes in the deontic score 
that I carry for my interlocutor. And if I acknowledge that they are not semantically 
equivalent, then I am not committed to ‘if P is the case, then I claim that P is the 
case’ - i.e. the no first-person ignorance condition. 
!
And the same considerations take down the no first-person error condition: the 
antecedent of this condition would be ‘I claim that snow is white’ so its 
consequence would be ‘snow is white’. Any claim incompatible with ‘snow is 
white’—‘snow is colourless’ —is incompatible with the consequence, but not with 
the antecedent—there is no incompatibility between ‘the snow is colourless’ and ‘I 
claim that the snow is white’ . 499
!
3.12. No privileged point of view 
!
All this offers us, as a corollary, an I-thou construal of intersubjectivity, one in 
which objectivity is built in the discursive practice, in the distinction that each 
interlocutor makes between attributed and undertaken commitments . Objectivity 500
is thus ‘a reflection of the perspectival distinction between undertaking and 
attributing inferentially articulated commitments’ . This entails the assumption of 501
a notion of ‘objective correctness of claiming and concept application that is not 
perspective-relative’ . But it also entails rejecting the possibility of a privileged 502
perspective , so ‘[i]t makes no sense to specify or express a propositional or other 503
conceptual content except from some point of view—which is subjective, not in a 
Cartesian sense, but in the practical sense that it is the point of view of some 
scorekeeping subject’. 
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4. The case of JRL 
!
To take Brandom’s approach to our present study is to translate the constitutional 
court’s position into that of a speaker that has to make an assertion which, including 
the terms employed by the legal rule whose constitutionality is being discussed, 
follows as a consequence from the propositional content of the constitutional rules 
that serve to define the conditions for the distribution of the distinction between 
constitutionality and unconstitutionality. Regarding such hypothetical assertion or 
movement, the entitlement of the court to assert it must be scrutinised and, since 
entitlements have to be vindicated, the justification of the assertion reclaims front 
stage. 
!
To carry this analysis forward I will proceed in two steps: first, my aim is to map 
the commitments the court undertakes by declaring the unconstitutionality, not 
necessarily the ones the court acknowledges. My goal is not to reconstruct the 
explicit reasoning that the court would put forward, but to give an account of the 
substitutional inferences to which the court would be subsequentially committed if 
it were to declare the unconstitutionality. I will be putting aside for the moment the 
possible ways in which those endorsements could be justified on the court’s ruling. 
!
Following the analysis done in Ch. 2, I will claim that if a court declares 
unconstitutional a piece of legislation, in consideration to some constitutional 
provision, then the court is committed to take both rules to be incompatible. Such 
incompatibility commits the court to the substitutional inference on which such 
declaration of unconstitutionality hinges: what I will argue is that, regardless of how 
the court grounds its decision, if it declares that a legal provision according to 
which ‘unions can block the companies building sites’ is unconstitutional vis-à-vis a 
right to ‘provide services’, the court is committed to take such right as serving as a 
premise to a right to ‘not have building sites blocked by unions’; and such inference 
will commit the court to an asymmetrical substitutional inference between the terms 
employed by the law and the terms employed by the constitution or the Treaty. 
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On the following part I will analyse the possible ways in which the court can be 
entitled to those undertaken commitments. 
!
4.1. The undertaken commitments in the declarat ion of 
unconstitutionality 
!
I have argued that the unconstitutionality of a law depends on it being in a particular 
relation with the constitution, one that corresponds to what was identified in 
Chapter II as a normative contradiction (as opposed to what was identified as a 
normative conflict). The easiest way to make sense of a contradiction between 
constitutional and legal rules is resorting to the relation of incompatibility that was 
analysed as one of the three possible relations of inferential articulation among 
assertions: two rules are to be understood standing in a relation of incompatibility if 
a commitment to the propositional content of one precludes an entitlement to a 
commitment with the propositional content of the other. The most obvious case in 
which this preclusion can be grasped is that of two rules that share the same content, 
but each assigns to it incompatible deontic statuses. Allow me to start with some 
brief and trivial remarks: since a permission is the negation of a prohibition, then a 
permissive rule is incompatible with a forbidding rule if they have a common 
content; and the same is true, mutatis mutandis, between liberating and requiring 
rules, and forbidding and requiring rules—in a system of rules, the same type of 
action cannot be simultaneously permitted and forbidden, liberated and required nor 
forbidden and required. Therefore, a legal rule that requires performing P is 
incompatible with a constitutional rule that liberates from performing P: being 
committed to ‘P is required’ precludes an entitlement to ‘P is liberated’. Thus 
understood, the property of a legal rule of being in contradiction to the constitution
—its unconstitutionality—corresponds to a secondary property of such rule whose 
obtention depends on the verification of the primary property of being incompatible 
with one or more constitutional rules.  
!
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This is a simple starting point, but useful enough to move forward. Let’s return to 
Laval to see how this serves to explain a possible reasoning and thus identify the 
undertaken commitments of a court. In Laval what was being analysed by the ECJ 
was the relation between the industrial action of a union that, in the context of a 
negotiation process with the company, blocked Laval’s building sites. Laval claimed 
that such action infringed their right of freedom to provide services. Since that case 
was about a concrete industrial action, it corresponded to an instance of JRA. We 
could apply Brandom’s model to it, but the commitments undertaken by the court 
could be vindicated by a justification that rested on an application discourse. This is 
to say that Laval is a case that can, in principle, receive a properly judicial answer, it 
just received a catastrophic one. To use it in order to assess a court’s position in a 
JRL case, we need to change it in order to state a pertinent example. Suppose that 
instead of a particular action of blocking building sites, a member state enacted a 
law that allows unions to block the building sites of their employers. Suppose that 
one of the possibly affected firms claims that such law is to be struck down in 
consideration to the Treaty’s right of freedom to provide services, and that—
similarly as with Laval—either the ECJ or a national constitutional court ruled on 
their favour. How could we use Brandom’s work to reconstruct the court’s 
reasoning and map its undertaken commitments? 
!
In our Laval-based example, there is no flagrant incompatibility, for both the legal 
rule and the treaty’s right do not seem to share the same content: the first allows 
‘unions to block building sites’ and the second refers to ‘freedom to provide 
services’—these are not the same expressions, their substitutional inferences are 
different, and thus it seems that no incompatibility is possible. But, as I will argue in 
this section, if the court declares the unconstitutionality, it will subsequentially be 
undertaking a commitment to the effect that both terms stand in a asymmetric 
substitutional inference relation—it will undertake, as consequence of declaring the 
unconstitutionality, a substitutional commitment between those terms. The possible 
entitlement of the court to such commitment is going to be the object of the 
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following section—for now, what interests me here is to identify the court’s 
commitments, not if it is entitled to them. 
!
To identify the undertaken commitments, we must keep an eye on the double role of 
assertions: the declaration of unconstitutionality is the conclusion to which the court 
arrives, its propositional content configures the content of a commitment the court 
acknowledges (attributes to itself) and thus undertakes. Such commitment has 
consequences: if unconstitutionality corresponds to a relation of incompatibility, 
then by asserting the unconstitutionality the court commits itself to take the content 
of the Treaty’s right to be incompatible with the content of the legal permission. 
This is a commitment the court undertakes consequentially—it follows from what 
the court has committed itself to (the unconstitutionality), mediated by collateral 
commitments the court doesn’t necessarily have to acknowledge (the 
incompatibility). 
!
This consequentially undertaken commitment, in turn, commits the court to 
something else, for if the court is committed to an incompatibility relation between 
the employers’ right to ‘freedom to provide services’ and the union’s permission to 
‘block building sites’, then the court is either committed to infer, from the Treaty’s 
explicitly stated right, a right whose content includes the content of the legal 
permission or, from the legal permission, a permission to hinder what the bearer has 
the right to do (or a combination of both). Here we need to explore only the first 
alternative, for the other can be reconstructed by inverting the terms—what matters 
is the substitutional commitment that is undertaken as a consequence of declaring 
the unconstitutionality, regardless of the specific route by which we arrive to it. 
Adopting this first alternative means that, by committing to an incompatibility 
relation between the legal permission and the Treaty’s right, the court is committing 
itself to endorse an inference from the employer’s explicitly stated right of ‘freedom 
to provide services’ to a right ‘not to have their building sites blocked by 
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unions’ (so we move from a Von Wrightian to a Hohfeldian right )—the court is 504
therefore endorsing a commitment-preserving relation between both rights. And it 
has to endorse this inference and the commitment-preserving relation, because by 
committing to the incompatibility between right and permission, the court is 
committed to infer, from what is explicitly stated, implicit incompatible contents. 
This means that the court starts by taking the explicitly stated right of freedom to 
provide services as a claim that is put forward by the Treaty (an authorised speaker) 
for others to use. This corresponds to the interpersonal use of a claim that was 
studied in Section 3.3: once the original claim is made, the judge (but also anyone 
else) can use it as a premise for his own inferences —since the Treaty’s assertion 505
authorises subsequent ones, the judge can rest on the treaty’s authority to take the 
original right and make further moves with it. 
!
In this case, by way of an intralinguistic movement that starts with the original 
right, the court moves to a right ‘not to have their building sites blocked by unions’; 
but when it does this, the court resorts to its own repertoire of substitutional 
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 The first right is stated in Von Wright’s terms, while the second formulation corresponds to Hohfeld’s: for 504
the latter, the strict correlative relation between right and duty—Hohfeld (1917)—entails that a ‘claim-right 
can never be to do or omit something: it always is a claim that somebody else do or omit something’ (Finnis 
(1972), 380), and this entails, in turn, that rights are to be specified expressively referring to the action whose 
performance or omission constitutes the content of the correlative duty: since there is only a duty not to gag 
me, my right is properly stated as a right not to be gaged, but not as a right to freedom of speech or to speak 
freely (Williams (1956), 1144-5). This has the undesirable consequence of entailing that our usual way of 
stating rights turns to be inadequate: instead of a ‘right of way’, we only have a ‘right not to be prevent from 
passing’; and, in general, we wouldn’t have rights to do things. Von Wright’s understanding of rights allow us 
to conserve the correlation between rights and duties without preventing us from stating rights as rights-to-
do-something, and this is done by breaking the identity between the right’s and the duty’s contents: a right 
arises by the combination of a permission with ‘a prohibition to hinder or prevent the holder of the 
permission from doing the permitted thing’—Von Wright (1963), Ch. V. Here, the right entails a permission 
to its bearer to perform the action that constitutes the content of the right, so a right to pass entails that the 
bearer is permitted to pass, and the correlative duty is stated by the inclusion of the verb ‘prevent’ in its 
content, resulting in a prohibition to prevent passing. If the content of the right refers to an omission by the 
bearer, as it would be the case in the right not to speak, then it entails a liberation from performing the action, 
and the correlative duty is stated including the verb ‘compel’, resulting in a prohibition to compel speaking. 
So when Finnis, defending Hohfeld’s terms, rhetorically asks, ‘what could (logically) be the content of B’s 
correlative duty if A had [per impossible] a claim-right to do (or omit) something?’, the answer that Von 
Wright makes available is found in a duty not to impede or compel: rights enable their bearers to perform or 
omit something, and the correlative duties hinder others from hindering such enablement. Von Wright’s 
model, as it should be obvious by now, has the inverse problem of Hohfeld’s: it cannot appropriately express 
rights that refers to other’s actions or omissions—it would be difficult to state the correlative duty of a right 
‘not to have building sites blocked by unions’. Since Von Wright’s rights are a combination of a permission 
(absence of prohibition) or a liberation (absence of requirement) with a correlative prohibition, and they can 
be translated to Hohfeld’s categories of privilege and duty, it shouldn’t be problematic to endorse a dual 
understanding of rights.
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inferences and uses one of them to index it into the original right asserted in the 
Treaty: the court thus endorses an asymmetric substitutional inference between 
‘freedom to provide services’ and ‘not having its building sites blocked by unions’ 
as a consequence of endorsing a commitment-preserving relation between a ‘right 
of freedom to provide services’ and a ‘right not to have its building sites blocked by 
unions’; and it endorses the latter as a consequence of endorsing an incompatibility 
relation between the law and the Treaty’s right. 
!
Now, this is not to say that the court just jumped from one commitment or right to 
the other, it might even not recognise nor explicitly mention the second one. But 
what matters now is to identify the commitments the court necessarily undertakes 
when declaring an unconstitutionality. In other words, how the court can justify 
such commitment—what other premises it would put forward—is not to be tackled 
here. What matters now is to identify the court’s undertaken commitments, not its 
entitlements; we want to clarify the substitutional inferences that are endorsed by 
claiming an incompatibility between a right and a permission, regardless of the 
correction of those inferences. And since it might not be clear at first sight that the 
court, by committing itself to the incompatibility relation, is implicitly endorsing a 
substitutional inference between ‘freedom to provide services’ and ‘not to have 
their building sites blocked by unions’, some simple examples can be useful: 
suppose a set of two rules, one that grants foreign companies a right to buy national 
mackerel from the state, and one liberates the state from selling fish to anyone. If 
the court undertakes a commitment to the effect that they are incompatible, then the 
court would be inferring a ‘liberation from selling mackerels’ from the ‘liberation 
from selling fish’, and therefore it would be (correctly) undertaking a commitment 
to an asymmetric substitutional inference between ‘mackerel’ and ‘fish’. Notice that 
the same commitment would be undertaken if the court were to take a rule that 
liberates the state from selling dolphins to be incompatible with a right to buy fish 
from the state. These are trivially not incompatible rules, but if a court were to 
undertake a commitment to the effect that they are in fact incompatible, then such 
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court would be (wrongly) undertaking a commitment to an asymmetric 
substitutional inference between ‘fish’ and ‘dolphins’—such court would be 
committed to infer the right that would actually be incompatible with a liberation 
from selling dolphins, i.e., a ‘right to buy dolphins from the state’: such right entails 
that the state is required to sell dolphins, requirement that is incompatible with the 
state being liberated from selling them. It doesn’t matter if the court’s inferences are 
good or bad, the underlying substitutional inferences are consequentially endorsed.  
!
If we move away from deontic statements, the substitutional inference is even 
clearer: suppose that a speaker asserts that ‘J is a dolphin’ and another one claims 
that ‘J is a fish’. If a third player takes both claims to be incompatible, it is because 
she takes that ‘J is a dolphin’ stands in a commitment-preserving relation with ‘J is 
not a fish’, assertion that is obviously incompatible with ‘J is a fish’; and by doing 
this, the third player will be endorsing a substitutional inference between ‘dolphin’ 
and ‘not a fish’. This substitutional inference is correct: ‘p incompatibility-entails q 
just in case everything incompatible with q is incompatible with p’ , and in this 506
example ‘dolphin’ actually entails ‘not a fish’ since everything incompatible with 
‘not a fish’ is incompatible with ‘dolphin’. But notice that the correction of this 
inference is irrelevant to the identification of the undertaken substitutional 
commitments: the same pattern would be replicated if someone takes ‘J is a 
dolphin’ to be incompatible with ‘J is not a fish’: who is committed to the 
incompatibility would be wrong, but he would nevertheless be endorsing a 
substitutional inferential relation between ‘dolphin’ and ‘fish’. The substitutional 
inferences between the contents are endorsed independently of the correction of the 
alleged relation of incompatibility—independently, that is, of the court’s 
entitlement. 
!
In our Laval-based case, if from the right of freedom to provide services, a right not 
to have building sites blocked by unions is not inferred, then the permission to 
 242
 Brandom (2008), 121.506
unions to block building sites is not incompatible with the employer’s right of 
freedom to provide services. On the contrary, if a right to not have building sites 
blocked by unions is inferred from the right of freedom to provide services, then the 
inferred right stands in a committive-preserving relation with its correlative duty, 
i.e. a ‘prohibition to unions to block the employer’s building sites’. Now there is 
shared content between the legal prohibition and the inferred Treaty’s right, so with 
this prohibition at hand the Court endorses an incompatibility relation between the 
Treaty’s right and the legal permission: it cannot both be permitted and forbidden 
‘to unions to block the employer’s building sites’. Throughout these intra-linguistic 
moves, the court has arrived to its minor premise in the legal syllogism: ‘a law that 
allows unions to block the employer’s building sites is incompatible with the 
Treaty’s right of freedom to provide services’, which taken together with the major 
premise that I’ve been using since Chapter 2—‘laws that are incompatible with the 
Treaty’s right to provide services are void’—, commits the court with the following 
conclusion: ‘the law that allows unions to block the employer’s building sites is 
void’. 
!
So, on the basis of the court’s declaration of unconstitutionality we find a 
substitutional commitment between the content of the law and the Treaty’s right. As 
it was shown in Section 3.10, since the court is committed to a substitution 
inference, we can employ a de re ascription to track the undertaken, acknowledged 
and attributed commitments involved on the court’s reasoning and thus identify the 
responsibility that weighs on the court in all of this—we can take the Treaty as the 
speaker and the court as the hearer/ascriber: the speaker claims ‘freedom to provide 
services is a communitarian right’. To this, the hearer replies, in de dicto, ‘the 
speaker claims that not having its building sites blocked by unions is a 
communitarian right’. We can see that there has been a change, for the speaker in 
his assertion never used the expression ‘not having its building sites blocked by 
unions’, but it is not clear whose substitutional inferences are being used to specify 
the content of the attributed commitment. De re ascription solves this:  
!
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The speaker claims of not having its building sites blocked by unions 
that it is a communitarian right.  
!
This is an ascription which the court has committed to, even if it doesn't 
acknowledge it: the court has to be committed to an inference from ‘the right of 
freedom to provide services is a communitarian right’ to ‘not having its building 
sites blocked by unions is a communitarian right’: otherwise the court cannot be 
committed to an incompatibility between the legal permission to block building 
sites and the right of freedom to provide services; and it has to be committed to such 
incompatibility since otherwise it cannot be committed to the voidness of the law at 
issue vis-à-vis to the Treaty’s right of freedom to provide services 
!
Now, with the de re ascription formulated, we can properly distribute the task-
responsibility of vindicating the assertions by means of distinguishing between the 
scope of the preposition of and the scope of the preposition that: first we have the 
content of the commitment that the court has attributed to the Treaty, commitment 
that from the court’s own inferential repertoire is specified as ‘not having its 
building sites blocked by unions is a communitarian right’. The court claims that the 
Treaty has undertaken such commitment subsequentially, for it follows from the 
commitment it explicitly acknowledges—that ‘freedom to provide services is a 
communitarian right’—taken together as a premise together with the court’s own 
substitutional inferential commitments.  
!
But that is not all: since the court is ascribing a commitment to the Treaty, and by 
way of ascriptions commitments are both attributed and undertaken, the ascription 
entails the undertaking of a commitment on the court’s side. By replicating the 
distribution of commitments that was analysed in Section 3.10, regarding the de re 
ascription ‘J claims of “The Preface” that…’ , we can assign responsibilities in the 507
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 Which was based on Brandom’s ascription: ‘the defence attorney claims of a pathological liar that he is a 507
trustworthy witness’. In this case, ‘that someone is a trustworthy witness’ is part of the commitment that is 
attributed by the ascriber; that ‘that individual is in fact a pathological liar’ is part of the commitment that is 
undertaken by the ascriber’.
following way: that ‘something is a communitarian right’ is part of the commitment 
that is attributed by the court; that ‘that something is in fact “not having its building 
sites blocked by unions”’ is part of the commitment that is undertaken by the court
—the possible entitlement to it will be analysed in the next section. 
!
All this can be succinctly expressed in the following terms: the acknowledgement of 
the unconstitutionality commits the court to an incompatibility relation between the 
Treaty’s right and the legal permission; incompatibility that, in turn, commits the 
court to infer from the Treaty’s right a right whose content is incompatible with the 
legal permission, and thus endorses an asymmetric substitutional inference between 
the terms employed by the right and the terms employed by the law. If all this 
follows from the declaration of unconstitutionality, then such declaration is a 
sufficient condition for undertaking all these commitments; and inversely, the 
undertaking of all these commitments is a necessary condition of the declaration. 
This means that the commitments we are identifying by mapping the court’s 
consequential commitments that follow from its declaration of unconstitutionality, 
serve as premises the entitlement to which entitles the court to declare the 
unconstitutionality: a commitment to the incompatibility entails a commitment to 
the substitutional inference; but, it is an entitlement to such substitutional inference 
what entitles the court to be committed to the incompatibility . 508
!
In other words, what has been identified is the content of the commitment whose 
entitlement the court must vindicate— ‘not having their building sites blocked by 
unions is a communitarian right’. I have argued that the court must take such 
content to be entailed or inferred by the Treaty’s explicit rule in which it is 
grounding the unconstitutionality: if the judge claims that a certain piece of 
legislation is unconstitutional in consideration to a constitutional provision, it is by 
such claim committed to the effect that they [the constitutional provision and the 
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antecedent commits us to asserting the consequence’; and moving upwards, a consequence leads to an 
antecedent by way of entitlements—‘asserting the antecedent entitles us to asserting the consequent’— 
Bransen (2002), 385.
legal rule] stand in a relation of incompatibility, for if it took them to be compatible, 
then in what possible sense it can claim that the legal rule is unconstitutional vis-à-
vis that one constitutional rule? What would unconstitutionality even mean if an 
unconstitutional law is understood as being compatible with the constitutional rules 
in which the unconstitutionality is supposedly grounded? So if the court asserts that 
a rule according to which ‘is permitted to unions to block the building sites’ is 
unconstitutional when contrasted to a certain constitutional provision, then it has 
undertaken the commitment that either the explicit content of such constitutional 
rule is incompatible with the law at issue, or that such explicitly formulated content 
entails a propositional content that is incompatible with the law that it takes to be 
unconstitutional. 
!
Since—as we saw in Section 3.3—undertaking a commitment is explained in terms 
of doing something ‘that makes it appropriate to attribute the commitment to that 
individual’ , the court has undertaken such commitment precisely by declaring the 509
unconstitutionality, it undertakes the commitment with the previously specified 
content (that what the Treaty establish as a communitarian right is in fact ‘not 
having its building sites blocked by unions’) regardless of how the court arrives to 
the decision of unconstitutionality, regardless of the way in which it explicitly 
justifies it. 
!
Once the judge’s commitment has been specified—once the assertion in which the 
decision in favour of the unconstitutionality pivots has been identified —, the task is 
to scrutinise the court’s entitlement to such assertion. Only by being entitled to such 
assertion, others that follow from it are authorised, most notably the declaration of 
unconstitutionality itself. The authorisation for subsequent assertions hinges on the 
responsibility to vindicate the entitlement for the antecedent assertions. And the 
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problem that we face is that such vindication cannot consist in a justification, on 
pain of the court’s decision constituting an instance of legislation . 510
!
4.2. The problem of vindication 
  
Having mapped the undertaken commitments by the court, what comes next is 
identifying the conditions in which an entitlement to them hinges. If the court is not 
entitled to its undertaken commitments, then it is not entitled to declare the 
unconstitutionality. What we’ll be analysing are the limits of JRL, and for this, the 
notions of inferences, entitlements and commitments (that we took from the 
discursive practice) have to be interlocked with those of justification and 
application discourses (that we took from our theories of legislation and 
adjudication). The aim is to identify the margins within which a declaration of 
unconstitutionality can be adopted employing judicial resources that would prevent 
the decision from constituting an instance of legislation.  
!
We have seen that the declaration of unconstitutionality rests on the asymmetrical 
substitutional inference between the terms of the Treaty and those employed by the 
law, substitution that can be made explicit in the assertion ‘not having their building 
sites blocked by unions is a communitarian right’, or, as we saw in Section 3.6, by a 
quantified conditional: ‘every employer who has right of freedom to provide 
services has a right not to have building sites blocked by unions’. Since such 
formulation is nowhere to be found in the Treaty, by declaring the 
unconstitutionality the court implicitly or explicitly inferred it from the explicitly 
established right: it took it as a conclusion that follows from a substitutional 
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constitutional-constitutive ones as ’whoever gets more votes is the president’ and a piece of legislation that 
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claims of whoever is appointed by congress that he is not the president’. In this case, by the inclusion of not 
inside the scope of ‘that’, the ascriber is ascribing to the speaker the negation of the property that the latter 
originally predicated of the substituted term.
inference that has the Treaty’s acknowledged right as a premise. By the dual 
pragmatic nature of assertions, this inferred right then serves as a premise from 
which the court arrives to her minor premise in the legal syllogism: the law is 
incompatible with the right of freedom to provide services. This latter assertion, 
taken together with the collateral commitment ‘laws that are incompatible with the 
right of freedom to provide services are void’ leads to the conclusion that asserts the 
voidness of the original legislated rule.  
!
This allows us to present the court’s reasoning according to the following syllogism: 
!
(1) laws that are incompatible with the right of freedom to provide services 
are void, 
!
(2) permitting unions to block building sites is incompatible with the right of 
freedom to provide services. 
!
(3) the law that permits unions to block building sites is void. 
!
While the entitlement to (1) can be vindicated discharging responsibility in the 
Treaty’s authority, entitlement to (2) ultimately hinges on the entitlement to assert 
‘not having their building sites blocked by unions is a communitarian right’. 
!
Now we can connect the judge’s position with the problem to which we arrived 
after the previous chapters: the judge is not entitled to propositions or premises 
regarding which the vindication of the entitlement to them requires to engage in a 
justification discourse—if a vindication for the assertion ‘not having their building 
sites blocked by unions is a communitarian right’ is appropriately required, and the 
only way to satisfy the undertaken task-responsibility is by providing a justification 
discourse, then the judge’s minor premise ‘permitting unions to block building sites 
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is incompatible with the right of freedom to provide services’ is one that demands a 
justification discourse—i.e. one to which it is committed, but not entitled to . 511
!
This means that the very nature of jurisdiction, and its relation with legislation, 
defines the scope of premises that are available for the judge: the entitlement for an 
assertion like the one the judge inferred can be vindicated, in the ordinary discursive 
practice, by putting forward any other claim or set of claims that stand as a premise 
for it; but—as it was argued on the previous chapters—that is not the case when it 
comes to the particular language game of law and legal reasoning: a claim like 
‘there is a right to not have building sites blocked by unions’, if it is going to play a 
role in the definition of legal statuses in general, and in the adjudication process in 
particular, is one that demands a particular justification—a justification discourse: 
this is the only response available that justifies such proposition as one that is to 
define the outcome of a judicial decision. And precisely for that, precisely because 
the justification of those premises—by means of a justification discourse—is 
presupposed at the judicial moment, such form of vindication is not one available 
for the judge: she is playing with discursively justified propositions, and thus is not 
entitled to propositions that are in demand of a justification discourse. Thus, the set 
of available assertions for the judge to employ is not only defined by the 
competence rules that serve to configure its institutional position (i.e., the rules that 
define what can the judge say in a courtroom and when, the ones that establish the 
conditions under which an attribution of culpability or the expiration of term are 
appropriately assert, etc.), but also by the implicit structure of adjudication itself: it 
is this structure what prevents her from using universal propositions that not being 
justified stand in demand of a justification. 
!
The very idea of jurisdiction and the constrainments that constitute it are expressed 
through a curtailment of discursive possibilities, as unavailable premises. While the 
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discharge—Section 3.4.
infringement of competence rules entails the possibility of depriving a judicial 
decision from its ordinary effects, the infringement of these intrinsic rules of 
adjudication prevents the decision from being a properly judicial one. This allows 
us to characterise the role of the judge in the legal discourse in consideration to the 
set of propositions that are available for her and thus define its horizon of possible 
moves within the legal game. And the claims paradigmatically available to her are 
those whose justification lies on application discourses. But, since neither the 
inferred right nor the minor premise of its syllogism refers to any radical particular, 
since they do not have the form of a language-entry transitions, but can only 
correspond to intra-linguistic movements, such a justification is unattainable: there 
are no concrete subjects or interests in which to ground that type of justification. 
!
But not everything is lost, and Alexy’s dispute with Günther gives us the key to 
move forward. As we saw in the previous chapter, Günther claimed that if the judge 
faces a normative conflict between two or more valid (justified) rules, he can assert 
a new rule that deactivates the conflict without having to engage in a justification 
discourse. Alexy replied that such a move was illegitimate, that the new rule does 
stand in need of a justification discourse, unless it is already contained by already 
justified rules. And Alexy is obviously right: any rule whose content is entailed by 
justified rules is to be taken as justified, so the judge is entitled to use it because 
such rule does not demand a new justification. 
!
Relating Alexy’s critique to Günther with Brandom’s distinctions leads us back to 
the different ways in which the responsibility of vindicating can be fulfilled: besides 
justifying the entitlement, alternative that is blocked to the judge regarding 
propositions that demand a justification discourse, the entitlement can also be 
vindicated by appealing to the authority of another speaker . This alternative 512
corresponds to the possibility noticed by Alexy of employing those universal 
propositions that are ‘contained’ or entailed by the already discursively justified 
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ones. Regarding these, the judge is in position to discharge her responsibility on the 
constitution or the Treaty itself—the commitment to them is not one that needs to be 
vindicated by means of a justification, so the entitlement of the judge to employ 
them is not precluded by her institutional position: if the Treaty were to declare that 
the prohibitions established on some annex or previous decision are to be taken as 
constitutive parts of the right of freedom to provide services, and in this other text 
or decision it is established that it is forbidden to unions to block building sites, then 
the court could assert a right to not have building sites blocked by unions and just 
pass the buck to the Treaty. 
!
This explains why the analysis regarding the court’s entitlement cannot be 
circumscribed only to its entitlement to the previously identified minor premise in 
the legal syllogism: just by identifying the court’s commitment to ‘permitting 
unions to block building sites is incompatible with the right of freedom to provide 
services’, we still don’t know if the court is entitled to it or not—despite being a 
universal proposition, if the inferred right from which the minor premise depends 
were to be entailed by other rules of the Treaty then the court would have it at its 
disposal.  
!
But if that is not the case, if the inferred right is a claim for which it is appropriate 
to demand a vindication and the responsibility to provide one cannot be satisfied by 
appealing to the authority of the Treaty itself, then such assertion stands in demand 
of a justification discourse and therefore is not one with which the judge can play in 
the courtroom. However the court reasons in order to explain and justify this right 
to not have building sites blocked, and regardless of how convincing the 
proportionality test is, the conclusion that there is an incompatibility between the 
law and the Treaty is one that would be blocked by its institutional position: if the 
previous arguments are sound, then the unavailability of the conclusion does not 
depend on how well grounded its external justification is, but on its nature. 
!
 251
If this is our problem, then it must be noticed that Brandom’s theory does not 
provide us with a suitable exit through a recourse to objectivity. In the game of 
giving and asking for reasons we assume a distinction between objectivity and 
subjectivity whereby we treat our propositions and concepts as expressions that 
must ‘answer for the ultimate correctness of their application (…) to what actually 
is the case’. So, the game itself grows on the back of a presupposition, that of a 
shared world whose properties are independent from us and thus constrains our 
uses, not just for individuals, but also for the whole community . But the assumed 513
existence of an objective common world, though it provides the reference for the 
notions of correct and incorrect to be meaningful, does not serve the judge: 
‘Conceptual contents, paradigmatically propositional ones, can genuinely be shared, 
but their perspectival nature means that doing so is mastering the coordinated 
system of scorekeeping perspectives, not passing something nonperspectival from 
hand to hand (or mouth to mouth)’ . 514
!
This means that an appeal by the court—or anyone in its defence—to the 
(objective) correction of the inference (from a right of freedom to provide services 
to a right not to have building sites blocked) has no axe to grind against the 
structural lack of entitlement, for even if the way in which the world actually is 
were to define that the inference is correct, any assertion regarding the way in 
which the world really is configured, is a perspectival assertion: while the world 
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must be understood as nonperspectival in a strong sense, there is no nonperspectival 
possibility of talking about it . 515
!
5. A way out 
!
The route out of the judge’s blockage is to be found if we go back to the 
responsibility to vindicate assertions in the general discursive practice. 
!
5.1. Avoiding the regress 
!
Both justification and deferring to another speaker are ways to vindicate an 
assertion that operates by inheriting an entitlement —they show the entitlement to 516
an assertion by relying on a previous one, so neither of them is apt to create an 
original entitlement, and thus the threat of a regress arises (either of assertions or of 
speakers) . 517
!
But the regress problem vanishes once it is noticed, with Wittgenstein, that ‘to use a 
word without justification does not mean to use it without right’ . In other words, 518
our dilemma arises only if it is understood that ‘the default entitlement status of a 
claim or assertional commitment is to be guilty until proven innocent’: the problem 
arises ‘only if the entitlement is never attributed until and unless it has been 
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demonstrated. If many claims are treated as innocent until proven guilty—taken to 
be entitled commitments until and unless someone is in a position to raise a 
legitimate question about them—the global threat of regress dissolves’ . Whether 519
or not a commitment requires to be vindicated—this is, if there is a prima facie 
entitlement to it before a vindication is offered—depends on the social practice. 
There are claims to which the interlocutors are entitled to as a default position. 
Regarding those commitments a question about entitlement can arise, but such 
question is itself in demand of vindication. This is, the challenge has to be 
appropriately made and therefore the responsibility to vindicate an assertional 
commitment is a conditional task-responsibility: ‘It is conditional on the 
commitment’s being subject to a challenge that itself has, either default or by 
demonstration, the status of an entitled performance’. In other words, the 
challenging assertion has no privilege status vis-à-vis the challenged assertion, so 
tracing the provenance of the entitlement of a claim through chains of justification 
is appropriate only ‘where two prima facie entitlements conflict’ . This need to 520
demonstrate an entitlement to the challenging assertion in order to trigger the 
corresponding vindication of a prima facie entitled claim, will be shown to be 
crucial in order to secure universal propositions for the judge. 
!
The eternal regress problem, then, is a false one, for no new answer is always 
required—giving reasons, Wittgenstein claims, comes to an end, one which ‘is not 
certain propositions' striking us immediately as true’ but a form of ‘acting, which 
lies at the bottom of the language-game’ ; and despite the finitude of grounds, 521
Wittgenstein continues, the lack of reasons is not a problem . The bedrock , 522 523
those hinge propositions, do not stand in need of justification, because they 
constitute the basis on which something can stand as justifications or as challenges, 
it configures the secure base that allows doubts to arise in the first place. 
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Analytic propositions play a key role in this; they constitute the most conspicuous 
case of assertions that do not that stand in need of justification: no reason can be 
offered to justify that ‘bachelors are unmarried men’ other than that’s just true 
according to the very meaning of the assertion. Because of this, they configure an 
ideal starting point in the analysis of claims to which we are entitled by default. 
Analytic propositions are to be understood as those that are true by reason of their 
linguistic meaning alone , that are guaranteed in consideration to the meanings 524
they contain . Therefore, ‘a judgement is analytic if the meaning alone is 525
sufficient for the speaker to be acknowledged as being entitled to make the 
proposition in the language game’ . 526
!
From this follows that universal rules whose propositional content corresponds to 
analytical propositions, are rules that the judge is entitled to assert without need of 
justification. The question that now arises is if we can use the theory of analyticity 
in order to extend the scope of justified propositions beyond the originally reduced 
set of analytic truths and thus make more material available to the constitutional 
judge to engage in—our question is whether it is possible to identify analytic 
propositions regarding expressions that employ constitutional rights concepts. 
!
Elizabeth Fricker’s notion of OLOL analyticity is a suitable candidate to the task. 
Being ‘OLOL’ an acronym for ‘our language is our language’, Fricker’s starting 
assumption is that our words cannot escape our control, that the meaning of our 
expressions is a supervenient property of our linguistic practice, and therefore our 
explanation of meaning has to be coherent with our semantic intuitions or common 
sense semantics—distinctions and assumptions that ordinary speakers are disposed 
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to make, statements about definitional synonyms, intuitive semantic notions, etc. ; 527
and the case of analyticity is no exception: that a proposition is analytical also has 
to be dependent on our use of it—if analyticity depends on meaning alone, and 
meaning depends on our practice, then the property of being an analytical 
propositions do not come from outside, but has to be grounded in how we use and 
treat those expressions. 
Within those coordinates, Fricker argues in a clearly Wittgensteinian fashion that 
the links between concepts (and with them, propositions) are schooled when 
learning a language, and a central element of this process corresponds to that of 
learning the platitudes of the common sense semantics. It is on the back of them that 
she will try to put forward a weaker, and thus more malleable notion of analyticity. 
She starts by analysing the properties of philosophically shallow concepts, like 
‘chair’, and argues that even though we might disagree on whether or not chairs 
need to have legs, there is no discussion about them having to have backs; that they 
necessarily have to have them is a modal truth fixed by our linguistic practice of not 
counting backless-seats as chairs. We can translate this into Brandom’s terms by 
saying that while the assertion ‘chairs have legs’ is not one to which we are entitled 
by default, ‘chairs have backs’ is. Our use of the expression in denoting things (we 
use ‘that is a chair’ to denote objects with backs) or the dispositions of common 
sense semantics (we stipulate that chairs have backs) establish a link between 
‘chairs’ and ‘backs’ that authoritatively  fixes what the term ‘chair’ applies to . 528
!
The challenge is to apply this strategy also when it comes to deeper concepts—like 
the ones employed by constitutional provisions. Fricker argues that our practice 
with them consists mainly in their theoretical links to other concepts, and not in 
their application to concrete events: deeper concepts are defined primarily by the 
theoretical commitments to other concepts that speakers uphold with them. In 
inferential terms: not by their role in language-entry transitions but by their intra-
linguistic role in substituting inferential relations. From those theoretical 
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commitments Fricker makes a distinction between primitive constitutive truths 
about a concept and derived ones. The first corresponds to explicitly stated 
platitudes of common-sense semantics that establish a link between the concept at 
issue and others; and ‘as such they are grasped, at least implicitly, by all masters of 
these concepts’ . This first set of links works as axioms that serve to configure an 529
a priori argument, one that ‘picks up certain links as central to the concept’ ; and 530
by taking them a priori—as an ungrounded base—we yield, through argumentation, 
derived constitutive truths. Regarding these latter, Fricker claims that in order to 
identify them we must engage in ‘lengthy and difficult’ arguments, and therefore, 
they ‘are not obvious, and not guaranteed to be implicitly grasped by all masters of 
the concepts’ . 531
!
For Fricker, both derived and primitive propositions can be taken as analytical, 
since they both express truths about a concept that is purely dependent of meaning, 
which in turn rests on the community’s practice. He has extended the scope of 
analyticity, but he has done it at the cost of preventing some analytical propositions 
from being available for the judge: the derived ones are propositions to which we 
can only arrive by means of a theoretical discussion, and that means that the 
entitlement to them has to be vindicated—their truth might be analytical, but it is 
mediated by a process that within our scheme corresponds to a justification 
discourse. This is not necessarily problematic, what is relevant here is the 
possibility of identifying some secured inferences regarding those deep concepts, 
and Fricker’s work does identify two constitutive features of primitive truths that 
provides enough material to move forward: on the one hand, since they express 
what can be taken as an a priori argument, they do not rest on a previous one to 
stand—like hinge propositions they constitute the background against which the 
justificatory process can get off the ground; on the other, they are grasped and 
shared within the discursive community. This characterisation is consistent with the 
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Wittgensteinian notion of blind reactions, with uniform linguistic responses that do 
not rest on argumentation, but, on the contrary, are the basis on whose shoulders the 
argumentation, disagreement and derived ‘truths’ stand. Both lack of reasons and 
shared understanding is taken from Wittgenstein to enrich and extend the notion of 
analyticity. And Fricker’s work, resting on those Wittgensteinian remarks, allow us 
to move in the direction of philosophically deep and constitutionally relevant 
entitled inferences and assertions, the type that could play a role as a premise in JLR 
cases. It is now when Wittgenstein’s work can prove to be a decisive contribution to 
get a better understanding of the role of agreement in our unjustified doings and 
sayings within the discursive practice. 
!
5.3. Wittgenstein on agreement and justification 
!
Wittgenstein’s remarks about acting without reasons or justification but still 
correctly and entitled, serve to intersect the notions of rule-following (and therefore, 
appropriate language use), with the conditions of possibility of knowledge and 
doubt. Regarding the latter, against G.E. Moore  he rejects that it is appropriate to 532
say that one ‘knows’ a proposition like ‘I have two hands’. The reason for this is 
that one knows something as far as one ‘is ready to give compelling grounds’ for 
one’s beliefs, but there cannot be anything like that to put forward in favour of a 
proposition like the one Moore claimed to know: ‘if what he believes is of such a 
kind that the grounds that he can give are not surer than his assertion, then he 
cannot say that he knows what he believes’ . And, as Wittgenstein points out, 533
there is nothing a speaker could be more confident in than the fact that he has two 
hands. For propositions like this, there are no possible reasons to offer, since 
whatever the speaker puts forward in their favour will be another proposition for 
which he is less sure than the one he is trying to back-up. This lack of grounds, 
however, does not lead to skepticism: just as there is no securer base for a 
justification to be presented, the doubt itself that could threaten our certainty is also 
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deprived of a suitable pivot, for it is not just the reason for something what has to 
have a firmer ground than what it is aiming to support, but the challenge too: ‘If the 
true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false’ —we cannot 534
give a reason, but we don’t need to do it either . 535
!
And something similar happens with following a rule and using a concept. 
Wittgenstein needs to escape the regress of interpretations  without falling prey to 536
the image of an unmovable interpretation that works as a logical machine . The 537
key of rule-following is found in the combination of ungrounded, immediate 
responses with the notions of custom and practice —it is the connection of both 538
features what will lead Wittgenstein to a position similar to Brandom’s: there is 
normativity, but not independent of our practices; or, in McDowell’s terms: ‘a 
performance can be an application of a concept only if it owes allegiance to 
constrains that the concept imposes (…) And being governed by such constraints is 
not being led, in some occult way, by an autonomous meaning (the super rigid 
machine) but acting within a communal custom’ .  539
!
So, what matters to us is the way in which being governed by rules and concepts, 
being a proper language player, requires training and immediate-unjustified 
responses, as much as agreement in action. It is in the appropriate articulation of 
these features where lies the possibility of unjustified propositions to which both 
speakers in general and judges in particular are entitled, thus providing an exit to 
the regress problem of vindication and the structural impossibility of employing 
universal propositions in the adjudicative moment. The focus is on ‘the importance 
 259
 Wittgenstein (1969), 205.534
 See Baldwin (2017), 140.535
 Wittgenstein (1958), 198.536
 Wittgenstein (1958), 193.537
 McDowell, (1984), 342.538
 McDowell (1984), 352.539
of primitive natural responses shaped through training and other forms of 
conditioning’ . 540
!
For Wittgenstein, being trained in a custom is not mechanically acquiring an 
immediate disposition to do something when faced to certain stimulus : my 541
training leads me to a reaction, but such training amounts to something more than a 
causal (not-normative) explanation: ‘a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as 
there exists a regular use of sign-post, a custom’ . Obeying a rule is a custom, 542
something that can only be done if it is embedded in a practice and relies on 
primitive, natural responses that are shaped through training . We are thus trained 543
to react in a certain way, and this is done in the context of a communal agreement 
among others that have been trained in the same way : if someone were to ask me 544
‘What time is it?’ I would just look at my watch and tell him—my answer (as 
anyone else’s in my position) wouldn't require any justification nor ‘inner process 
of laborious interpretation; I simply react’ , and we will all agree that I was 545
entitled to my answer. 
!
This is easily connected with Fricker’s analyticity—we could claim that, given a 
common training, some movements and transitions will be shared (i.e., Fricker’s 
primitive propositions). It is regarding these explicit saying that Wittgenstein 
claims: ‘It is of the greatest importance that a dispute hardly ever arises between 
people about whether the colour of this object is the same as the colour of that (…) 
And one must say something analogous about proceeding according to a rule. No 
dispute breaks out over the question whether a proceeding was according to the rule 
or not (…) This belongs to the framework, out of which our language works’ . 546
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This could move us into taking as prima facie entitled assertions those sayings on 
which we agree as a consequence of a shared training and for which we offer no 
justification. 
!
But Wittgenstein’s remarks allow looking for a deeper agreement, one that can be 
aptly explained by Brandom’s work. When the latter argues that ‘claims such as 
“there have been black dogs” and “I have ten fingers” are ones to which 
interlocutors are treated as prima facie entitled’ , the relevant feature for their 547
status is not that they constitute shared sayings, but they are treated in a certain way. 
There is some crucial doing underlying our shared inferences. Brandom’s remark 
about the essential normative nature of linguistic behaviour is one that would have 
easily been subscribed by Wittgenstein: this rulishness ‘is taken in the first instance 
to be lived in what the linguistic community does’ . In Brandom’s inferential 548
model, agreement among speakers regarding the meaning of ‘that is a black car’ is 
agreement in what follows from it and what it follows from ; and for both him and 549
Wittgenstein such consensus of opinion supervenes on a consensus in a particular 
kind of doing: that of judging the assertion as appropriate under those conditions 
and of judging that some other assertions appropriately follow from it. This points 
us to understand that the object of our training-based agreement, which for 
Wittgenstein constitutes the base of language’s normativity, stands below what we 
explicitly say—it is at that deeper level that agreement turns into custom and 
becomes cousin of rule : the possibility of taking someone’s assertions and use 550
them to make our own, rests on an agreement ‘not only in definitions but also 
(queer as this may sound) in judgments’ . For Wittgenstein, below the explicit 551
agreement in meaning that we experience when we communicate, we find an 
agreement in doings, i.e., in judgements. And Brandom’s notion of default 
entitlement can appropriately express those shared judgements to which 
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Wittgenstein is referring: it is our taking some moves as prima facie correct, our 
judgement to the effect that the speaker is entitled to them, what allows the process 
to start in the first place—and that’s a doing, not a saying, in which we agree. 
!
We’ve seen that Brandom’s defaulty entitled assertions rests on them being treated 
as such, but he claims that the only thing that is shared by players is the structure of 
scorekeeping —i.e., a capacity to navigate, traverse and ‘specify contents from 552
different points of view’ . The grounding agreement, the one that matters to him is 553
just the underlying one about the practice of scorekeeping itself—what is 
fundamental is the shared structure that relates deontic statuses as the ‘counters in 
terms of which discursive score is kept, and the deontic attitudes, whose adoption 
and alteration constitute the activity of scorekeeping’ . But if agreement is 554
circumscribed only to a common structure in which we asses and make moves, then 
explaining a collective treatment within the practice becomes problematic. Such 
collective dimension, however, can be supplemented by Wittgenstein trained-based 
agreement: Brandom’s notion of collectively treating some moves in a privileged 
way is explained in terms of Wittgenstein’s notion of a common training that 
renders agreement in judgement. And this Wittgensteinian judgement, in turn, can 
be explained in terms of Brandomnian deontic attitudes—not as agreement in 
sayings and opinions, but as agreement in treating both sayings and opinions as 
prima facie entitled. Our common training, then, is not aimed to produce just 
converging explicit answers, more importantly, we implicitly agree on the entitled 
status of some performances—it is semantics answering to pragmatics. So—with 
Wittgenstein—on the bedrock what we find ‘is not a consensus of opinion’ but ‘a 
consensus of doing the same thing’ , and this doing includes, besides shared 555
sayings, shared attitudes about the prima facie entitlement to certain movements. It 
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is only because of those shared judgements that we can act, in some cases, 
blindly . 556
!
And it is crucial to notice that both levels of agreement do not have to stand in 
pristine correlation: we can make sense of someone who, having been trained in the 
linguistic community, would agree on the fact that certain claims are taken in 
practice as prima facie entitled ones, but that is not herself committed to those 
claims—e.g., a radical defender of animal’s rights that doesn’t refer to apes as 
‘animals’, but as ‘persons’, can nevertheless recognise that calling them ‘animals’ is 
an entitled performance. If we look at her responses at the superficial level of 
sayings, we would find disagreement; but at the deeper level of judgement she can 
still take the asymmetrical substitutional inference from ‘ape’ to ‘animal’ as one 
that is prima facie entitled—even if she doesn’t endorse it. As long as the speaker 
avoids collapsing the way in which inferences are treated in the discursive practice 
with the way she herself treats them, i.e., with her own deontic attitudes, the 
superficial disagreement does not endanger the prima facie entitlement. And, as we 
saw in Section 3.11 about objectivity, avoiding these conflations is secured by the 
capability of adopting an internal third-person perspective regarding her discursive 
attitudes. This will allow the disagreeing speaker to map her substitutional 
inferences with those of others that explicitly say things she doesn’t: when someone 
else asserts that ‘apes are animals’, since she recognises that assertion as a prima 
facie entitled one, she will be capable of crossing the doxastic gap by indexing the 
speaker’s claim with her own repertoire of substitutional inferences. It is at this 
level where Fricker’s constitutive truths ‘are grasped, at least implicitly, by all 
masters of these concepts’ . Thus, prima facie entitled claims are not those that 557
are shared by all speakers jointly, but those to which interlocutors are jointly treated 
as prima facie entitled. 
!
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Since an entitlement to them is sharedly recognized, and it is sharedly recognised 
because of a common training of taking them as entitled movements (a custom), 
when we assert them we do not need to offer justifications and we can just say ‘this 
is simply what we do’ . This is how these claims lay the basis for subsequent 558
doubts: we can make sense of a doubt regarding if some particular object is ‘black’ 
because we share a common basis of what ‘black’ is—we have been taught, when 
faced with a crow or a piece of coal, that they are black. It is in contrast to those 
shared unjustified instances that disagreement can be meaningful. And the same is 
true, mutatis mutandis, when it comes to intra-linguistic movements: to move form 
‘there is a crow’ to ‘there is something black’, or to assert ‘crows and coil are black’ 
are also entitled movements by default. The argument is thus threefold: from a 
deeper agreement regarding the practice of scorekeeping and judgements (structure 
and doings), we cash out an agreement regarding undoubted, explicit linguistic 
moves (asserting), and the grasp of them constitutes the entry point to the game of 
disagreeing and doubting if some other moves are acceptable.  
!
Now, since language is not as rigid as logic , there will be disagreements about the 559
status of both some language-entry transitions and—in what is key for JRL—intra-
linguistic movements. But those disagreements imply that our ‘judgments in 
straightforward cases’ are correct : some things need to stand unshakeably fast for 560
others to be ‘more or less liable to shift’ .  561
!
None of this means that these entitled assertions cannot be challenged, and if that 
were the case a vindication could become necessary. But, as we saw at the 
beginning of this section, since a challenge is just another assertion, it requires an 
entitlement too. Therefore, unless the challenge also corresponds to a prima facie 
entitled claim, the need to vindicate the prima facie entitlement is conditional on the 
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challenging assertion being demonstrated as an entitled performance . And this 562
connects with the judge’s situation, since now the curtailment of discursive 
possibilities plays in favour of the court: demonstrating the entitlement to the 
challenging assertion could only be grounded on a justification discourse. And since 
this kind of demonstration is structurally impeded to take place at the judicial 
moment, the status of the prima facie entitled claim is thus secured—this cannot 
become a challenged assertion in the adjudicatory stage. 
!
What we can take from this is that the default status of being entitled does not need 
to be reduced to the shallow concepts typically related to analyticity, that it can be 
extended to include some movements regarding politically contested expressions. If 
this is the case or not, depends on the discursive practice of the community, on how 
we treat some assertions regarding equality, freedom or dignity. And this practice 
includes—although it is obviously not reducible to—the constitutional debate itself. 
!
6. Living constitutionalism 
!
These last remarks direct us towards the role of constitutional tradition in the 
configuration of our constitutional commitments. A way to understand this role is 
proposed by the approach of the living constitutionalism: in its different modalities, 
the underlying idea is that our debates on constitutional rights commit us beyond 
what the constitution explicitly establishes, and if these commitments undertaken 
throughout the constitutional history are given constitutional status, then they can 
grant entitlements to assertions that are not included in the constitutional text. 
!
The first challenge in this route is to identify what is to be counted as part of the 
tradition that serves to develop the constitutional commitments. David Strauss, 
endorsing the common law model, defends that the relevant history is that written 
by the USSC in its rulings . For Jack Balkin, on the other hand, the proper way to 563
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understand constitutional provisions is by looking at the general activity of all 
governmental branches, implemented policies and, in general, state-building 
constructions by political branches that are later ratified by the judiciary . And the 564
same is true with Barry Friedman and Scott Smith: they claim that the actions of all 
those who have an official role in interpreting the constitution is to be taken into 
account . In Bruce Ackerman’s approach, constitutional commitments arise from 565
successive cycles of popular sovereignty  in which The People expresses itself 566
through an irregular and assumed privilege of proposing informal and unauthorised 
propositions. These forms of ‘constitutional politics’, configured by a series of 
decisive victories sustained in intense political debate and mass mobilisation, allow 
the representatives to speak—in name of the people and through ‘legally imperfect 
bodies whose anomalous nature renderers their actions legally doubtful’ —a 567
higher law from all three branches . So it is on the back of informal manifestations 568
of popular will that landmark statutes and superprecedentes crystallise fix points in 
the constitutional tradition and become equivalent to formal amendments , 569
achieving a constitutional change beyond the scope of Art. V. of the Constitution 
(the constitutional rule of change) and thus constituting an operational cannon that 
exceeds the official one configured by the text of the constitution and its formal 
amendments . Constitutional moments can therefore be understood as 570
instantiating the amendment rules that belong to the operational cannon: a 
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1779.), but by doing this he is impeded to simultaneously recognise The People the power to stand above the 
constitutional court, to enact a new constitutional principle according to which the court is devoid of such 
faculty.
To grasp the difficulty that this endeavour must overcome, we could start by 
accepting the living constitution approach to superprecedents: we could accept that 
Brown is now part of the constitution itself, being committed to attribute to the 
constitution that no segregation is compatible with equality, that any differentiated 
treatment between black and white people is void, and—even more—that the same 
stands for any race differentiation. But what do those commitments mean when it 
comes to an equality case not related with racial differentiation? The answer 
requires to attend the distinction between the commitments to which a speaker 
would be entitled and those to which such speaker would be committed as a 
consequence of committing to the new constitutional claim ‘no differentiated 
treatment between races is compatible with the constitution’. This new 
constitutional commitment surely would commit us to declare unconstitutional a 
law that imposes an especially burdensome treatment to members of a certain race, 
but when it comes to a law that distinguishes between, say, nationals and foreigners, 
things are not that simple. 
!
Suppose now that besides Brown, other super precedents about discrimination 
become constitutional law, and so now the constitution forbids differentiated 
treatment based on race, but also gender, sexual orientation and language. We could 
then look at what is common to all those commitments and understand that the 
constitution does not accept legal differences based on qualities that are not 
controllable by the subject that would be receiving an especially burdensome 
treatment. By doing this we are engaging in the type of reasoning that is expressed 
through inductive inferences, for the move that we are making is an attempt to 
‘make explicit, in a form that can be thought or said, what is implicit in what is 
done’ . 571
!
The weakness of this process is that, as we saw in Section 3.2, inductive inferences 




entitle one to commitment to their conclusions (in the absence of countervailing 
evidence) but do not compel such commitment. For the possibility of entitlement to 
commitments incompatible with the conclusion is left open’. In this way, if all the 
previous rulings are taken as establishing new constitutional commitments, then we 
would actually be committed to the claim ‘it is forbidden to establish differentiated 
treatment based on race, gender, sexual orientation and language’; but when it 
comes to a novel case that does not tap on previously identified categories, we find 
that this commitment only entitles to claim that ‘it is forbidden to establish 
differences based on qualities that are not chosen’—it does not commit us to it, 
since it is compatible with understanding that differences based on nationality or 
VIH risk are justified :  573
!
one can be (taken to be) entitled to claims one is not (taken to be) 
committed to—these are conclusions one is entitled to draw but 
has not yet committed oneself to. In this way one may be entitled 
to each of two mutually incompatible claims, so long as neither 
has been endorsed and commitment to it undertaken. Either 
conclusion by itself could be defended, though one would cease to 
be entitled to it if already committed to the conclusion of the other 
argument . 574
!
The problem is replicated if we adopt a broader view and focus not just on 
particular decisions of the supreme court, but on the whole constitutional history. 
Suppose that we ignore ‘the contestability of history’  and just rightly assume that 575
the relevant bits of our tradition include the expansion of voting rights to black 
people and women, accepting them in universities, establishing policies of 
affirmative action in favour of minorities and natives, de-criminalising 
homosexuality and allowing same-sex marriage. Now we need to provide an 
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assertion that allows us to describe all these events as instances of a regularity , 576
but such description would only be available to the judge if the transition from 
observing those events to asserting the relevant description were to correspond to 
prima facie entitled language-entry transition—it would have to be as undisputed as 
it is to claim ‘that is a black car’ when we observe a black car. It is easy to advert 
why this is problematic: it is unlikely that a description of those events that is 
ecumenical enough to constitute a prima facie entitled assertion would constitute a 
commitment whose content is sufficiently precise to ground by itself, without 
resorting to further premises, the unconstitutionality of a law that establishes a 
differentiated and burdensome treatment to novel subjects: we could look back and 
claim that ‘we are committed to an expansion of rights in favour of oppressed 
groups’. But what follows from such commitment regarding novel cases regarding 
foreigners coming from war-zones or LGBT+ adoption.? We would be more or less 
in the same position as we would be if we were discussing directly about dignity or 
freedom or equality and their relationship with our current constitutional questions. 
So even if we accept the demands of living constitutionalism and grant 
constitutional hierarchy to the previous steps in our emancipatory struggle (and 
assuming that we can identify this steps without resource to a justification 
discourse), we will obtain through induction a constitutional entitlement to further 
moves, but that will not entitle us to claim that the constitution has undertaken those 
commitments sub-sequentially. 
!
7. Tradition and constitutional meaning 
!
To properly understand the role of history in constitutional change, without falling 
into the problems and dilemmas that have been noticed, the events that constitute 
the constitutional tradition cannot be taken as instantiating the terms of a rule that 
defines the conditions for the modification of the constitution. And, as we just saw, 
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it is also unworkable to employ inductive reasoning to frame those constitutional 
events in propositions and then assign them constitutional status.  
!
The route that we should follow in order to explain the role of constitutional history 
is a different one: constitutional tradition is to be understood as part of the 
discursive practice in which the very meaning of constitutional rights and rules in 
general arises.  
!
Time, and the political and constitutional debates and decisions that extend through 
it, alter the net of inferences that define the meaning of freedom, equality, privacy, 
dignity and all other concepts that are employed and debated in constitutional 
discussions . Landmark legislations or super precedents are not to be taken as 577
constitutional amendments, as explicit or formal changes in the constitutional order, 
nor as part of the operational constitution. But in absence of such constitutional 
recognition, they have still changed the way in which we speak of discrimination or 
privacy, and that’s a change in meaning. Ackerman rightly points out that ‘our 
constitution’s explicit commitments to the institutions of contract, private property, 
and state’s rights remain textually intact despite the retreat of the Old Court before 
the New Deal in the 1930’s’; but from that obvious remark he infers that the 
meaning of those terms must remain intact, and this leads him to the conclusion that 
any interpretation that tries to ‘avoid revealing these classic constitutional texts as 
hostile to the pretensions of the nationalistic welfare state of the last half-century’  578
has to be fraudulent. With Brandom and with Wittgenstein, we can reply that this is 
simply not true: we don’t need to constitutionalise the New Deal to acknowledge 
that it effected a change in the constitutional scenario—regardless of any formal 
recognition of it, the 30’s modified the way in which Americans understand private 
property (what is incompatible with it). 
!
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With Brown it is probably clearer. Because of that decision, and the debates that 
precede it and still continue, now we do recognise a prima facie inferential relation 
of incompatibility between discrimination and ‘segregating students by race’. This 
means that the very meaning of equality has changed through time, and 
constitutional debates about it have been part of its development; it is in that sense 
that Brown is constitutionally relevant, not as if the constitution now has a new 
explicit rule that asserts ‘impeding black people from entering schools is 
incompatible with equality’, but as part of the discourse that implicitly establishes 
an incompatibility relation between equality and segregation. Instead of 
problematising the constitutional status of a precedent, a piece of legislation or 
instances of intense political activity—status which is dependent on the content of 
existing constitutional rules—the focus is shifted to the way in which those legal 
decisions and political actions alter how we speak about the contents of 
constitutional provisions, including the set of entitled assertions. So even if Brown 
was not justified at the time, it was still part of the debate that defined the meaning 
of equality. No explicit recognition is required to change the discursive status of 
expressions that were used to refer to African Americans, much less to identify the 
set of events through which those changes took place. Our discursive practice 
simply modified the meaning of those terms up to the point in which a speaker is no 
longer entitled to call a black woman as they used to be called in the 30’s. Here we 
see why it is crucial that prima facie entitlements do not correspond to inferences 
shared by all speakers jointly: radical Trumpists that do not call themselves racists 
can claim that keeping blacks segregated is not discriminatory, but they would still 
treat the inference from segregation to discrimination, or the claim ‘segregation is a 
form of discrimination’ as one to which speakers are, as a matter of social practice, 
entitled—even if they don’t endorse it, they would acknowledge that this claim is 
treated as such. 
!
Let us go back to the constitutional judge’s position to see how this translates to 
him: I argued that the set of assertions to be vindicated by means of a deferral and 
the set of assertions to be vindicated by means of a justification, are not jointly 
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exhaustive—not every universal proposition that is not entailed by the constitution 
stands in demand of a justification, since a justification is a way to live-up to the 
responsibility to vindicate an assertion if such vindication is needed. In other words, 
some universal assertions have to be vindicated by means of a justification 
discourse, others by means of a deferral and some others just don’t need to be 
vindicated at all—only the first set is blocked to the judge. 
!
The constitutional tradition serves to define the contours of this latest set, to alter it 
by way of its decisions—not in the sense of an explicit legal rule that defines what 
is to be taken as constitutive of discrimination, but as part of the context in which 
the term obtains its meaning. If a legal rule were to establish a prohibition to 
members of a certain race or gender to become students in a university, such law 
would justifiably be declared unconstitutional, and that would not count as an 
instance of legislation, since its underlying premise would be one to which every 
speaker is entitled: ‘there is a right not to be excluded form educational 
establishments in consideration to race or gender’—this one just follows from the 
explicit constitutional commitment to equality. The judge does not need to vindicate 
this claim, it is no longer one that stands in demand of a justification discourse and 
thus is entitled to use it. An assertion like that has become part of those claims that 
now a speaker can assert as an immediate and share response within the discursive 
community. A commitment to equality is today incompatible with a commitment to 
segregation; and that is an achievement that can be attributed in part to decisions as 
Brown. 
!
8. Meaning and reasons in JRL 
!
The consequences of this last observation are twofold: on the one hand, it does open 
the door, within JRL cases, to a broader set of legitimate inferences that employ 
universal propositions. Constitutional debates are in no way the only factor, but they 
do contribute to settle the status of some claims regarding the expressions employed 
by constitutional rights clauses. But, on the other, it serves to establish the core of 
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the problem for the court in JRL cases, the caveat to the previous silver lining. 
Unlike ordinary contexts of discourse, the legal system in general and the judicial 
subsystem in particular deals mainly with disagreements, so if a query about the 
relation between ‘freedom to provide services’ and a right ‘to block building sites’ 
goes to the constitutional court, then it is quite unlikely that there is an extended 
agreement regarding what such relation is—the case probably wouldn’t end up in 
court otherwise. While it is true that the prima facie status of some claims about 
minorities’ right, women’s role in public life, cruel punishments and other, has 
changed over time, the already answered questions are not the ones that are usually 
asked today. And in the scheme that is defended here, the court is in a sense 
impeded to provide a new answer but can only restate what is already justified . 579
Even more, the type of concepts and expressions that are usually at the center of 
constitutional cases (the content of constitutional and international rights and 
provisions) is likely to be more disputed than the average assertions with which we 
ordinary play—‘essentially contested concepts’ they’ve been called , so we 580
should expect that the scope of the agreement regarding prima facie entitled 
inferences with freedom of association, cruelty, equality or dignity is smaller than 
the one we find when we debate in the ordinary discursive practice. 
!
Taking these considerations to our Laval-based case leaves us with an answer that is 
to be celebrated, for it means that it is quite unlikely that we agree on taking as 
entitled the inference from a right of freedom to provide services to a right not to 
have building sites blocked by unions. But if the situation were inverted, and 
workers were to claim that some regulation infringes their right to engage in 
industrial action, it would be they who would receive a disappointing decision. 
!
This is why judicial deference is not to be taken as an external constraint to the 
adjudicatory function in JRL cases, but as a consequence that follows from its 
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intrinsic features—the court can only ring the bells that still ring, so it is 
structurally impeded to use the premises that a declaration of unconstitutionality 
usually requires: if the premise needed to declare a legal rule void is not within the 
judge’s grasp, then he simply cannot declare the unconstitutionality and the law 
status will remain unchanged. This means that if the constitutional review system 
takes a law as valid unless its unconstitutionality is declared, then the structural 
impossibility of the judge to employ the premise that would ground its decision 
against the law entails the subsistence of its validity. These rules that distribute the 
default status of laws are the ones that perform the function of ‘risk management’ 
regarding the unavailability of premises, and also the ones that define what is the 
status of a piece of legislation that (unlikely as it is) stand in an incompatibility 
relation with a constitutional provision and at the same time in a commitment-
preserving relation with another. 
!
There is a richness in our discussions about these subjects, richness that is 
constituted precisely by our debates and the reasons that we can put forward to 
support our conclusions. But such openness is not available from the judicial seat, 
for its position is configured to be filled with language-entry transitions, to try to 
cope with the irreducibility of the concrete and particular. In JRL none of these 
sources of discursive value are within the court’s reach: there are no particulars to 
engage with and, at the same time, the available intra-linguistic moves are reduced 
to those few that do not need to be justified. The reduction of alternatives that 
characterises JRL is therefore twofold: first, the institutional frame of adjudication 
is never filled with particularity, and second, the court is left just with basic, prima 
facie entitled linguistic moves to make. To grasp the magnitude of this discursive 
curtailment, the reduction of possible moves can be expressed in inferential 
semantic terms: since the meaning of an expression is constituted by its inferential 
net, by its role as premise or conclusion in inferences, in JRL the very meaning of 
our constitutional commitments is radically impoverished—and with this, the 
possibility to understand judicial context as one in which we engage in the practice 
of giving and asking for reasons is cut at the root: curtailment of meaning is 
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curtailment of reasons. So much for the ‘forum of principle’ —for the court as 581
‘exemplar of public reason’ . The opposite is the case: an inappropriate way to 582
address constitutional issues, one deprived from key premises, is the only possible 
one for the judge to decide without becoming a constitutional legislator and thus 
living up to the promise of offering a judicial answer. The corollary we finally 
arrive serves to make explicit our predicament: either we give up the idea of 
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